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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

When employee dishonesty and resulting third-party claims are known to a

financial institution insured by a "discovery" bond, can the insured artificially postpone its
"discovery" of dishonesty for months until a new "discovery" bond, with higher coverage
limits, has been purchased, and then claim to have "discovered" the dishonesty within the
new bond period, all in violation of contract clauses that expressly define discovery and that
preclude coverage on the new bond as to the dishonest employee?
2.

In admittedly rewriting terms in a fidelity bond which govern coverage, in

artificially restricting the parties' chosen definition of "discovery", and in rejecting universal
precedent regarding the bond's termination clause, did the Majority Opinion violate this

Court's established precedent for contract enforcement, generate important state law issues
that should be resolved by this Court, and create incentives that will adversely affect Utah
financial institutions.

REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals below, Home Savings and Loan

Association v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. (Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1991), is
attached at tab 1.

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on August 6, 1991. This

Petition is timely, within the extension allowed by this Court. Jurisdiction to review by Writ
of Certiorari is proper under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended). Aetna's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is based on those grounds approved in Rules 46(b), (c), and
(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The issues raised in this Petition are vital public policy questions of first impression
in this jurisdiction.

Resolution of the issues will have profound, far-reaching impact on the
- 1 -

financial institutions and insurance companies doing business in this state.

The Majority

Opinion runs directly counter to better-reasoned opinions from other jurisdictions that have
addressed the specific fidelity bond at issue here, and it contradicts this Court's leading
precedents for contract enforcement in the State of Utah.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS

No provisions of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Annotated, or other regulations
are determinative of the issues in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This lawsuit concerns enforcement of standardized fidelity bond contracts that

indemnify Utah financial institutions for certain employee dishonesty losses that are
discovered within the effective period of the bond.

Home Savings and Loan Association

("Home") seeks to recover on such a bond issued by The Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
("Aetna").

Home's bond claim is generally referred to as a "third-party" dishonesty claim,
meaning that Home's request for indemnity from Aetna arose from accusations of employee

dishonesty contained in a lawsuit by a third-party (here, Home's borrowers). Specifically,
customers sued Home (and recovered) for frauds in loan transactions that occurred between

November, 1981 and January, 1982. Home blamed the frauds on a single employee named

Larry Glad, and sought fidelity bond recovery. Although Home was bonded by Fidelity &
Deposit of Maryland (F&D) when the frauds occurred and when Home was sued by its

customers, Home's suit is for recovery on a larger bond that it later bought from Aetna,
seven months after it had fired the dishonest employee (Larry Glad), and months after it had
been sued by the customers.

-2 -

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURTS BELOW

In the case below, Home alleged that in a previous suit entitled Armitage v. Home
Savings and Loan Association, it had been adjudged guilty of various frauds on 36 separate
loans.

Attributing all of its violations to the alleged dishonesty of its employee, Home

sought indemnity under Aetna's bond for the Armitage judgment and for Home's costs in
defending that consolidated case.
Aetna answered that the dishonesty had been discovered within the bond period prior

to Aetna's because the Armitage case, which was the key to Home's claim, had been filed
and served on Home in the period when Home was insured by F&D. Knowing that Aetna's
bond covered only dishonesty "discovered" within Aetna's bond period, and knowing that

F&D had insured Home under an identical Standard Form 22 bond for dishonesty
"discovered" within the prior F&D bond period, Aetna sought to join F&D as a party, but
was not allowed to do so.

Aetna also answered that under Section 11, its bond had never

gone into effect for Larry Glad, because of his known dishonesty.
Although the jury answered special interrogatories confirming that Home had known

of Larry Glad's dishonesty prior to the inception of Aetna's bond, the trial court entered

judgment against Aetna on November 2, 1988 in a total amount of $1,977,505.27, plus court
costs and prejudgment interest. Timely appeal followed.

On August 6, 1991, the Court of

Appeals issued a forty-one page Majority Opinion affirming the trial court. Court of Appeals
Judge Russell Bench wrote a thirty page Dissenting Opinion, extensively addressing the two
issues on which Aetna now petitions for review.
The Majority Opinion rejected Aetna's reliance on a bright line test in a Rider to the
bond, which defines "discovery" in third-party claim situations as occurring no later than the
date on which Home is sued by a third-party alleging any employee dishonesty.

The

Majority Opinion also rejected Aetna's reliance on Section 11 (the "prior termination"
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clause) which voids the bond ab initio as to Larry Glad, about whom Home already had

knowledge of dishonesty at the inception of the Aetna bond.
The Dissent correctly urged judgment for Aetna as a matter of law on the "discovery"
and "prior termination" issues that are the basis for this Petition. Although other issues were
tried and appealed below, this Petition concerns only (1) whether coverage is triggered by the
per se_ "date-of-suit" definition of "discovery" contained in the bond (which places the loss in
the prior F&D bond period), or by the Majority's judicially created coverage trigger, which
relies on a date-of-verdict test that postpones discovery until Aetna's bond period; and (2)
whether Home's knowledge of Larry Glad's dishonesty, seven months before Aetna's bond
was purchased, precluded coverage under the "prior termination" clause.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Third-Party Dishonesty Claims

At the root of this case are 36 loan transactions in which Home violated state and

federal securities statutes and committed common law fraud between November, 1981 and

January,

1982.

210.70-210.76).

(See Special

Verdict Form,

Armitage v.

Home

Savings.

R.

at

Home's borrowers in those loans invested their loan proceeds in

interrelated companies ("AFCO") controlled by Grant Affleck, whose financial empire

quickly collapsed in March, 1982. These AFCO investors avoided their obligation to repay
their loans to Home, and actually recovered money from Home, by proving Home's illegal
loan practices, in multiple fraud suits that were consolidated as Armitage v. Home Savings.
Id. An employee involved in the loans, Larry Glad, was fired by Home on December 29,
1981, for dishonestly taking $15,000 from AFCO during these loan transactions.

(See

Stipulated Pretrial Order, R. at 719-771 [copy attached at tab 2], and jury answer to Special
Interrogatory No. 8 [copy attached at tab 3]).
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The Timing Of The Third-Party Accusations
And Of The Aetna and F&D Bonds

The kinds of illegalities and irregularities that caused the loans to be voided became

extensively known to Home during the six months (January to June, 1982) after the loans

were made and when Home was insured by F&D. By June, 1982, the AFCO investor loans
were delinquent, loss reserves had been established by Home and noted by federal regulators,
borrowers had rescinded or sought to rescind the loans because of the illegalities, and certain
plaintiff AFCO investors who ultimately collected from Home in the Armitage judgment had
already filed their suits against Home.

at 719-771).

(R. at 200-200.20; and Stipulated Pretrial Order, R.

The F&D bond was in place throughout this intense activity to cover any

dishonesty discovered in that bond period.

The F&D bond had standard clauses providing

that if a third-party dishonesty claim were received during the F&D bond period, that bond

would remain open for coverage as to that discovered dishonesty for as long as it took for
the third-party claim to be litigated.

On June 21, 1982, F&D's bond expired and was replaced by Aetna's bond, which
contained the same industry standardized terms but higher coverage limits.

(R. at 725).

When the Aetna bond was purchased, Home did not tell Aetna about the suits pending since
April 1982 (consolidated as Armitage v. Home Savings) and for which Home later sought
recovery from Aetna. (R. at 726). Home did eventually give notice to Aetna and F&D in

December, 1982, six months after the Aetna bond had been purchased, but long before any
verdict was rendered in Armitage:.

The jury verdict against Home (used below by the

Majority Opinion as the coverage trigger) was not rendered until almost two years later on
August 14, 1984.

(R. at 727).

Judgment was not entered on that verdict for another

eighteen months, on February 24, 1986 (R. at 727), by which time Aetna's bond had expired
(R. at 725) and Home had begun coverage under another standardized discovery bond from
yet a third bond carrier.

Judgment for the Armitage plaintiffs' attorneys' fees was not

entered for yet another six months, until August 24, 1986 (R. 210.70-210.76).
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The Governing Contract Clauses

Both F&D and Aetna insured Home through industry standardized Form 22 Savings
and Loan Blanket Bonds, with identical language on all pertinent points.

(Tr. Exs. 343 and

116 respectively. [Copy of Aetna's bond Ex. 343, attached at tab 4]). The preamble of each
bond limits the coverage to loss that is discovered within the bond period. The bond's Rider
SR 6091 (also attached as tab 4), defines an insured's "discovery" of loss objectively as
when the insured learns of "facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume a

loss . . . has been or will be incurred," but with particular regard to third-party claims such
as Armitage, Rider 6091 established per se discovery no later than when the insured receives
"notice . . . of an actual or potential claim by a third-party" alleging employee dishonesty.
(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 25).

Section 11 of the F&D and Aetna bonds also each terminate coverage as to any
particular employee once the insured learns of any dishonesty by that employee. Section 11
of each bond terminates coverage for an employee such as Larry Glad "as soon as the
Insured shall learn of any dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of such Employee. ..."
(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 5, Dep. Ex. 116, p. 5).

ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT'S INVENTION OF, AND RELIANCE UPON, LANGUAGE THAT
IS

NOT

FOUND

PRINCIPLES
PRECEDENT

OF

IN

THE

PARTIES'

CONTRACT

FOR

CONTRACT

ENFORCEMENT,

ALLOCATING

VIOLATES

UTAH

IGNORES

ACCEPTED

RISKS

BETWEEN

FIDELITY

SUCCESSIVE BOND CARRIERS, AND WILL UNIQUELY PREJUDICE UTAH
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR DEPOSITORS

Before June, 1982, when Home contracted with Aetna, the financial community and
the surety industry had reached agreement about when "discovery" occurs in the context of
employee dishonesty losses involving third-party suits.

Under their agreed Rider 6091 to

Standard Form 22, discovery occurs whenever an insured learns of dishonesty, and such

discovery is deemed to occur no later than when the insured has been sued by a third-party
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for an employee's allegedly dishonest conduct.

Under the Majority Opinion, Utah now

stands alone in judicially replacing that agreed per se trigger for discovery and coverage of
third-party losses (the date-of-suit test) with a superficially appealing, but fatally flawed,
reference to the uncertain and irrelevant future date of a "verdict" in the third-party's

lawsuit. The Majority Opinion improperly rewrites the parties' agreed bright line trigger for

"discovery," ignores precedent, and commits Utah courts to repeated judicial rewriting of
commercial agreements that significantly affect Utah lenders and their depositors.
A.

The Majority Opinion Judicially Rewrites This Discovery Bond

The financial community and its sureties have dealt with "discovery" bonds for years.
Their carefully refined agreements are now significantly and unexpectedly upset by the
Majority Opinion. Discovery bonds are neither "occurrence" policies (triggered by when the

act of dishonesty occurs) nor "claims made" policies (triggered only if and when a claim is
made against the insured). Standard Form 22 is a "discovery" bond, with coverage triggered

as soon as dishonesty is uncovered (or "discovered"), regardless of whether that is at the
moment when the dishonest act occurs, or at the first time when such dishonesty is later

brought to the insured's attention through any means, including a third-party's lawsuit.
1.)

The Court Rewrote The Concept Of Loss

Acting as if it were writing on a clean slate to fashion a better contract, the Majority

Opinion hypothesized that the maturation of a fidelity loss proceeds from a point of
"possible" loss to a point of "actual" loss; that "possible" losses are not what fidelity bonds
are about, because they are not what is ultimately paid by the carrier; and that only discovery
of "actual" loss, and not discovery of "possible" loss, should place a third-party suit about

employee dishonesty into a particular bond period.

To support this novel construction, the

Majority Opinion had to create a whole new vocabulary for fidelity bonds, because the
parties' written contract never discusses "possible" or "actual", and nowhere defines its
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coverage trigger in terms relating to when "possible" monetary consequences become
"actual" monetary consequences.

As Judge Bench recognized in his Dissent, the entire approach of the discover/ bond

is that once the insured peril of employee dishonesty surfaces, a loss occurs and the coverage

is triggered, no matter how it is discovered, and no matter how long the monetary
consequences take to develop. Under the judicial rewrite in the Majority Opinion, all thirdparty employee dishonesty suits are now only "possible" losses until there is a verdict against
the insured, when the loss suddenly becomes "actual."1 Since no verdict occurred until the
Aetna bond period, the Majority Opinion declared that only a "possible" loss had been

"discovered" in the F&D period, and that coverage was not triggered until the suit matured

to a verdict during the Aetna bond and thus became an "actual" loss under the Majority
Opinion's new terminology.

2.)

The Court Rewrote The Agreed Rider That Defined "Discovery"

The slate was not truly clean for judicial rewriting. The bond has a per se definition

in Rider 6091, establishing that discovery occurs no later than the date of any third-party suit
alleging dishonesty. That occurred in this case squarely within the F&D period.

The Majority Opinion circumvented the per se_ definition by artificially limiting the

Rider's "discovery" definition only to the clause in the contract that governs the giving of
notice, despite explicit bond language integrating all of the bond's terms and conditions. Just

as it had judicially created two kinds of loss ("actual" and "possible"), the Majority Opinion
had to judicially create and define two kinds of "discovery" to sustain its result.

The

Majority Opinion has now created and distinguished discovery that only triggers notice, and

'Whether losses that have supposedly been "actuaT-ized by a verdict suddenly revert to
being only "possible" losses upon the grant of a new trial, the entry of judgment n.o.v., or
an intermediate appellate reversal, are but a few of the many questions the Majority Opinion
has left for future litigants and Utah courts as they finish the rewriting that the Majority
Opinion has begun.

discovery that triggers coverage, without any bond text to support the distinction.

In Utah,

"discovery for notice purposes" is now the only issue governed by the parties' Rider 6091,
which defines a date-of-suit trigger.

A new, judicially created "discovery for coverage

purposes" is now governed in Utah by the Majority Opinion's preferred tngger, the date of
verdict.

A dishonesty loss can now be "discovered" for the purpose of giving notice to an

existing bond carrier, but for years it may remain un-discovered for the purpose of
establishing coverage, because it is only a "possible" loss until there is a verdict.

The

Majority Opinion labels all such loss only "possible" until verdict, even though hundreds of
thousands of dollars of "actual" attorneys fees are being incurred prior to verdict, for which

fees the insured expects indemnity regardless of any verdict.
3.)

The Rewriting Is Incomplete And Inconsistent On Its Face

The Majority Opinion overlooks a major flaw in its own rule:

using the Rider's

definition to only trigger notice is a meaningless or impossible exercise if the same definition
does not also tell the insured to whom such notice should be given.

That cannot be done

without simultaneously establishing which carrier's bond covers the loss. Under the Majority
Opinion's new rule, Home would have known it had to give notice to someone, when the

AFCO investor suits were filed in the F&D period, but such notice would be meaningless.
Notice to F&D, under the Majority Opinion's approach, does not trigger coverage. F&D
went off the risk before verdict. Aetna had not yet been identified as a future carrier when
the suits were filed. The consequence is that early notice - which is vital in financial frauds

- is given to a carrier who ultimately provides no coverage.

This approach is especially

perverse here, where the courts below excused Home's complete failure to disclose the

pending suits to the new bond carrier (Aetna), on whom coverage responsibility was then
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imposed.

Under the Majority Opinion, that carrier would be providing coverage

unknowingly and involuntarily for losses previously reported to its predecessor.2
The rewrite is also inconsistent with the industry norms reflected in Home's own
conduct.

Home did not need a verdict to know it had discovered dishonesty.

Even Home

recognized discovery no later than December, 1982, when it reported the Armitage matters

to both carriers, long before the 1984 verdict, which the Majority finds so essential to

"discovery."3 Knowing that it had discovered a loss long before the verdict, Home's actual
conduct more closely reflects the established understandings and agreements in this, industry
that are not keyed to verdicts, and which are now up-rooted by the Majority Opinion.
Perhaps most obviously, the Majority Opinion completely overlooks the hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorneys fees, which were part of Home's "actual" loss long before

any verdict, and were never "possible" losses. These fees were being incurred by Home in
April, May, and June of 1982, before Aetna's bond was even issued.

Coverage for these

fees, incurred from the outset of any third-party suit, undermines the entire premise of the
Majority Opinion that third-party situations present only "possible" losses until verdict is
rendered.

2If allowed to stand, the Opinion below affirmatively delays the normal process of
finding employee dishonesty and locking-in coverage for it. All the consequences that should
have been associated with Home's late notice have now been judicially removed; with
predictably unhealthy consequences. There was no sacrifice of coverage for Home's late

notice on the F&D bond, because the Majority Opinion redefined the loss as being
discovered only when the verdict was rendered in the Aetna period. The same Opinion,
however, excused Home's unfair non-disclosure of the suits to Aetna when Aetna's bond
began.

3Home cannot retroactively recharacterize its December, 1982 notice as compliance with
the Majority Opinion's newly announced approach. Even the new approach, interpreting
Rider 6091 as defining discovery only for notice, but not coverage, does not fit because it
would have required Home's notice to F&D in April, 1982 (instead of to Aetna in
December, 1982). Moreover, Home's own conduct and its notice letter (Tr. Ex. 119) were
wholly inconsistent with the Majority Opinion's hypothetical separation of "actual" and

"possible" loss when Home referred to the indemnifiable defense costs that it was already
incurring years before the Armitage verdict. Home's behavior did not follow the Majority
Opinion's imagined model of immediate notice to F&D, followed by actual loss and a
request for coverage only when a verdict arrives.
- 10 -

Finally, verdicts are not inevitable products of litigation. They do not always remain
unchanged, and are not related to the ultimate timing of any payment. A date-of-verdict test

is in no sense inherently superior to the parties' chosen date-of-suit test for discovery. The
date-of-verdict test commits Utah courts to judicially struggling with innumerable questions

about settlements, verdict reversals, and other contingencies. All of these questions can only
be answered with more litigation and more impermissible judicial rewriting, always
substituting judicial invention for commercial agreement.

B.

Under This Court's Precedents For Contract Enforcement, Utah Litigants
Are Entitled to Enforcement Of Their Agreements As Written, To
Accomplish The Central Purpose Of The "Discovery" Bonds

This case is simply a judicial substitution of "date of verdict," instead of the

contractually agreed "date of suit," as the trigger for coverage.

As such, the Majority

Opinion violates this Court's admonitions against judicial rewriting. See Provo City Corp. v.
Neilsen Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979).

It also undermines the fundamental

emphasis of financial institution bonds on early discovery and reporting in an industry where
the uncovering of dishonesty is crucial to the well-being of regulated institutions and their

depositors. It is no accident that "discovery" bonds were created for, and exist primarily in,

the financial community.

The Majority Opinion's total rewrite of that "discovery"

orientation violates this Court's rule that "[a] construction which contradicts the general
purpose of the contract ... is presumed to be unintended by the parties." LPS Hospital v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988).

The Majority Opinion's treatment of the parties' own per se definition of discovery
for third-party losses went beyond impermissible rewriting. It created disharmony between
different clauses that use the very same term "discovery," thus violating this Court's
directive to interpret a contract in a way that will "harmonize all of its provisions and all of
its terms . . . "

LPS Hospital. 765 P.2d at 858.

This disharmony of having different

definitions for the same words was created entirely by the Majority Opinion.
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C.

Discovery Was A Well-Negotiated, Well-Defined, And Well-Understood
Term Before The Majority Returned The Financial Community To The

Very Uncertainties That Had Led To A Bright Line Per §e_ Test For
Discovery

The trigger for insurance coverage should always be objectively ascertainable and

beyond the subjective manipulation ofeither the insured or insurer. Were it otherwise, every
claim would give rise to a challenge that the insurer (when the claim is denied) unfairly

manipulated the trigger event to fall outside the period of coverage or that the insured (when
the claim is allowed) unfairly caused the trigger event to fall inside the coverage. This is

exactly the uncertainty and unmanageability which the Majority Opinion creates with its
arbitrary adoption of the date-of-verdict trigger.4 It is that uncertainty and confusion which
the banking and surety industries laid to rest in drafting Standard Form 22, and in making its
definition of discovery precise and explicit in Rider 6091.

Utah's adoption of a date-of-verdict test, instead of the parties' agreed date-of suit test
returns the parties to a world in which there is no agreed, objective, and immediately
identifiable trigger that locks in coverage for a financial institution when it is sued for

employee dishonesty. There may never be a verdict, it may be reversed, and it is always
postponed until long after realization that employee dishonesty is being litigated at the
expense of immediate defense costs (for which the insured seeks indemnity regardless of any
verdict). Despite the Majority Opinion's preferences for the date of verdict, Home knew it
had discovery without regard to any verdict and it gave notice to F&D and to Aetna long
before that verdict. F&D's bond - if timely notice had been given ~ would have remained

open and susceptible to any verdict no matter how long it took to be rendered. But Aetna's

bond had higher coverage limits and notice to F&D was late.

The consequences of

4Arbitrary is, indeed, an appropriate label. For example, the Dissent assumed that the
Majority Opinion's logic led to a date-of-judgment test. Date of confession by the employee,
or date of a guilty plea by the employee, or date of payment to a third-party claimant are all
other equally available options; but contract enforcement requires adhering to the term
chosen in the contract.
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individual choices by Home should not cause Utah to stand alone in contorting otherwise
well understood rules of contract enforcement and in ignoring agreed rules for fidelity bond

discovery.5
D.

The Majority Opinion Uses Policy Terms Out Of Context To Create An
Ambiguity That Cannot Be Fairly Identified In The Contract As Written

The Majority Opinion cites the only use of the phrase "loss sustained" in the bond
preamble as if to imply that it had been used in contradistinction to "loss discovered but not

yet sustained" or "loss that is expected but not yet sustained".

Quite to the contrary, the

bond uses the word "sustained" precisely to demonstrate that the timing of actual monetary
loss is an event totally unrelated to determining bond coverage. The actual context, as noted
by Judge Bench's Dissent, is completely consistent with Aetna's position: the bond states that
loss can be "sustained at any time", with no consequence to that timing, but the loss is

covered so long as discovery occurs within the bond period.

Such "discovery" is clearly

defined as happening, for third-party claims, no later than when a third-party demand is
made or suit is filed.6

5It does not matter whether Home pursued Aetna as a gamble for Aetna's higher
coverage limits or because it had given such obviously late notice to F&D. This entire
litigation flows from Home not following Rider 6091 (failing to give notice to F&D "no later
than" the date of the third-party suit, and to then pursue F&D's indemnity). There was no
risk or adverse consequence to timely pursuit of F&D's policy since the bond expressly holds
F&D's coverage open as to a notified third party loss until two years after any judgment in
any third-party suit, such as Armitage. The Majority had no reason to worry that holding
the dishonesty peril to have been discovered in the F&D bond would have unfairly prejudiced
Home. It would have allocated the loss to F&D's period as agreed, and F&D's defense of
late notice would have succeeded or failed based on facts that Home alone had created.

^e Majority Opinion is at its weakest, when it attempts to distinguish Royal Trust Bank
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 788 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1986), which rejected precisely the
Majority Opinion's distinction between discovery for "notice" purposes and discovery for
"coverage" purposes. The Majority praises the bond in Royal for being far more clear,
when Royal amounts to no more than the placement of Rider 609l's definition inside the
body of the bond, combined with a reaffirmation of the limitation (also already in the F&D
and Aetna bonds) that dishonesty must be discovered within the bond period to be covered.
- 13 -

E.

The Majority Opinion Will Uniquely Prejudice Utah Financial Institutions

This argument is not a suggestion that insurers will avoid Utah.

Far worse, it is a

demonstration that financial institutions: nearing the end of a policy period will repeatedly be

left uncovered (and their depositors unprotected) against immature, but potentially
substantial, losses. Under Aetna's bond interpretation, notice and coverage travel together.
The "discovery" of a loss fixes the bond period in which it occurred (and thus the earner

responsible) and obligates the insured to give notice to that carrier, unlike the Majority
Opinion's rule that calls for notice, without knowing what carrier has the coverage. Under
the Majority Opinion rule, and as this case demonstrates, mid-suit changes in carriers will

often mean that the carrier at the time of "notice" will go off the risk before any verdict, as
F&D did here.

When that happens, Utah financial institutions will not be able to find a

renewal market. F&D, for example, would have had every incentive not to renew, so as to

avoid the obviously "expected" (but still only "possible") loss when its bond expired. No
new carrier would knowingly walk into the likelihood of inheriting the still "possible" (but
soon to be "actual") loss, without excluding that impending loss by special endorsement, or

without charging a premium equal to the expected loss. This kind of commercial disruption
and damage, particularly when it flows from judicial rewriting, calls for review and
correction by this Court.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE MAJORITY'S REFUSAL TO HOLD
THAT SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE FOR LOSS
FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT WHEN HOME SAVINGS HAD LEARNED
OF HIS DISHONESTY SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE AETNA BOND WAS
PURCHASED

Section 11 of the Standard Form 22 bond terminates fidelity coverage immediately
and automatically as to any particular employee as soon as the insured employer leanis of his
dishonesty.

As the Dissent noted, courts have repeatedly found such provisions valid,

unambiguous, and enforceable.

E.g.. Alfalfa Electric Cooperative. Inc. v. Travelers

Indemnity Co.. 376 F.Supp. 901, 912 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna
- 14 -

Casualty & Surety Co.. 426 F.2d 499, 500 (8th Cir. 1970), Verneco. Inc. v. Fidelitv &
Casualty Co.. 219 So. 2d 508, 510 (La. 1969).

Prior to the Majority Opinion, the universal rule was that a new carrier's coverage
never goes into effect for an employee about whom the insured had prior knowledge of
dishonesty, as Home did about Larry Glad in December, 1981. E.g.. St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.. 359 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1966); Verneco. at 510.
Clear precedent had applied that rule specifically to a situation involving different successive
bond carriers such as the F&D and Aetna situation here.

See C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v.

Ins. Co. of North America. 590 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.6 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied. 444 U.S.

831 (1979). But the Majority dismissed Wilson as "unpersuasive."
The Majority Opinion disparaged the universal rule as based on "luck,"
apparently because it misapprehended that rule.

Section 11 does not affect whether the

insured is covered, contrary to the Majority Opinion's expression of the rule.

The rule

simply leaves all coverage with the particular carrier in whose bond period the dishonesty
was first discovered (here, F&D). Home would have had, and kept, whatever coverage it
perfected for loss on the AFCO loans through timely notice to F&D.

It can acquire no

second bite at the apple by buying new coverage from Aetna for a known dishonest employee
to cover consequences of his past conduct.

Such a result would allow regulated financial

institutions to postpone reporting losses in the hope of buying higher limits for known
problems, injecting dangerous speculation into Utah financial institutions, whose depositors
think of fidelity bonds as protection.

If properly applied and enforced, these bonds are unaffected by the "luck" to
which the Majority Opinion refers. The Majority Opinion's entire analysis makes coverage
depend upon the "luck" of court system delay and the timing of a future verdict. Properly
applied, these bonds given an insured immediate knowledge of how much coverage it has,
- 15 -

and from whom, at the moment of discovery (which is date of suit for third-party claims).

Timely notice locks that coverage in, regardless of future verdicts, judgments, and bond
carrier charges. It also allocates any discovered loss to the then existing bond carrier and
prevents speculation by an insured as to what limits to buy, and when, for already known
dishonesty or for employees already known to be dishonest, such as Larry Glad was when
the Aetna bond was purchased.
CONCLUSION

This case represents the worst consequences of judicially rewriting a contract
that has been fine-tuned by the involved industries to serve important risk allocating

functions. "Discovery" is the touchstone of these "discovery" bonds; and parties are entitled
to freedom of contract in their definition of it. This case calls for enforcing, not rewriting,

the bright line per se. definition that the parties agreed to use to fix the date of discovery with
certainty, and to protect it from the kind of misadventure in judicial drafting that occurred
below. Utah contract precedent calls for no less.

"Discovery" and "prior termination" work together to provide seamless

coverage for a financial institution who buys from different bond carriers over consecutive
bond periods (as Home did from 3 carriers in 5 years).

An insured need only lock-in

coverage through timely notice to its existing bond carrier whenever it is sued by third
parties over employee dishonesty. The ultimate date and amount of liability in such suits are
then details unrelated to fixing the date of discovery and to allocating the loss to a particular

bond. Any new carrier takes subsequent coverage only as of a certain date, only for matters
genuinely not yet "discovered," and only for employees not already known to be dishonest.
Utah's sureties and Utah's financial institutions are both best served by not reaching out to

create new uncertainties and new rules uniquely designed to save Home from having sent late

- 16-

notice to F&D, at the cost of undermining the very provisions that make consecutive bonds
work together for the benefit of both industries.
Aetna prays for this Court's grant of certiorari to review the "discovery" and

"prior termination" issues in the Majority Opinion below, to restore commercial stability in
the insurance of Utah financial institutions, and to avoid leaving Utah as the ony state where

subjective judicial preferences are substituted for the written coverage triggers chosen by the
parties.
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GREENWOOD,

Judge:

Aetna Casualty and Su rety Company appeals the trial
court's ruling that a loss incurred by Home Savings and Loan
was covered by a fidelity bond issued to Home by Aetna.
Home
made a total of forty-two second mortgage loans to individuals
(AFCO investors) who had b een referred to Home by Grant
Affleck.
The loan proceed s were invested in AFCO, which was
controlled by Affleck.
Fo 1 lowing the financial demise of
Affleck and AFCO, the AFCO investors brought suit against Home
because of its involvement with AFCO.
Home lost the lawsuit
and was ordered to return the second mortgage notes and trust
deeds to the AFCO investor ^ , ^'reTM.'ifj,
\\i>r\\cs
further col lect ion '^> ';ha 1 • > n n T .

significant loss w 11 i<•'i in
fidelity bond.
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3,1

,-

suit.
Following ^ iuty tr i. '.I 1 ,
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bond.
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that

affirm.
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investor loans.

Included in these acts was Glad's receipt of a

kickback on a loan made directly to AFCO, a loan that AFCO
eventually repaid.
Glad was promptly terminated effective
December 29, 1981.
Following Glad's departure, Home closed
several more second mortgage loans to AFCO investors.

On January 28, 1982, AFCO issued a check to Home,

to be

applied toward the first monthly payments due on the AFCO
investor loans. Although it was contrary to Home's usual
policy to accept third-party repayments of its loans, AFCO and
its investors had apparently made this arrangement.
However,
when Home attempted to cash the check,
insufficient

funds

in AFCO's

On February 26,

it was returned due to

account.

1982, Affleck sent a letter to Home

requesting additional time to bring the second mortgage loans
current.
He informed Home that there were potential problems
with the loans because the loan documents had been backdated in
order to eliminate the right of the AFCO investors to rescind ~

the loans.
He also informed Home that he had closed the loans
personally without any Home employee being present.
Affleck
requested the extension in order to avoid "any direct legal
action from individuals that have taken out the above
referenced 2nd mortgage loans."

On March 8, 1982, AFCO filed for bankruptcy.
At Home's
board of directors' meeting held on March 17, 1982, Home's

legal counsel indicated to the board that Home's position was
sound despite AFCO's bankruptcy because of the "documentation
of

the

loans."

In April 1982, approximately three hundred plaintiffs

filed a complaint in the United States Bankruptcy Court against
Affleck, AFCO, and numerous other defendants, including Home
and sixteen other lending institutions that had made similar

second mortgage loans to AFCO investors.

The complaint,

designated as Alcorn, et al. v. Grant Affleck, et al.. was

served upon Home on April 13, 1982. The complaint listed
numerous irregularities in the loans and sought an order
declaring the notes and second mortgage trust deeds void, and
an order barring the financial institutions involved from

demanding repayment of loans made to the AFCO investors.1
1.

Home also received other "" *" if i'-^ t *vn . in the form of

lawsuits and letters from *tt'-rneys , of" alleged improprieties
in the AFCO investor loan processing and the investors' intent
to avoid repayment of those loans.
received in March and April 1982.
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7

"1

"~

—

~

-

'" ° '-unflct"e i" order t~o~

S L"vera^ Allowing the expiration

uncovered the likelihood of dishonesty of Home employees in
processing the AFCO investor loans, creating the likelihood
that if Home lost the case,

such loss would fall within the

bond's fidelity loss coverage.

Aetna then began monitoring the

case .

On September 30,

1983,

Aetna elected to not

assume defense

of the Armitage litigation.
Aetna gave three reasons for this
decision.
First, Aetna claimed its bond would not cover losses
sustained during the coverage period of the F&D bond it
replaced,

except to the extent that such losses exceeded the F

S< D coverage amount.3

Second, Aetna concluded that the

borrowers' claims in the various complaints were attributed to
acts of Home employees that were committed "at the direction of
and for the benefit of Home Savings."
Such acts did not fall

within the bond's definition of employee dishonesty and,
therefore, even if proven, would not fall within the fidelity
coverage of the bond. Third, Aetna stated, "it appears that
many of the claims may have been discovered prior to 6-21-82, ~
the date on which

this

bond was

issued."

Nearly a year later, on August 14, 1984, the Armitage jury
returned special verdicts against Home.
Judgment in the case
was entered on February 24, 1986.
Pursuant to the judgment,
Home was barred from foreclosing on the second mortgage trust
deeds and from seeking any recovery of its loans to the AFCO
investors.
Home's Aetna bond was still in effect at that time.
for

the

esult

of

Aetna moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
Armitagg loss was not covered by the bond because it was

"discovered" prior to the period of coverage provided by the
bond.
In response, Home moved for a court order construing the
"discovery" language of the bond to mean the discovery of an
actual loss sustained and not the discovery of a potential
3 . Aetna apparently assumed fha t H(o k--^ w=*s vus H ained when
the loans were made . As r] i^ci-^e'l t-i <-? fni jv mi our treatment
of Aetna's argument as to whet* ohe Imgs was discovered, this
assumption was not correct.
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problems with the AFCO investor loans in the bond application
voids coverage; (4) because the loss was related to trading in
securities, it is excluded from the bond's coverage; (5) the

jury instructions improperly prevented the jury from finding
that Home *s loss was caused by its own mismanagement and poor
judgment rather than by Glad's dishonesty; (6) Home's loss was

improperly calculated, in that certain of the loan outlays were
returned to Home; and (7) Home should not recover the legal
costs awarded against it in the Armitage case, nor all of its
own legal costs incurred in defending that case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW—INSURANCE CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

The interpretation of a contract normally presents a
question of law.

Village Inn Apartments v.

State Farm Fire and

Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). We regard
the Aetna bond as a contract for insurance, and therefore give,
no particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of"
the bond. LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857,
858

(Utah 1988).

Contract interpretation begins with an examination of the

contract itself to determine the intentions of the parties.
Icl.

The document should be interpreted in a manner to

harmonize all of its provisions and terms,
poss ible.

The question of whether
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Association of America and the United States League of Savings
and Loan Associations.
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Aetna and Home agree that once Glad's dishonesty became
known

to Home

in mid-December

1981,

section eleven of

the F

S< D

bond terminated coverage for losses caused by any subsequent
dishonest conduct by Glad.
Once an employer is on notice of an
employee's dishonesty, the fidelity insurer cannot be required
to indemnify losses resulting from similar subsequent conduct
by that same employee.
It is quite proper to shift the risk of
loss due to employee dishonesty from the insurer to the insured
once the insured knows of the dishonesty, but elects to retain
the employee.
13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 46:247 (1982).

It is also proper to refuse coverage for losses caused by
an employee whose dishonesty is known to the employer even if
the conduct through which the dishonesty is revealed is
unrelated to subsequent conduct that actually causes a loss.
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 376
F.2d 33,

35

(5th Cir.

1967)

(modifying

and

affirming

359

F.2d

579 (1966)), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 828, 88 S. Ct. 91 (1967). __
Thus neither the F & D bond nor the Aetna bond would have

covered Home for
mid-December

any dishonest conduct by Glad,

occurring after

1981.

Aetna argues that because Glad was known to be dishonest
before the Aetna bond took effect, its bond was void ab initio

as to

losses caused by ajry and all of Glad's dishonest conduct,

whether such conduct occurred before or

1981.

after mid-December

Aetna cites several cases in support of its position,

which we examine

in some detail.

Three cases cited by Aetna involve employee fidelity
insurance that was void ab initio as to certain employees of
the insureds.
Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co..
426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970), and Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity &

Casualty Co, of New York, 253 La. 721, 219 So. 2d 508 (1969),
involved fidelity loss insurance that contained section
eleven-type provisions.

The insured in each case hired an

employee, knowing that the employee had a history of theft.
The employees then stole money from the insureds, who were

denied recovery for the losses under the insurance policies
because they knew of their employees' dishonesty from the
outset of the employment.
Therefore, the policies had never
covered any loss caused by the employees' dishonesty.
Similarly, in St. Joe Paper, 37^ f .2d 3 "* , *n insured became
aware of its emplov°° 's M i',° jv -H-h^no^i- <••<>m'1moh before the
relevant fidelity i'?ss i.n;oi •.-im,-o -;r,~ j-:;MCyi.
Losses

attributable to t-hat same oour--^ of dishonesty were therefore
not

recoverable
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under

the

policies.

, rn BiisJiie^Grjjrier and Verneco t-h •
empioyeesi^T^rlrTlTearH ^T"^?'
e lnsureds hired

consistent with the poiTcy e^a?pSViSh0neSt" Ifc ^s
Y Qm^>-^-la5U1^ncs
dishonest conduct o?hosee f caused bTiu^e^.
deny insurance coverage "for ?n«

Properly fell up0n the insureds ^"''d
employee dishonesty, opted to hire Ut
the present case, Glad's LL» ' S
Home until after he had a
6 L'

to

"V"* °* such losses
P^e awarene" of
employees. However in
"0t beCOme k"°»" 7

^^r^hf^t^r^-d-^^i«--e-:eSs-r-ugt
-not
decisive as to ^Kef^a^*^.,^..
St^jj^
"oticeInori7f^^;,sth^°"duct
that put the insured on

conduct that caused the ]
" 7 h"3^"* °f the same
denied. Again, it was proper to L ^ lnsu"nce coverage was

shift the risk of loss

! t

deny the insured's effort tn

the insurer, where
"surance cnf
C°?dUCt fr°m ^se f to *
Purchased until after t
P?llCy ln Nation was not

the insured and the emX^T^ dishonesty Was k"°«" by
It appears that tho'retained despite that
not have any fidelity issuance
a^V" ^—^^^ did
dishonesty became known.
"S „ tlme lts employee's
knowledge.

coverage for losses caused by the ° P°SSlMe to obtain

there had been no Prior coverage at al?766'3 dish°"esty where

--"^ho^bec^ "£™™*™<» ^ '^ bond when
any dishonest conduct that Glad -t^"1"31^ "itn^pect to
Home
learned of his dishonesty Zl „^ 6"gaged in a"er t0
by his Eiiaj; dishonest conduct 'in u contlnued for losses caused

that its bond, „hich replaced the "°™'s employ. Aetna argues

this coverage. Aetna cites ti^Ltvt, r

: did n0t c°"tinue

"very. The bank sought recovery

890101-CA
10

under the renewal bond for various losses arising from the
dishonest conduct of the employee.

The Cgjitral Bank court held that the renewal bond did not

"reinstate coverage for an employee that had already been
terminated by a known dishonest act; it simply continuefdl
whatever coverage existed at the time of renewal."

672 S.W.2d

at 647 (emphasis added). It was therefore unnecessary for the
insurer to raise a void ab initio defense to coverage under the
renewal bond.
Id. Thus the insurer was not liable for losses
caused by dishonest conduct of the employee that occurred after

his dishonesty became known.

However, the insurer was liable

under the renewal bond for losses arising from the employee's
dishonest conduct that had occurred before he was found to be
dishonest.
Id. at 650. This coverage had not terminated under
the prior bond and continued under the renewal bond.6

6.

As acknowledged by the parties. Central Bank is rnnh.^ng *

to read at first. It appears to support Aetna's void ab initio
argument in that it states at one point that Central Bank's

loss coverage as to its dishonest employee terminated on
December 11, 1974, the date the renewal bond was issued. 672
S.W.2d at 650; see, icl. at 647. The jury in Central Bank is

described as having found that the bank employee's dishonesty
became known "before December 11, 1974," icl. at 644, then is
implicitly described as finding more precisely that the

dishonesty came to light on October 24, 1974. Icl. at 646. We
find the confusion to be resolved by reference to the court's
discussion holding the appellant insurer's void ab initio
argument to be unnecessary:

The jury's answer to special issue sixteen

did not absolve appellant of liability for
losses occurring after October. 1974
because the renewal bond which was issued
December 11, 1974 was void from its

inception. Rather, appellant is absolved
of liability for these [post-October 1974]
losses because a renewal policy does not

reinstate coverage for an employee that
had already been terminated by a known
dishonest act; it simply continues
whatever coverage existed at *"he ^ime of

renewal.

. . . It v.^is unnecessary ^"or
\ v>m1 *\}

appel lnnt-

to r 'e^d

defense.

It mev >_ely '.mi its bond

termination defense
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,„ jt- ;_,_,

dishonest.

Such c

LpL ,

terminated coveraqe b ? J

coverage. Ins^T^ren^
elected to replace it with l„ •*

learned that Glad was
n0t be a rei^tatement of
J

°f """ng

D bond' howeve^ Home

argues that, as a new Usurer V it^*1
^ compelled
fr0ra Aetna'
Aet™
to assume

coverage for losses re

dishonesty, even if
renewal of the F & D bond
bond.

e 1
9 ^ Pre-mid-December 1981
w??.
3Ve been
covered
by a
Wij^cur supports
Aetna's
position..

(Footnote 6 continued)

cfver%ra7:^
bond renpw^i «al„ ....

™» P««-ge indicates that

°nest emPloyee did not terminal
ermmate n
on

n to De dishonest

—

the

~*<= lhC employee was

nofdishorlest em^oyel con^occ^^V" ^^^n.

r the employee ricame known" S^"™? b*fore —

Losses attributable ^olV^

engaged in before being 1

^7" 'M*'"-"^ induct.

Q \7'"^ "^ the employee

covered under section -Ipven ~ln° •I t 0nest' however- remain

not become known until'after'the
l^i
SSeS themselves do
dishonest.
the emPloyee is found to be
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Wilson involved an original employee fidelity bond and a
pair of replacement bonds from different insurers,

all of which

contained coverage termination provisions essentially identical
to section eleven of the bonds in this case.
In Wilson, as
here, the insured's employee engaged in certain dishonest
conduct while the original bond was in effect, but the insured

did not, at that time, learn of the employee's dishonesty.
Later,

while the original bond was still in effect,

the insured

learned of other, unrelated dishonest conduct by the same
employee, but did not discharge him. Nine days after learning
that its employee was dishonest, the original bond expired and
the replacement bonds went into effect.
One month later,
insured learned of the earlier dishonest conduct of its

the

employee, whereupon the employee was discharged.
As in the
present case, the loss for which the insured sought recovery
was caused by the earlier dishonest conduct, and not by the
conduct through which the employee's dishonesty first became
known.

The Wilson court held that because the insured knew of its
employee's dishonesty before the replacement bonds went into

effect, and because the insured did not disclose the dishonesty
to the issurers of the replacement bonds,

those bonds never

went into effect as to any losses caused by that employee's
dishonesty.

Wilson, 590 F.2d at 1279.

Therefore, the losses

caused by the employee's dishonesty were not covered under the
replacement bonds, even though those losses arose from
dishonest behavior that had occurred before the insured learned
its employee was dishonest.
In a footnote, the court indicated

that had the insured elected to extend the original bond, that
bond would have covered those losses.
Icl- at 1279 n.6.
The
court stated that the "unfortunate position in which Wilson

finds itself was occasioned in part by sheer bad luck in timing
as to the change in insurers . . . ."

We do not find Wilson persuasive.

Icl.

at 1280.

Its analysis is

troublesome because of the reliance it places on sheer luck to
determine whether certain losses are covered under a

replacement fidelity bond, even where a renewal of the prior
bond would cover them. As stated by the Wilson dissent, the
analysis "defeat[sj the purpose of insurance and base[s]
recovery on chance."
M- at 1291 (Hoffman, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

wo observe that a

fundament a 1 purpos° " f a"v <•->?•> ^ -n'-1- 's i- '•> ri^f ino t- he
relationship of the '"Mit r^ct i"-i nrH^; inri provide the maximum

possible stability and predict abi 1jty i-<> that relationship,
thereby minimizing the effect of chance or luck.
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Our scrutiny of section eleven of the Aetna bond reveals
no language that mandates the result reached in Wilson
A-

interpreted by the foregoing authorities, it clea7ly"bars °
recovery for any losses Glad might have caused subsequent to

mid-December 1981. had Home not fired him. However, by itself
the section simply does not address questions of ongoing "
coverage between successive insurers.7 Section eleven is
therefore, ambiguous on that question, and susceptible to'the

samerHdel
H°Vhat
^ ^
"0t barthetheAetna
continuation
the
same fidelity
loss coverage
under
bond that ofexisted

under the F & D bond. Therefore, utilizing rules of
construction applicable to insurance contracts, we cons-rue
section eleven to provide coverage here. Such a construction
promotes predictability of bond coverage and minimizes the
mpact of luck or chance. Therefore, we hold that coverage for

losses caused by Glad's dishonest conduct, where that conduct

occurred before Home learned that he was dishonest, and where

the'To n^nd

Dond

1S

^T^ W°Uld h3Ve c°"tinued under renewal of,
barled by secti°n eleven of the Aetna

Our holding is supported by the absence of any extrinsic
TIsue!dCetS,Ugge%tlng
th3t' at that
thS time
the Aetna
bonddiminished
was
issued, the parties intended
it would
provide
coverage compared to that provided under the F & D bond The
in oart "Tagent prepared fche Aetna bond proposal, which read
° att-. X Pr°P°^e a bond be issued effective June 21 to

cove age
^ \be "issued
"iU Pr°Vide
5'. The6hond
The bond Wl11
through ^
Aetna retroactive
Casualty 5,

Surety Company."

(Emphasis added.) There is no evidence of

processCasStonS
thS PartieS
durin9
thebond
Condthat
appUc
process as to any"^u"
risks covered
by the
F&D
would ion

"^continue to be covered under the identically-worded Aetna
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provisions properly shift such increased fidelity loss risk to

the employer.

On the other hand, firing the dishonest employee

does not affect the risk that some dishonest act commixed
before the employee was found to be dishonest will result in a
loss. Nor does changing insurers affect this risk. Absent a
clear agreement to the contrary, an insured who purchases
replacement employee fidelity coverage that appears t-0 be

identical to the prior coverage should be entitled to coverage
that is in fact identical with respect to section eleven
limitat ions.

In sum, section eleven does not bar Home's recovery from
Aetna. So long as the loss caused by Glad's dishonest behavior
was discovered within the effective period of the Aetna bond
that loss is recoverable. We turn to the question of when i-he
loss was discovered.

DISCOVERY OF LOSS

S

Aetna argues that Home's loss was discovered before the
Aetna bond went into effect and, therefore, does not fall

within the coverage period of the bond.

The bond provisions

relevant to this argument are found in the "Insuring
Agreements" and "Conditions and Limitations" portions of the

The preamble to the Insuring Agreements states the bond

will cover any "loss sustained by the Insured at any time but
discovered during the Bond Period ....*• The insuring
agreements define the losses that are covered under the bond

Among the covered losses are those related to employee fidelity
*
b°ndis 4d8r
number
6041 to resulting
the insuring
agreements,
a f^Ti>U9!
fidelity loss
defined
as "[l]oss
directly
from
one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee,
committed anywhere and whether committed alone or in collusion
with others . . . .*• "Dishonest or fraudulent acts" are
further defined as those committed "with the manifest intentfa) to cause the insured to sustain such loss; and (b) to
obtain financial benefit for the Employee . . . ."8
Coverage for all types -f losses defined in r-h- insuring
agreements is sxpc-s.lv ^iti-H .., h,q ;„,;,, r„,i •~ Reliance

8. The jury found that Gladys conduct "in processing ch» AFCO~~
investor loans met this definition of employee dishonesty, and
Aetna does not challenge this finding on appeal
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with the "Conditions and Limitations" portion of the bond
fn^rpS
C°nditions
Limitations
insured f°Ur-°f
to give '^
prompt
notice ofandloss
to Aetna: requires
"At the'th*"
earliest practicable moment after discovery of any los-

hereunder the Insured shall give the Underwriter written notice
hereof and shall also within six months after such

0

particulars "9 UnderWriter affirmative proof of loss with full
,ho *ider 6091 J!0 the section four notice requirement defines
the discovery of any loss hereunder," triggering the duty to

notif^the^nsurer, as the moment when the'LsurSd iLrnfcfa
Discovery occurs when the insured becomes
aware of facts which would cause a

reasonable person to assume that a loss
covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred even though the exact amount or

*

details of loss may not be then known
Notice to the insured of an actual or

potential claim by a third party which
alleges that the Insured is liable under
circumstances, which, if true, would

create a loss under this bond constitutes
such discovery.

to compheen^ted
tLTnllll?t'orlUlll^^Trk^^
'?"'
the
effective
bond
period,
^^eV^n™
tnltlT^T-^
actually occur. One such compensable loss is a fidelitv L-.

bond's notice re^irLent! '-These Lents includl IVAlllV ^
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February 1982

letter to Home relating the irregularities in the

AFCO investor loan processing, closely followed by
delinquencies in those loans; the well-publicized AFCO
bankruptcy petition of

March

1982;

and the service of

complaints by AFCO investors against Home beginning in April
1982.

The AFCO investor complaints are of particular note in

that they alleged the mishandling of the investor loans which

ultimately resulted in the Armitage judgment against Home, and,
as

such,

may have met

the

"notice

...

of

an actual or

potential claim" definition of discovery applicable to Home's
prompt notice duty.
All

these events occurred before the Aetna bond was

in June 1982.

issued

Arguably, many of these events alerted Home to

the possibility of a loss due to Glad's dishonesty.9
Therefore, Home's failure to notify Aetna of a possible

fidelity loss until December 9, 1982--nearly six months after
the Aetna bond was issued,

and ten months after problems with i.

the investor loan processing came to light— arguably may have
been a breach of the bond's prompt notice requirement.
Aetna,

however, does not argue that any breach of the

prompt notice requirement by Home should prevent recovery under
the bond. The trial court held that recovery could not be
denied for breach of the prompt notice requirement because
Aetna failed to show that it was prejudiced by any such
breach. Aetna does not challenge that holding on appeal.
Aetna's argument is limited to its contention that a loss is

discovered for the purpose of coverage at the same time it is
discovered for the purpose of notifying the insurer, that is,
when the possibility of the loss becomes known.

If Aetna is

correct and the possibility of Home's fidelity loss was
discovered before the Aetna bond went into effect, Aetna cannot
be required to compensate Home for that loss.

Aetna cites a

number of cases involving similar discovery bonds in support of
its

contention.

The bulk of the cases cited by Aetna deal with arguments
that the insureds had breached the prompt notice requirements
of various bonds similar to the Aetna bond.

9.

Aetna also cites the revelation of Glad's

See Perkins v.

loan kickback in

December 1981 as inf ^ mat J,_,n "- '^ r- rr* vI'e'l Ho'no •^ duty to notify
Aetna of a "poss ib.l e i--ss ." -V; F-wind hy f-'>e io ry, however , the
December 19 81 discovery that '-lad w^s d *shenest involved

activities unrelated t^ the losses eventually incurred via the
AFCO

investor

890101-CA
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Clinton State Bank. 593 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1979); Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur, Corp.. 426 F.2d 729

Cir. 19 70); Alfalfa Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Travelers Injjernn^
376 F.Supp.

901 (W.D. Okla.

1973); National Newark h Essex

v. American InsT Co.. 76 N.J. 64, 385 A.2d 1216 (1978).
lecause Aetna is not arguing on appeal that Home breached its

prompt notice duty, these cases are not useful to its appeal.
We are also not persuaded by other authority cited by Aetna,
some of which,

nevertheless, warrant closer attention.

We first examine those cases cited by Aetna, which,
because they focus on the question of when the employee
dishonesty element was discovered, all proceeded on an
assumption that the loss element of the fidelity loss had both
actually occurred and been discovered before the employee
dishonesty element was discovered.10 First Nat'1. Bank of
Bpwie v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York. 634 F.2d 1000
(5th Cir. 1981); Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360; Fleming. 581

P.2d 744. With discovery of the loss itself thus given, the ~
question of when the employee dishonesty element was discovered
was determinative of when the fidelity loss itself, was
discovered.li

10.

This assumption is somewhat troublesome in First NatT7!

Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty CoT. 581 P.2d 744, 745
(Colo. App. 1978), in that it refers to "probable" loss,
without analysis or explanation. A similar problem exists in
USUFE Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp.. 115 Cal.
App. 3d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1981) (discussed more

fully in footnote 11) and its reference to loss "established by
the record."

£££_ Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v.

Insurance Co, q£ n, Am,, 166 cal. App. 3d, 212 cal. Rptr. 754
758 (1985) (criticizing UfiltlEE's failure to analyze whether
loss occurred at same time as fraud).

United States Fidelity &

Guar, v, Empire State Bank. 448 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1971) at
least establishes the fact of loss in its recitation of the

insured's exercise of its repossession and liquidation remedy
upon its borrower's default.

11. But see. VSLIFE Savt , 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, which implicitly
adopted the fidelity coverage interpretation urged here by
Aetna.

It did this by reference to the prompt notice

requirement of the bond in guest inn i-here, wh ioh appears

identical to that in Home's Aetna b"nd. 1.71 Cal. Rptr/'at
398. Apparently, the bond in fJSLIFE did not define "discovery
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The insurer's denial of recovery was affirmed on appeal.
The court noted that the employee improprieties that were known
before the bond was issued were, by themselves, dishonest and
fraudulent.

The court

rejected the insured's contention that

it did not know the improprieties amounted to dishonesty until
it learned, during the bond period, of the kickback

allegation.

USLIFE, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 398.

Accordingly, the

employee dishonesty element of the fidelity losses had been
discovered before the bond period commenced, and the losses
were not covered under

the bond.

Icl.

The court

seems

to have

also held, in effect, that the alleged kickbacks had never
occurred, apparently based on the employees' submission of
affidavits denying the kickbacks.
Icl. at 396-97.
Therefore,

the insured had presented "no new facts" during the bond period
to show that its loss was caused by employee dishonesty.
See
i_d.

at

3 9 8.

Bowie states that discovery of loss "within the meaning o£
the loss provisions of the Bond [occurs] when the insured party
discovers facts sufficient to create a condition in which the

insured might be subjected to a claim against which it is
indemnified by the Bond."
634 F.2d at 1004. The disputed
provision in the Bowie bond,

however,

was not a "loss

provision."
Rather, it was a provision indemnifying the
insured for legal costs incurred in defending itself against
claims which, if proven, would create a covered loss.
In
Bowie, the insured successfully defended seven suits that

(Footnote 11 continued)

of loss" for purposes of the notice requirement as does the

bond in question here; however, the court applied a case
law-derived definition similar to the "reasonable person"
standard of the Aetna bond notice requirement.

Like Aetna,

the

insurer in USLIFE argued that the fidelity loss for which
compensation was sought was not discovered within the bond's
effective period.
Like Fleming, however, the issue in USLIFE
was not when the losses themselves were discovered, but rather

when the dishonest employee conduct that made them fidelity
losses was discovered. That conduct consisted of improper
student loan processing, including failure to comply with
applicable federal regulations, granting the loans to
ineligible students,

and hiding such act? fr^m the insured,

which became known *•" the ;nsnved before the N^nd in question
came into effect . A single additional, impropriety — alleged
kickbacks to the involved employees--came to light after the
bond' s effective date. The insured sought recovery for the
fidelity losses under the bond.
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contained such claims, thus Pj^bZejltinci a covered loss

it

s."fx^.r:^Ti;i;? V":n.ir """'»• "--

K ^ X - j r ! ! ^ ! ' '"

?central 0°»*
'!>• WW"
»< lo»» byoov.r,,,
Sr„LJh.r
to its f"
holding
nor supported
the cases
cit^ 12

orAe^rporrt^ere1^ ^ ^ ^ Pe-Li^lupport
made woufdf^'aU^robnbfJitv"- det«r°ed that a ^an it had

^^t^P^^
f.^a at 745. The loan had been made possible bv * hani,
Therefore, the fidelitv n

~

after the bond had terminated.

effectiVe'PerLd:d:„dtno1^o-^or?hl^U--:iLh^?ndIl.
"hen the employee dishonesty that caused it ^r0'"* bUt °"

353 (Tex. 1968) As Telitr^H^H^9?* °£ M^1*"^ 431 S.W.2d
provision for such o
in ^h I*1•exPense coverage, the
notice requirement,
°„V ^
^ COntained ^s own
promptly notify the in ,
, ',. '"V re0 w^ -bligated to
successful, would -stabl^h , ,
, Pl0ceefJinc's th^t if

provisions. 634 F.ld aj to02

*" " ^ l0SS cov«"ge
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discovered.

While Fle.nung is sparse on details, it appears

that the insured had neither knowledge nor suspicion of the
e:npiMyee dishonesty that caused its loss until'well after the
bond terminated.
Therefore, even if the loss itself was

discovered within the bond period, the identity of that loss as
a fidelity loss was not discovered unti 1 later".

Empire State Bank dealt with losses sustained by an

insured bank after it had liquidated collateral securing
certain loans on which the borrowers had defaulted.

As

occurred in Fleming, an employee of the insured had dishonestly
caused the loans to be made.

Again, although framed as a

question of when the loss was discovered,

the Empire State Bank

dispute actually concerned the discovery of the employee
dishonesty element of the fidelity loss.

The insured had

suspicions as to the dishonesty before the bond in question
went

into effect,

but the suspicions were not confirmed until

the insured uncovered further evidence, after the bond went

into effect. The court deferred to the trial court's finding ~
that the discovery of the employee dishonesty causing the
insured's loss occurred when the suspicions were confirmed, and
not when the suspicions originally arose.
Id. at 366. This
brought the discovery of the fidelity loss within the bond's
coverage

period.

Fleming and Empire State Bank demonstrate that a

determination as to when the employee dishonesty element of a
fidelity loss is discovered is a relatively difficult,
subjective one.

This is particularly true where, as in Empire

State BgnK, a distinction must be made between a suspicion that

this element exists, and confirmation of that suspicion.^-3
where reasonable people could disagree as to when suspicion
thus ripens into discovery, it is appropriate to defer to the

fact finder's determination as to when discovery of the
employee dishonesty element of a fidelity loss occurs. To aid
in this determination, it is appropriate to apply standards
similar to those found in notice requirements.

The fact finder

can and should inquire into when a reasonable person in the
insured's position would have concluded, i.e., discovered, that

dishonest employee conduct had been the cause of a loss. ?4

13 . See also USLIFE . 115 r'a 1. a.pp . ;r* n &t m \ r^ i

14.

RPr-r . 393 .

Courts have m-h~h t-h =. t- ..i,.,, .,,, ,.,Ppi,.vee ,,^ -erved ably in

a position of trust . m19 hlsc^..Qrv ,1(_ ,,iqf_ erc j_^Voo •s

dishonesty cnmes hard ^0 Mie «^pL-y«i.
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3_ej£, e.g'. ,' Perpetual

.nves^rioanr^biscc^rerbn^
T^""* ^ the AFCO
resulting from those on
s s ™h 1°" ^ aCtual J°"

dishonest conduct was discovert , *llshed- Possibly, tha;
However the discovery
^ ^ nfthefMari.,Aetna ^;„,
bond went
into effect.. 15. """ever,
;•-„„, *
.

-"..>-..

«B

succinctly

loss, not dishonesty.

put

hv

the

i-r; = i

T

-"•"•••"'

uuukl

r.

9l C0Urt' the bond covers

souglirbyUAetna" ^a^oot a^neS T^T *" """ the "^-e
of when posslDle loss^a^^aV^Ilo^eT "' te™S
question indicated a clear intent *an*ua?e of the bonds in

(Foot~™t^7i~c<o^^

—

——

—

—

^^H^^

lie

not ordinarily shattered in an L a ' COnfldence °f years i
S

*"*. 448 F.2d at 366. This hiohliohts'th -"Jl E*X^^^1
Pinpointing the time whe L I ' S, he difficulty cf

fidelity loss
is disc
v e"4™
discovery
may vary
according
!

trustworthiness.

^^
he

-'" ^^
"P^ity
of such

°'"

accordln9 to an employee's perceived

ve

v

t»

over ..no u*

, ,•

,,;:7 ;•

,

rc

"^'-;

not

discovered

° 'w'- ^^ »*d b;en

the employee dishonesty ,„ knort/ '\" ""*' ";-n^ -^gues that

force.

S'? "/ns Ln'JWI! i^t'-i- M,e bond went into
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di scovered.
The subject bonds in Royal Trust Bank v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co., 738 F.2d 7 19 (11th Cir. 1986), and Home
Life Ins• Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, ^73 p.2d 666
( l')89) , each contained a section four provision that differs
substantially f rem section four of Home's Aetna bond.
Section
four of the Royal Trust and Clay bonds each provided:

This bond applies to loss discovered by
the Insured during the bond period.
Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes
aware of

facts

which would cause

a

reasonable person to assume that a loss
covered by the bond has been or will be

incurred, even though the exact amount or
details of loss may not then be known.
Royal

Trust,

788

F.2d

at

720;

Clay,

773

P.2d

at

676.

This

language clearly ties coverage to discovery of possible loss,
because the definition of discovery is given in the context of*
the bonds'

applicability,

requirements.

rather

In contrast,

than in the context of

the bond at issue here,

promising coverage for "sustained"

loss,

notice

by

indicates that

coverage turns on actual, rather than possible losses.6

Royal

Trust and Clay are instructive as to how Aetna might have
drafted its bond to obtain the result it now seeks.
As
actually drafted, however, the Aetna bond does not limit

coverage in the fashion accomplished by the Royal Trust and
Clay bonds.
We cannot

accept Aetna's

contention that

the

loss element

of a fidelity loss means possible loss. A possible loss, no
matter how likely and no matter how closely tied to employee
dishonesty, is no more compensable under the bond than is
employee dishonesty standing alone.
Indeed, a possible loss
may turn out to be no loss at all, for which no coverage is
available.
Just as the employee dishonesty element must be

discovered beyond mere suspicion to create a fidelity loss, so
must

the loss element be established,

and not merely be deemed

16.
Royal Trust also indicates that the bond in question there
contained a rider that provided, "there shall be no liability
in respect of any claim . .
=* r is i m
out nf =>nv circumstance
or occurrence known ^
t'10 ".-:^"'^d pi i"> t-- l h^_ inception

hereof and not disclosed '" o^io r-.,-,, i-,:-,, .- ., r inoeption."
738
F.2d at 720. Home's Aetna bond ^'uitains no similar language
limiting coverage.
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possible.

It makes no sense, without bond language clearlv

California Court of Appeals noted that in the case of

'

^ttlame^ime^t^r^ud
«™»""r
as me fraud, ^nd
and "^
might ^
not occur
at all:occur'
[I]n the case of a secured loan made

because of fraudulent misrepresentations,
the fraud and the loss do not necessarily

occur at the same time.

The loss may

occur much later Qijfii.^^n since the

debtor may eventually become creditworthy

or the underlying property may appreciate

suffered.30 that n° aCtUal l0SS ^ —
212 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (emphasis in original).

™ch
UK.8thr&C.&nr£^^
processing by Glad diri ™£

i-

The dishonest loan

Possible losL The possibl.lTo^3,617 S3"36 a l0SS' but »"ly a
that
we e resisting
elisMrTrV"9"^1^
thS "eWS
loans,thebutAFCO
thisinvestors
rP.i,t J!
repayment of their
action against Home stiu'd?dennrhen U devel°Ped into legal
The actual loss ro™ n ! t .1 amount to an actual loss.

subsequent julgmenTba^ed Home ?* ^^^ ^

verdict and

the loans. Vs ^^l^^^l^^^h^^r
°"
,,;_,,
a" ^ hY

already-known empl"i- di~h->np- <-••

discovered within the ,ff=,,, ^ ^, ,/, ^ h '''7 "V"'
to apply.

Because the Armitaa- ,7

7 7 ^ond f,

""] '° be
•• verage

rendered during the effe^77e77 ^t^*^ ^
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loss was both sustained and discovered, completing the
discovery of the fidelity loss, during the bond period.
•\ etna

a lso

relies

agreements, which
bond's Condi tions

on

t he

preamble to the

insuring

makes cov erage subject to compliance with
and Limit ations, including the notice

the

requi rement,

to support its argument that "discovery of loss"
of possibl e loss," throughout the bond.
We
are not pers uaded.
The not ice requirement itself, not the
definition o f discovery fou nd in its rider, forms the condition
"disco very

means

that

must

be

met.

Nor

is

t here

evidence

that

the

definition of

discovery ap plicable to the notice requirement

is intended to
apply to the bond's insurin g agreements.
Two aspects of the
relationship of the notice rider to the bond belie such intent.

First, the
revise sections

tider itself
12 and 4" of

indi cates
the bond,

that

it

is

intended

"to

the "Rights after
Termination" and the notice requi rement, respectively.
If the
definition of "discovery" contain ed in the rider were intended*

to apply to that term everywhere it appears in the bond, the
rider should not have been labele d as revising only sections
twelve and four.
Second, section one of the conditions and
limitations portion of the bond i s specifically entitled

"Definit ions," and gives certain terms meanings that apply
the bond.
If the defi nit ion of "discovery" found in
the notice rider were to apply th roughout the bond, the rider,
once again, could and should have been made applicable to
throughout

section one, instead of simply to sections twelve and four.
do

not

ascribe to

the

assertion o f our dissenting

that the "average purchaser" of

We

colleague,

a fidelity bond would readily

17.
The dissent inco rrectly argues that u nder our reasoning, a
loss is sustained onl y when actual damages are precisely
determined.
The tria 1 court held that a 1 oss was sustained by

Home on August 14, 19 84, when the jury ver diet was rendered,
well within the bond period.
Such verdict established Home's

liability for acts of a dishonest employee , and, therefore, its
discovery of a loss s ustained.
Subsequent determination of the
exact amount of the 1 oss did not affect th at discovery.
Furthermore, Aetna di d not argue at trial and has not argued on
appeal that the disco very of loss occurred after bond
coverage.
Any such a raument w^u1d ho cent rarv to one of the
i n i • \ ij i) cir 1 j;i Mi" p :-s t ': i":; ' 'Stipulated
"'-incontroverted f ^ct s

pretrial order,

s t a t i nq

extended through Augu argues an issue not p r

390101-CA

that- ' •• - vo l ? '.i•J
" nde l 'he
]n ,
' •: n <;
ti,q ,], 5 sent,
o po r 1 v ' >e f <m e us.
'-
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bond

was

'-.herefore,

"disc
as opp

posed to defining covered losses in the insuring

7^r:=--;a^'7 -

LCIce'

«E1IHd'777

effect 7f fhJ disco^- before the Aetna bond wentTnto

lofr^orbeing^ove^ed^L^ th-Tb^' *"" ^ >™™ ^
MISREPRESENTATION IN BOND APPLICATION

in "M.^ .-,, Hlo , ime Home appUed
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for

the

That provision reads,

bond.

in relevant part

Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment
of facts, and incorrect statements [in an

insurance application]

shall not prevent a

recovery under the policy or contract
unless:

(a)

fraudulent ; or

(b) material either to the acceptance of
the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the
insurer;

(c)

or

the insurer

in good faith either

would not have issued the policy or
contract

.

.

.

, or

would

not

have

provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the insurer

as required either by the application for
the policy or contract or otherwise.
Aetna

correctl y

notes

tha t

subsections

(a) , (b),

and

(c)

listed disjunct ively,

by t he word "or," so that the
sat i sfact ion of onl y one subse ction can prevent recovery under
the policy.
Berger v. Minneso ta Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 723 P. 2d
188, 390 (Utah 1986).
Here th e jury, by specia 1
i nte rrogatories, found that in the bond applica tion Home had
are

unin tentionally

misrepresented or omitted facts

that

were

rial to the risk to be ass umed, and that ha d those facts
been disclosed, Aetna would ha ve either not iss ued the bond or
excl uded coverage for the cons equences of Glad' s dishonesty,
Ther efore, while fraud was not proven, the "mat eriality" and
"wou Id not have provided cover age" bases for de nying recovery
were
established under the sta tute's subsection s (b) and (c). 19
mate

18.

Section 31-19-8 was replaced by Utah Code Ann.

§ 31A-21-105 in 1986.

19.
The trial court subsequently ruled that there was
insufficient competent evidence rn n^t-^hi ish *-he "w"ild not
have provided co vo raae " -i5t-^r"-i*-i--^; ,m; id^U'vj -•: h<? or; m '"• ris

(b) and (c) in th" com uncti"e , >iHio, ii,q,, M,e disjunctive,
held that the stat nto ry '. Qqu iremen ts for denial of coverage had
not been met.
as our analysis

We do not,
focuses on

however, address the court's ruling,
the fact that the omitted material

information was not requested in the bond application.
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The bond application in question is a standard form

furnished by Aetna. Among other inquiries, it asks the
applicant to list employees to be covered by the bond, and t0

list all losses sustained . . . during the last six years "

Home responded truthfully to these inquiries. Glad wis

loss from it.

Nor were any other inquiries, by any reasona

reading of the bond application, answered incorrect lb
Ho ble
y by Home.

20.

IT^i:^™^1^

«gVu%rS;"t^ n\T ^ "" n-^ -ng tfie^mployees °i
whether
SartiruT«r employee
™V ^is^listed
Under onthea bond"
^nni^L a particular
fidelityHowever,
bend
s" C;:?;:hl ^Possible importance, is not dllposr ive

period and there 7 „o '„„,, „7 7^ 7

,777 ''7" the b""d

that the employee List is n^n^Ht. 7 delusive? '^^
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Aetna argues that S_u m ltomo Bank of California v. Iwas aki,
"3 Cal. Rptr. 564, 447 p.2d 956 (1968), Phoenix Sav . S. Loan,
7nc^. v. Aetna Casualty S« Sur. Co., 266 F.Supp 465 (D. Md. 1966),

and West Am. Fin. Co. v.
App.

1936),

Pacific Indem. Co., 61 P.2d 963 (Cal.

establish a duty on the part of an insurance

applicant to volunteer information not requested in the
application.
As noted by the trial court, none of those cases
clearly addresses such a duty in the context of whether or not

the insurer had ever requested the information in question.
However, in dictum, Sumitomo notes "an absolute duty upon the
obligee to volunteer disclosure of all facts materially
affecting the risk to the surety on a fidelity bond." 447 P.2d
at 960.^
To the extent that Sumitomo suggests that a surety

insurance applicant has a duty to disclose facts^about which no
inquiry is made, we decl ine to fo1 low that case.22

We believe the rule stated in Couch is more appropriate:
"It is an insurer's duty to ascertain the facts, and if nothing
21.
Sumitomo did not involve a fidelity bond, but a "creditor
bond," guaranteeing repayment of loans.
The case involved the

question of whether the insured had a continuing duty to
disclose adverse material information discovered during the
course of the insurance contract.
447 P.2d at 958.
It
therefore did not address the question of whether an insurance

applicant has an initial duty to volunteer unrequested
information during the application process.
22•
Wpptton v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52,
395 P.2d 724 (1964), the only Utah case to which we have been

directed on this issue, suggests a result contrary to that
urged by Aetna.
In Wpptton, our supreme court held that the
fai lure to volunteer certain information on an insurance
application "cannot reasonably be considered as sufficient

evidence upon which to base a finding of intent to defraud."
395 P.2d at 726.

Because intentional misrepresentation was the

issue in WoottoH/

and because the omitted information in that

case was not material to the risk for which recovery was

sought, that case is not on all fours with the present case.
The court did note,

however,

that the insurer had failed to

inquire about the omitted information, despite being aware of a
possible risk, and that the injure'- '-oi 1d n~. i- No por^h^ed to
thus "blind itself 7"1" -> -.:r-f-;. *- m m n-i m1q ' .•, *_ i, .,,-,,.] M-i^n claim

wilful misrepresentation
a policy."
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>" -'v id payment under

is concealed, and it makes no inauiHe^

that the situation was not wh777

OILinsuran^ 2d § 38-72 (1985)

if.

' 7 cannot complain

ThisT^ 7 t0 bS' " 9 ^^

applicable to fidelity bonds ^See 7 7^7}™le'* Pr°Perly

rii?H^s^S^^-^r^^
-

..^ = ^

iu

uur

recitation of

the standard „<=

insurance applications, problems a

,1?

:rr"v-3Llu"'

rSVleW aP?ilerl to

failure to clearly make re evanf ariSlng from an insurer's

insurer. A contrary ru7 would iTeff1^ re3t "ith the
insurance applicant to77T7=7 7 effect- require an

issue the applied7or policy 23tlVely con-^e an insurer not to

AetnaW771nc7ude7nqhuairies7n1?heabo7dbeen
l"*"*1* -"«
leveal the omitted material inform^" aPPllcation
desicned<°<to.

could have been draf t^d regardnH h" ' SlmplS ^stions
^d the pendency of a„su7ts or other
' f°rmer emPlc'^es

cause a covered loss.24

Contrarv to t7 ™tances that might

?o
not ignore the statutory
hlb H n nf1SSMtin9 opinion, we
insureds, but construe it fnpronit,ltlon of omissions by

an questions vosltTn the% i^Ln^omi11^ •^^ "8wer

-s^c^ateT^?:-i-aLurb:
-\r--n-r--c-t
"«nt. with no reasonable means o^1?^^s^Ta^on.
in the^nrapp'u^LT TnaV.^ ^^^ was not as.ed for
withhold
thatTnfoption TroTtTnt "weVJS T inte"tionaUy
under the bond cannot be denied u^ll T °ld that recovery

§ 31-19-8.

denied under former Utah Code Ann.

24. The Aetna underwrito, ....,,, ,oc., •,• ,
that, subsequent to "the Y>« • 1IjnI
"
"'" Ulal indicated

— aquestion about ^di„q' ^ i^'to Vt^"aPP^t^.
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TRADING

EXCLUSION

Aetna's fourth argument en appeal is that Home's loss

resulted from its trading in securities, and that the loss is
therefore excluded from coverage under rider 6030a of the

bond. b The relevant portion of rider 6030a states:
The Underwriter shall not

be liable under

the attached bond for any loss resulting
directly or indirectly from trading, with
or without the knowledge of the Insured,
in the name of the Insured or otherwise,
whether or not represented by any
indebtedness or balance shown to be due
the Insured on any customer's account,

actual or fictitious, and notwithstanding
any act or omission on the part of any
Employee in connection with any account
relating to such trading, indebtedness, or

z

balance.

The parties agree that "trading" in rider 6030a means
"trading in securities." Accord, Shearson/American Express.

Inc. v. First Continental Bank. 579 F.Supp. 1305, 1310-12 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (because exclusion was adopted from stockbrokers'

blanket bond, term "trading" refers to trading in securities).
The dispute is whether, as a matter of law, Home's losses on
the AFCO investor loans resulted from trading in securities.

The Armitage verdict against Home was based on a finding
that Home had been a seller of securities for the purpose of
proving violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 and of section 61-1-22(1)(a) of the Utah Uniform

Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1989).

The

securities involved were the promissory notes the AFCO
investors received from AFCO in return for their

investments. 6 The funds used to make those investments came
from the second mortgage loans Home made to the investors.

Home's status as a seller of securities arose from the grant of
25. Aetna's trading exclusion argument was presented to the
trial court in a motion for summary iudcrment, which was denied.
26 . The Armi taae iurv w^s ilp" inn t'u'-t-ed t-ipr n,e trust deeds

received by Home fo secure the AFCO investor l^ans^were not^
securities.
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nr.hJ0anS;,,Mit!!0i!t
"hiCh
thS Purchase of the AFCO promissory
notes would not have
occurred.
The jury in the AimiUae case also found that Home had

engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase
of
the%e a.feCurit^ and ^ therefore violated section 0(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under that act.

with ThS
^i31 C°Urt
bhat status
Horae's asconduct
in of
connection
with
securities
sales hSld
and its
a seller
securities
rnL ? purP°se of the securities acts violations did not
compel a conclusion that it had tended securities within the
meaning of the rider 6030a tradir, exclusion. Aetna poins out
"di ectl" 6030a.excl^s coverage of losses resulting'
°Ut
„ ectly ox indiifictlsr" from trading in securities. Because
Home was indirectly involved in securities trading by vUtue of

its loans to the AFCO investors, Aetna argues tha? the trading

exclusion applies. Based on our understanding of the purpose
*
of the trading exclusion, we disagree.
purpose
tradin^"S?n/Amf'r7'-F,n FKBJcaaa relates the history of the
The
= 9,
°" adopted
ln b°ndS from
issued
t0 financialbonds
institutions
The exclusion
was
stockbrokers'
in the 1370s

because financial institutions were becoming increasing y
thin
^ Th"'163
Presents highe
? sks
than the
the usual
business tlading'
of these which
institutions.
Insurers
believing that the extra risks involved in securities tradinn

the tradino" 'T^ WithOUt °harging "i^r premium .adopted

coverage
suchDigest
risks of
fromBank
standard
coverage. 9^rrUr°n
579 F.Supp. t0.eliminate
at 1310 (citing
Insurance, 35 (3d ed. 1977)).

TOI "[ HapKl

that thent^HteS two,cases as authority for the proposition
more than
7? exclusi°" applies where the insured does no

invest
IT T67 t0 Neither
3 Custoraer
then uses
that money
invest ?n
in securities.
case,wh°however
supports
the to

acceptance of noncertifier) -hecks, ,

payment for securities it ,.,,u]

,,,

i, h„o,", "n„„"°o

,,: , ' Y

Y ' ln

the trading exclusion barred UcoJery' ./"he
insureds oTtheir
-n« msureas
on their

surety bonds.

890101-CA

32

Shearson/Amer ican Express

and

Sutro

Bros,

involved actual

ownership interests in traded securities by the insured or an
insured's employee.
The losses suffered by the insureds were
indirect, in that they did not result from the insured's own
securities speculation, but from unauthorized speculation by an
insured's employee and from the receipt of improper payment for
securities, rather than from market losses suffered by the
insureds.
The history of the trading exclusion, related in
Shear son/American Express,

exclude

losses

employee's,

resulting

actual

indicates

from the

investment

it

is

intended

insured's,

that

or

the

in securities.

It

to

insured's

does

not

indicate that losses resulting from an insured's customers'
investments

are

to

be excluded.

Other courts have held that
only to

on

insured's market

the trading exclusion applies

losses

in securities

transactions

stemming from market fluctuations.
See First Federal Sav.
Loan v. Fidelitv S< Deposit Co. of Maryland, 895 F.2d 254,
260-61 (6th Cir. 1990); Insurance Co. of N. Am.
Inc., 847 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1988).
Here,
market losses accrued to Home's loan customers,

investors.

£<

v. Gibralco,
~
the securities
the AFCO

Home's loss arose only when those disappointed

investors were able to avoid their obligation to repay the
invested funds,

as a result of the Armitage judgment.

Aetna points to no case holding the trading exclusion to
apply where the insured did not acguire at least an arguable
ownership interest in securities.
Here, Home acquired an
interest only in real estate, by the trust deeds on the AFCO
investors' homes. As such, Home was assuming a routine risk of
a lending institution, not the high risk of securities
speculation to which the trading exclusion is directed.

Gibralco also expresses a sound approach to the trading
exclusion when employee fidelity coverage is implicated:
We do not agree with [the insurer]

that

the trading loss exclusion precludes
coverage if

a trade occurs anywhere in the

chain of events resulting in a loss to the
insured.
The broad applicability of the
trading loss exclusion urged by [the
insurer] would evisoerat-e hhR omp io vee
dishonesty --->-•^ > -> --i ^ <- • • •-Y •Y >m> ^ ••('^ p- >i,-1

in every •" ase '"liri \ c ' * -t-i.^ -n Yd y ••>••-••>} r
the course •Y '* n e n i'1->y « e 's dishonest
scheme.

847

F.2d
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[ •]

Here, Glad's dishonest conduct was the ultimate cause of
Home's loss.
Glad's conduct, however, included no

representation that either Glad or Home was engaging in
securities trading in a manner that the trading exclusion is
intended to discourage.
The Aetna bond's fidelity loss
coverage should not be defeated by an expansive interpretation
of the trading exclusion.
Therefore, we ho Id that Home's loss
is not excluded from coverage by the trading exclusion.

JURY

INSTRUCTIONS

Aetna's fifth argument on appeal is that the instructions
given to the jury improperly failed to allow the jury to
consider Home's own mismanagement and poor business judgment as
the cause of

its

loss.

At

trial,

Aetna elicited voluminous

testimony about Home's alleged mismanagement and bad judgment

in connection with the AFCO investor loans.

Aetna argued

strenuously that mi smanagement and poor judgment,
dishonesty, caused the AFCO investor loan fiasco.

._

not employee

It is incumbent upon the trial court to instruct the jury
on both parties' theories of the case, so long as competent
evidence has been presented in support of those theories.
Powers v. Gene's Bldq. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174,
1977); Pacific Chromalox Div. v. Irev, 787 P.2d 1319,

(Utah App.

1990).

Utah R. Civ.

P.

of jury instructions upon timely,

51

176 (Utah
1328
permits appellate review

specific objection, or at the

appellate court's discretion:

No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless

27.
Much of Aetna's argument on this point is devoted to its
argument that Home's recovery under the bond, under an
"equitable apportionment" theory, should be reduced according
to the portion of its loss caused by mismanagement, as opposed
to Glad's dishonesty.
Aetna did propose a jury instruction
allowing such apportionment, but the trial court refused to

give that instruction.
Aetna did not object to the refusal to
so instruct the jury, nor does it appeal that refusal now.
Nor
does Aetna's answer to Home's comcl^int. the stipulated
pretrial order in this ar-M-in, "' ^iivr-hin^ .jI-q ;n i he record
to which we have been directed, Yi<)i',^|'i HirY "•.etna otherwise

presented its appor t ionment then iy t<i the trial court.
Therefore, on appeal, we do not consider jury Instruction
errors related to that theory.
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he objects thereto.
In objecting to the
giving of an instruction, a party must
state distinctly the matter

to

which he

objects and the grounds for his

objection.

Notwithstanding the foregoing

requi rement,
discretion

justice,

the appellate court,

and

in the

may review the giving of or

failure to give

Under Rule 51, we
errors

in its

interests of

an

instruction.

first examine the claimed jury instruction

to which Aetna objected in

the trial court.

Aetna objected to instruction number twenty-nine.
In
substance, instruction twenty-nine told the jury that any
negligent failure by Home to prevent Glad's dishonest conduct

was not a defense to coverage under the bond.2^ We do not
perceive Aetna's point on appeal to be related to Home's
__
failure to prevent Glad's dishonesty; rather, it is related to""
alleged general mismanagement and poor business judgment in

approving the AFCO investor loans. 9

The thrust of instruction

twenty-nine, however, is limited to Home's failure to prevent
G lad's dishonest conduct.
So limited, the instruction properly

28.

Instruction

29

reads:

You are instructed that negligence
resulting from the existence of inadequate
policies and procedures at Home Savings,
or the failure to follow policies and
procedures then in place at Home Savings,
is not a defense
conclusion drawn

available to Aetna if the
therefrom is that better

policies and procedures or adherence
thereto would have checked the dishonesty,

if any, of Larry Glad and prevented a loss
that

would otherwise

surety company is

not

have occurred.

A

released from

liability by the absence of even ordinary
prudence on the part of the insured in
lessening the risk.
The Aetna bond does
not contain any provision to this effect.
2 9.
to

In

its

brief,

show Home 's

Ae t o a

•^o >' <--• '>'". u,

a J i"ued i"i,.:PrVi-'M'j"i,ji'1

- f * ;W1 ' e^ y •"• oiv it used
.mil p-" >t

"isjn^ss

judgment, and characterizes M|ah Lestun^ny ^s dealing with
matters unrelated ^_o Glad's dishonesty.
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states the general rule that, absent a specific bond provision
to the contrary, an insured's negligent failure to prevent
employee dishonesty is not a defense to fidelity loss
coverage.

13 Couch on rn^urjjncja. 2d § 46:233 (1982); First

STr^T^ff^
24rKan.
576, 769 P.2d 1184, 1193 (1989). Instruction twenty-nine
properly limited Aetna's general mismanagement argument to
mismanagement unrelated to Glad's conduct, and, therefore, was

its
DJnf?PrlJS° °^ected to the trial court's refusal to give
its proffered instructions number two and forty-two The

relevant portions of those instructions read as follows:
[Proposed instruction no. two]:

If you

find that the losses sustained by Home
Savings were solely and proximately caused
by Home Savings' own mismanagement
misfeasance or other negligence and/or

failure to follow safe and sound lending

practices, then you must find there is no
coverage for Home Savings under the bond.

[Proposed instruction no. forty-two]- The
law does not necessarily recognize only
one cause of an injury, consisting of only
one factor, one act, or the conduct of

only one person. To the contrary, the
acts and omissions of two or more persons
may work concurrently as the efficient
cause of an event or loss, and in such a
case, each of the participating acts or
omissions is regarded in the law as a
cause.

In this case, the bond allows coverage
only if Home Savings' loss directly
resulted from the dishonest or fraudulent
acts, if any, of Larry Glad. A direct

result requires a connected sequence

between any act of Larry Glad and the loss
tnat ultimately occurred.
,,

—

-

if you find
•~-J«-'l-*i-4.1HJ

tnat a primary contributing r^,^ f-^ f-ho

rsicl Hnmo's I'OSS '.jw U- f-MT,M« ,Y l-}ie
officers ;md .iir.ecf'Ms ,,f n-.,n- snvjnr,s ,-,,
require compliance with appropriate

J

lending practices and procedures, and that
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such failure was the primary cause of its
loss,

then the

loss was

not the direct

result of dishonest or fraudulent acts,

if

any.

Aetna's theory that Home's losses were caused by

mismanagement and poor business judgment was presented to the
jury in instruction twenty one, which provided in part:
"Aetna
also claims . . . that the independent acts and decisions of

Home Savings' management constituted the cause of Home Savings'
loss." Instruction twenty-six similarly advised the jury of
Aetna's view that Home's loss was caused by factors independent
of Glad's dishonesty:
Aetna

has

asserted

as

a

defense

in

this action that the loss Home Savings
sustained in the Armitage litigation
resulted not from the dishonesty of Larry
Glad, but that it directly resulted from a
separate and independent cause.

~

For Aetna to prevail on this
defense, you are instructed that Aetna
must prove the existence of an alternative
cause of Home Savings' loss, i.e.[,] one

separate and independent from Larry Glad's
dishonesty, if any.

Taken together, instructions twenty-one and twenty-six
adequately apprised the jury of Aetna's theory that Home's loss
was caused by mismanagement and bad judgment independent of
Glad's conduct, and invited the jury to find in favor of Aetna

if it agreed with that theory. Instructions two and forty-two,
rejected by the trial court, to the extent they presented the
same theory, were unnecessary; and, in that they presented the
same theory in a longer and more confusing fashion, they were
undesirable. Therefore, it was not error, having given

instructions twenty-one and twenty-six, to refuse to give
instructions two and forty-two.

We now turn to jury instruction arguments presented on
appeal that were not made in the trial court.

Aetna asks us to

exercise our discretion, as permitted under Rule 51, to
entertain the merits of these arouments on appeal.

An

appellant making such a rouuest -mtc;h: r-^nvi'ice Mie appellate
court that the merits of Y— -MoomcntFeredav,
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^18.

6:.'

("f Y

^h'^ilri be heard.

iriR7).
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King v.

specia^ra^for^
consistftfT
C°ndenSed
* the
jury
answered in Home •s
£avor \J
questions,int°
which
verdict form was defective fn fh
ar9USS that the sPecial
a manner that unfairly flvored h™ °neYuestlon »as Phrased i,

proposed by Aetna wa;impropIrly
Te'ft"ut "of^ qUeStl°n
F
y iett out of the special

verdict form.30

»^rsrPK"'Y "j-:~-.S'»r^:so„
verdict form to the

acknowledges that if*

r

i

C°Vrt'

involvement in draftina tho »

°Wn Pr°P°se<3 special

Additionally, Aetna

,'

Aetna's central

ample opportunity to pLserv^obiect^^1^ £0rm 93Ve Aet™

objections^ a^r -^ ^^^d £ &f22th°"
OFFSET OF DAMAGES

loan "i^ip^fsho2irbehoa!^^
&? ?^ ^ ^Trt^s"'
^^
says
„orae recouped on the loans. &leforftr7al™
30.

a^.-=s;s^

s any differently than
ru£ infr"Cti°^ "nder Utah R Civ. T Si"
we apply that
rule and lts related case law to the special soverdict
argument

the
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had agreed that the jury would decide which of the loans fell
within the bond's coverage, and that the trial court would then
calculate Home's loss accordingly.
However, the factual

question of whether the return of certain loan outlays to Home
amounted to a recoupment was neither submitted to the jury nor
ieserved

for

the

court .

Aetna's characterization 0£ the $237,760.77
recoupment on the loans, and thus a reduction of

as a
the loss

sustained by Home, was not made until after the jury's verdict
on Aetna's

liability was

returned.

The characterization is

based on an exhibit and testimony received by the jury, but the
jury was never asked to apply this evidence to determine

whether Aetna's characterization was factually correct.^^
Indeed, we are not directed to anything in the record

indicating that Aetna ever made sn offset-of-loss argument to
the jury.

The trial court noted that while some of the evidence may""
have supported Aetna's argument, it could not make a fact
finding based on that evidence, where Home had not waived its

right to have the jury consider it.
We agree.
"All questions
of fact, where the trial is by jury . . . are to be decided by
the jury, and all evidence is to be addressed to them, except
when otherwise provided."
Utah Code. Ann. § 78-21-2 (1987).
Therefore, Aetna is not entitled to an offset of the damages
sustained by Home on the AFCO investor loans.

LEGAL

FEES

AND

COSTS

Aetna finally argues that legal fees incurred by Home in
the Armitage litigation should not be

32.

recoverable under the

Home strenuously objects to Aetna's characterization of

the partial return of the loan outlays as an offset of Home's
loss,

arguing that the $237,760.77 did not diminish that

but simply averted other losses.

loss,

Although we affirm the

refused offset on the basis of Aetna's failure to submit the

issue to the jury, we note that Home's characterization appears
to be correct.
It does not appear that any of the loan outlays
returned to Home cons t i fM t ed reravmenf nf Y° investors' debts,
wh ich won Id have <edu fed "• ,,re ' ' ' •"••-.
'o•• • <>-• •Y •"• ^ t n a '~ exhibit

reflects that fhp i»iii' •o the -..> h.,,,,<..ri '.,,,, '•i-w]s •_.,as applied
toward satisfaction of a d^b*- '"^'1 'U rec*- ly 'o Home by AFCO,
toward the

recission of

Y-/o

the subject of litigation,
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bond.

The fooS fall

• .

,

*<"-™-™.U" we Ser't^ tfof-f/^—-} "^ °

^na^rsT^ tnl* T^ot co^rV™^ P^tirrs,
exclusion. Because we have alread^f U"der the b°"d's trading
«c
usion does not bar ci, 6 rHo^'fr that ^ *»* "|
fails. Next, Aetna argues that thl ^ ! S loss' this argument

or the Arrnitaae judgment against Home 0neSt 3CtS ^ponsioTe

but statutory, ,nalum u^hlhllnm rrT^ Were n0t m-a-1^ in S£,

- bond's fidelity-i^f™

Th^ ^ lncl^edYitt n

^onesty,
but ny-^ine K^n" cause,, not^Cla^T .
AFCO investors' Loan agreements dlshonest backdating of the*

Reese backdated the documents at r? h?USS °f evide«« that
argument is also unpersuasive » ^ S di^ction, this
egal fees that were awarded to the "a" ^f P3y the $"0,647.31
Home because these fees were part „>OV^f^ Plaintiffs against
a* a result of that lawsuit
f the loss sustained by Home

Cof
the'bonrrndem^ifie's Ho'e'fo?
*7f^'
General Agreement
attorneys' fees incurred
on
Utt C0Sts and reasonable

damage which, if establish
', '
account of any loss
1 !
KscaDlished against t-h= •
ubs' claim
constitute a valid and collerMhi2 ,
lnsured, would
rnn,HL„.

or

Insured under the terms of th,sh i°SS sustained by the
one of the seven causes of action" 1 Aet"a 3^ues that only

covered loss under the bond and th" hjmii^^ represents a Y
under General Agreement C should "! ?' ltS obligation

the stipulated total, i.^ ^ s^To.^we disagree.
*° °—enth

3 3

"y the
the axm^p,^^"
armiaae Plaintiffs

the am0Unt °"ginal]77St

SaV-s~ ^P^i---;:,-- -— as Home,

this
"V 'J0US '"•'"' »'-""'^ d,lh
M,= portion
,ight h, of
thlS %;
am°unt.
•'"' 7'" '°"'•"»•'
'=r;„,.or „ly
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As noted by the trial court, Aetna 's "one-seventh" formula
is over 1y mechanistic and reflects no examination of the actual
allocation of attorney time and effort among the seven causes
of act ion. Add it ionally, Aetna"s formula turns on various
arguments, already rejected here and by the trial court, that

some of the seven causes of action are not covered by the
bond.

These arguments cannot be resurrected to reduce the fees

due under Genera I Ag reement C.

Finally,

the stipulated total reasonable defense fees,

$'43 7,500.00, was decided upon after the trial court rejected
Aetna

's "one-seventh"

formula.

In the stipulation, Aetna

" s pec ifically

reserve[d] the right to appeal the issue of
wheth er Home Savings is entitled to any attorneys'
fees, if it
is de termined that Aetna owed no obligation to provide coverage
under the Bond."
(Emphasis added.)
Because we have determined

fhat Aetna Ls_ obligated to provide coverage under the bond, it
appears that, under the stipulation, Aetna has waived its right
I- n

appeal whether any attorney fees are due.

In sum, the legal fees awarded to the Armitage plaintiffs

against Home and the stipulated amount expended by Home in its
defense of the Armitage litigation are both covered under the
bond, and are to be reimbursed by Aetna.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment in
favor of Home Savings is affirmed in all respects.

£^C 7~
Famela T. Greenwood,

I

Judge

CONCUR:

•Tudi th

M . Pi 11 inus .
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HENCH,

Presiding Judge (dissenting):

The majority holds that there i s a distinction between the
phrase "discovery of loss" as it is used to determine coverage
and "discovery of loss" as it used t o t rigger notice
requirements.
The majority thereby adopts a minority, if not a
totally novel, interpretation of dis covery bonds and demands a
significant departure from current i ndustry practices.
I
believe that, under the terms of the bond, Aetna is not liable
to Home for any loss resulting from the dishonesty of Glad or
the Armitage lawsuit. Any coverage for the loss arising from
the Armitage lawsuit must be found u nder the F&D bond, not the
Aetna bond.
Home is simply seeking recovery from the wrong

insurer.

r therefore respectful 1yd issent.

The loss was not discovered during Aetna's bond period for
any one of three reasons: (1) Rider 6091 expressly provides
that discovery includes potential losses; (2) even without the

nder, a loss arising from liability created by the dishonesty*
of an employee may be discovered when the employee's dishonest
conduct is discovered, though the liability has not yet been
adjudicated; and, (3) under the majority's own rule that a loss
may not be discovered until it is sustained, the Armitage loss
could not have been discovered during the bond period because
it was not sustained until after the effective period of the
bond .

The loss also was not covered because it fell within the

exclusion found in Section 11 of the bond. Section 11 excludes
from coverage all employees previously known to have committed
a dishonest

act.

Home also should be barred from seeking recovery for any
damages resulting from the Armitage lawsuit because it did not,
as required by statute, disclose in its application the pending
Arrrutaqe claim, a material fact regarding the hazard assumed by
J

Aetna.

In view of the foregoing arguments, any one of which

should be dispositive, I dissent without opinion as to -he
other issues addressed by the majority with the exception of
the offset issue. Even if the loss were covered by the bond,
the majority errs in not remanding r-h i^ case for consideration
of the offset of damages
reserved the
court rather

issu>-> <> f
than the

f-:-no
- ''"''"'
<",-o '"Y bo iod'".^ load express
r:""D "

''•'in.vipc; r.. i -'•>( o ,r„ ;M;n» Ymi by i- he trial
inr. y.
n,ainauoo simply may not be

determined without addressing any claimed offset.
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I.

CONTRACT

INTERPRETATION

The majority either misapplies or ignores the following
recognized rules of contract interpretation.
"The cardinal rule is to give effect to the intentions of
the parties, and, if possible, to glean those intentions from

the contract itself."

G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841,

845 (Utah App.

S_£e_ also LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life

1989).

Ins. Ccu, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (applying the same
principle to an insurance contract).
"A construction which
contradicts the general purpose of the contract ... is
presumed to be unintended by the parties."
LPS Hospital. 765
P.2d at 859 (quoting Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins.

Co_^, 99 Wash.2d 65, 659 P.2d 509,

511 (1983)).

"In interpreting a contract, we determine what the parties
intended by examining the entire contract and all of its oarts^
in relation to each other, giving an objective and reasonable
construction to the contract as a whole."
G.G.A., 773 P.2d at

845 (citing Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah
1982)) (emphasis added).

S_g_e also Western Surety Co. v.

Murupjhy., 754 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Utah App. 1988) (applying the same
rule to a surety bond).

"Where questions arise in the

interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is
within the document itself.

It should be looked at in its

entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts
should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big
Cottonwood Tanner Pitch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted).

"[I]t is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted
so as t0 harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms,
which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do
so-" LPS Hospital/ 765 P.2d at 858 (emphasis added). Courts
may not view a subparagraph of a policy in isolation to

determine if it is ambiguous; all provisions of a policy must
be interpreted together as one contract.

Village Inn

Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 583
(Utah App. 1990) (citing 2 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance
Law § 15.29 (rev. ed. 1984)); c_f. Drauahon v. CUNA Mut. Ins.

SoCy, 771 P-2d 1105, 1108 n.3 (Utah App. 1989) (reviewing
particular provisions in their overall context often aids
interpretation).

"Unless there is some ambiguity '.it uncertainty in the

language of the policy, it should be enforced according to its
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terms. We presume that the language used ... was included
for the purpose stated and [we will] give effect to its usual
and ordinary meaning." Bear River Mut. m,, Co. v. Wrinhi- '770

P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah App. l^iTtcTTttions omit ted)
Contract language may be ambiguous if it
is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms
used to express the intention of the

parties may be understood to have two or

more plausible meanings. A policy term is
not ambiguous, however, merely because one
party assigns a different meaning to it in
accordance with his or her own interests.

Village Inn Apartments, 790 P.2d at 583 (citations omitted).
In determining whether a provision is capable
more plausible meanings, such interpretations must

upon the "usual and natural" meaning of the languaq
may not be the result of a "forced or strained cons

Buehrier. Block Co , v, HWr.Assag^, 752 P.2d 892, 896

(gating AutQ lease Co, y. Central Mut. Tnr, m,

of two or
be based
e used and *
truction."

(Utah 1988)
7 Utah
2d

336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958)). "Contract terms are not necessarily
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a
different meaning than that relied upon by the draf t e r . "
Bjjefrner Block rn,, 752 P.2d at 895. £££ also
v. HinJjle.,

611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980) ("contract provisions are not
rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that the part ies urge

diverse interpretations.").

An insurance "policy should be interpreted in accordance
with the way it would be understood by the average person

purchasing insurance." W&Mn^iXAl, 765 P.2d a 859

^

^Kf' 7?1 P-2d at l108- The test for determininf\he

iS^^oSrt'L^^Jo^T C°ntraCt haS ^ Stat6d ^ theVah
Would the meaning [of the language of the
insurance contract] be plain to a person
of ordinary intelligence and

understanding, viewing the matter fairly
and reasonably, in accordance with the
usual and natural meaning of the words,
and in_ light of the circumstances,

including the p" rprY^_Yf_ __L! ie vol icy .

Id. at 858-59 (quoting Auto Lease Co.. 325 P.2d at

(emphasis added).
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266)
Exch

786

r.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1990) ("we examine the language from
the viewpoint of the average purchaser of insurance").
Farties to an insurance policy "are free to define the

exact scope of the policy's coverage and may specify the losses
or encumbrances the policy is intended to encompass." Valley

Bank S. Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 933," 936
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting Brown v. St.
634 F. 2d 1103, 1107 (8 th Cir. 1980)).

Paul Title Ins.

Corp..

An insurer has the right to contract with
an insured as to the risks it will or will
not assume, as long as neither statutory
law nor public policy is violated.
Thus

an insurer may include in a policy any
number or

kind of exceptions and

limitations to 'which an insured will agree
unless contrary to statute or public
policy.

Farmers Ins. Exch.

»

v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1985).

Despite the liberal interpretations often afforded the
insured in insurance contracts, "[i]t is not the function of a
court to rewrite an unambiguous contract."
Crowther v. Carter,
767 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Provo City Corp. v.

Neilsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979)).

"In

construing fidelity bonds, courts follow the liberal rules
applicable to insurance contracts.
However, the bond cannot be

extended by implication or enlarged by construction beyond the
actual terms of the agreement entered into by the parties."
FDIC v. Aetna Casualty St Surety Co., 426 F.2d 729, 736 (5th
Cir.

1970).

These express contract provisions are not
rendered ambiguous merely because
appellant claims they should be

interpreted other than according to their
plain meaning. . . . [Wle will not iniect
ambiguity into a contract where none
exists in order to save fa party] from
what,

in retrospect,

seems

an ill-advised

agreement.

Crowther . 767 F .;:d at ]:: '-mph io io udo.i).
Bank & Trust Co . , 7 76

p .yi

at

-^ ai~rj Valley

,] ^7 .

The unambiguous language of the Aetna bond must therefore
be enforced as written, even if the result is that the loss is
not covered by the Aetna
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r i.

DISCOVERY OF LOSS

While this appears to be the first time Utah courts have
been called upon to interpret the effect
hdVe

^ltn^es^^^15-n57^
"ot "°ve'l. ?f The^orH
of law that al?nores industry practice and adopts a novel
y

£ law that a loss may not be discovered until the actual
damages resulting from the liability are determined

rule

The majority's interpretation of the bond is contrary to
d i iew it as a part of the contract as a whole

A n.rrh^pr

discov"yrya^^h:SUld reaS?nab1^ -terp.et the def? t

l uiscovery, attached as new lanquaqe in Section 4, as the on
definition of discovery as that t
erm is used throughout the

1"A discovery provision in a bond limiting liability to"
losses discovered [during the
termj of the bond is valid and

enforceable.

The contract must be construed the way the
parties have plainly writt
en lt-" Wachovia Rank s. Tm^'r^,
Manufacturers Casualty Tns --XQ_u,
171 F.Supp. 369, 375 (M.D.N.C
19 5 9).

A

provision o f

a fidelity bond which

clearly limit s the liability of the
insurer to lo sses discovered within a
certain speci fied period must be
enforced acco rding to its terms, so that
there can be no recovery on a fidelity
bond if the 1oss is not discovered

within the ti me specified therein.

13 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 46.191 (1982 ed.).

The Underwriter, in consideration of an
agreed premium, and subject to the

Declarations made a part hereof, the
General Agreements, Conditions and
Limitations and other terms of this Bond
agrees

with

t-he

in Rii r ed

to^loss .su_s_t_a ' "o,i I-- t-i
time b u t __d_i_s c o"•e r ° u • MIT

:-H th r^esp_ec t
-1 it •ll1y
T M 'T

Pexied, to indemnify ,:(,kI iV

Insut-d for; [th- frY.lMv.Yng
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t_
h_

_ H, ,nr]

'' harmless the
osses I .

bond.

Even if Rider 6091 did not exist,

the majority's

interpretation is a clear departure from the established case
law which is in
discovery found

If,

fact consistent with
in Rider 6091.

on the other hand,

it is fully adjudicated,

the definition of

a loss may not be discovered unt11

as held by the majority,

then the loss

claimed by Home in this case still could not have been

discovered during the Aetna bond period because the Armitage
judgment was not entered until after the Aetna bond period had
expired.

So the Armitage

loss was

discovered either

before the

Aetna bond period, as I propose, or after the Aetna bond
period, as the majority's analysis dictates, but it was not
discovered during the Aetna bond period.
A.

Rider

6091

The bond clearly states that both coverage and the
procedural requirements of Section 4 are triggered by the

*

discovery of a loss.
Discovery is defined in the bond by means
of Rider 6091, which states in relevant part:
The attached bond is further amended by
inserting the following as the final
paragraph of Section 4:

Discovery occurs when the
Insured

becomes

aware of

facts

which

would cause a reasonable person to
assume that a loss covered by the
bond has been or will
even though the exact

details of
known.

be incurred
amount or

loss may not

Notice

to

the

be then

insured of

an

actual or potential claim by a third
party which alleges that the insured
is liable under circumstances,
which,
under

if
this

true,

would create a

bond constitutes

loss

such

discovery.

I believe the foregoing definition of discovery applies
throughout the bond and is di sdos it- ive of f-|Ys appeal.

The

definition clearly permit--: ^ ^<? u ;<:f •,-•,- r-,- •'
> p- *- oM t- i g 1 Y_is s
that "will be i nci r red e " "n ' ;" ••' ••>h * ho !- " ~" 'l -'jm' -m n f •*• x. details
of loss may not then be kn"wn."
th" > iHe r <1 so states that

mere notice from a third patty of a potentia 1 claim of
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liability, such as the ArmlUas lawsuit, would constitute
iscoyery. There can be no serious dispute, under the
definition found in Rider 6091, that Home had discovered its
I'-'Ss prior to the effective period of Aetna's bond
The

pffect of

Ch

no

I improperly strains to limit the

^fer r'°91 to only Section 4.

It does so despite the

£*f that thereis absolutely n° indication in the rider
the definition is m any way limited.

Not only is the

that

.najonty'smterpretation contrary to the plain la nguage of the
nder it is contrary to the rules of contract interpretation
and the language of the bond.

rule re,e,rdlngriIVd^^hnlo^"^
t0 °Ur ™1
sements, ""'"^
riders, marginal
and other

references,
contract

writings which constitute a part of the

of

§ 15:30) .J

'he contract^i^
Thi* ?« ?

386 (1984)

C0UCh on Tn.siirqnre. 2d, § 4:27

^iiv^iix
ii i£\z%£ ^dr' adds anew and
the majority. xd. at 386-87.

P-

as is asserted by

Standard policy laws sometimes expressly

authorize the attachment of slips or
nr h ^° ^0ntracts of insurance in a form
provided thereby, so as to modify the
provisions in the body of the policy, and

where such a rider is properly
prop
pursuant to
part of t- [.,o

original

sm-- 1

n t i n< • t

provi s i nris

1 CQUCh on Insuranro 7,1 § 4
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f'o l ['is

a

M p Q f_ -

tn wn j r-h
P•

•^tfnched,

V9 1

i t-

a p p 1 i e;

(19 8 4)

bank's claim, pointing out that the rider was merely a more
exp1icit restatement of the presumption that any losses
discovered prior to the bond period were not covered.

Similarly, the definition of discovery added by means of Rider
6091, like the rider in Royal Trust Bank, is a consistent, but

more explicit, statement of what constitutes discovery as it is
used throughout the whole bond.

Rider 6091 amends "[t]he attached bond" to include new and

additional language under Section 4.

The majority erroneously

assumes that the rider is limited to the notice provision found
in Section 4 because the instructions on the bottom of the
rider indicate that the rider is to "revise sections 12 and
4."
The fact that the rider "revises" Section 4 to add a new
paragraph, however, in no way indicates that the effect of the

new paragraph is limited to Section 4.
to the location, not to the effect.

The reference is merely

There is absolutely no

indication in Rider 6091 that the definition is a purely
procedural provision, as assumed by the majority.

The

definition of discovery becomes a new and additional part of
the bond's Conditions and Limitations which, by the express
terms of the bond, determine the extent of coverage offered.4
Thus, by the bond's own consistent internal references to
applicability, the discovery definition added to Section 4

applies to both the procedural aspects of Section 4, and the
substantive aspects of coverage.

S_e_£, e.g. , Home Life Ins. Co.

4. The bond's insuring claus e is explicit with regard to the
general applicability of the contract's Conditions and
Limitations, of which Section 4 is a key provision.
The
insuring clause reads in part , with my emphasis:
"The
Underwriter, in consideration of an agreed premium, and subi ect
t3_the Declarations made

a pa rt

hereof,

the General

Agreements,

Conditions and Limitations an d other terms of this Bond- agrees
with

the insured ....*'
The bond reiterates the

foregoing incorporation at the top

of page four which contains t he conditions and limitations of
the bond.
Page four reads, a gain with my emphasis:
"THE
FOREGOING INSURING AGREEMENTS AND GENERAL AGREEMENTS ARE
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING COND ITIONS AND LIMITATIONS."

Rider 5538 also provides , with my emphasis,

that "the

attached bond shall be subiec f to all " h s agreements,
limitations and condition'-; o r_ '" o O t" ;i '- h e '. e i. M o v- p |- a c; q
modi tied."
The ma \ n i; \ * -.- I" ' ' U
1 I o
ti y p r w
•'- ' • :noiji f lea t i on"

the discovery definition
it from applying fo t-h.e
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.4

that

wou Id

of
prevent

v..-Clay,

13 Kan.

App.

2d 435,

773 P. 2d 666,

677 (1989)

("The

definition pf discovery clearly acts as a limitation on
coverage")."

Given the fact the bond contains only one definition of
discovery, and there is no limitation of that definition, a
purchaser of the bond would reasonably interpret Rider 6091 as

providing the definition of "discovery" to be used throughout
the bond.
The majority presents no other plausible
interpretation of the bond that would render Rider 6091 and its

application ambiguous.

The definition of discovery found in

Rider 6091 should therefore be applied to questions of coverage
as

an unambiguous

term of

the bond.

The languag e of Section 4 itself supports such a
Fir st of all,
the discovery definition was added
as a new and sep arate paragraph to Section 4 which covers
severa 1 topics, including notice of loss, proof of loss, and ^
legal proceeding s.
It is not limited to notice provisions as
represented by t he majority.
Each of the time periods .relating
to these topics begin when a loss is "discovered."
For
example, the ins ured must (1) provide the insurer with notice
cone lusion.

of

the

loss

as

s oon

as practicable after it is discovered,

(2)

file a proof of loss within six months of the discovery of
loss, and (3) br ing suit under the bond within twenty-four
months

after

the

loss is discovered.

Section 4 also grants an

5.
The majority attempts to distinguish Royal Trust Bank a nd
Home Life Insurance by claiming that the Section 4 in those

cases differed substantially from the Section 4 in the pres ent
bond.

The language used in those cases,

however,

is virtua lly

identical to the language used in the present case if one 1ooks
at the insuring clause and Section 4 together, as we must w hen

looking at the Aetna bond as a whole. The majority asserts
that the language regarding coverage immediately preceding the
definition of discovery in the Royal Bank bond enlarged the
context in which the definition was given, whereas the ;oca t ion
of the definition in the present case, i.e., in a section
discussing procedural aspects, limited the definition to it s

immediate context.

Section 4 in its entirety, however, by

the

express terms of the bond, must also be interpreted in the

greater context of what constitutes discovery for purposes
coverage.
See note ?.
'Die 'bf j. n i| iot! t-ilt3, uf ,,, « applies

of

throughout the bond and is urY )irn it«d >o iis ;mmediate
context.
See Draughpn, 77]. p.u] nt iins M. 3 (review provisions
in overall context).
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extension of time to begin legal proceedings to recover under
the hond if the insured is attempting to recover on account of

a judgment against the insured.
-_ n account of a judgment,

[f an insured seeks recovery

as does Home,

the

insured has

twenty-four months following the final entry of the judgment
before it must begin legal proceedings against Aetna.
If, as

the majority holds, a loss could not have been discovered prior
to the entry of the Armitaae judgment, then why does the bond
expressly provide an extension for claims arising on account of
s uch

a judgment 7

In order to hold Aetna liable,

the majority ignores our

obligation to enforce unambiguous terms and reads ambiguity
into the contract by adopting an unprecedented rule of contract
interpretation.
For the first time in this state, a court has
held that if a definition is not contained in a specific

section outlining general definitions, the definition will only

affect the section of the contract where it is located.

The

^

majority offers absolutely no support for this new and

obviously flawed rule.

Such a rule will create disharmony in

contracts by reguiring more than one definition of key terms
that are used in more than one section of a contract, but which
are not defined in a general definition section.
It would
create confusion in interpreting contracts if the contractual

definition agreed to by the parties would be effective only
within a single section while a different common-law definition
would be effective throughout the remainder of the contract.6

The correct rule is that a definition given to a term in

one section of a contract, even though it is not in the general
definition section, applies throughout the contract so that the

6.

In the present case, "discovery of loss" means discovery of

a ^gss^ble JQ55 in Section 4, but by virtue of the majority's

holding, it means discovery of the actual damages throughout
the rest of the bond. The problem in this approach is readily
recognized when one considers that even as the majority
pronounces the rule, it violates it.

Despite its express

rejection of the possibility of discovering a potential loss
under the case law, the majority interprets "discovery of loss"
to mean the discovery of a potential loss when considering
indemnification for attorney fees.

But in tho present case,

the provision regarding af V1' n<>v f<><v: j- 1<><• »\ .>d j_n Sect ion C
of the Genera 1 Au re^men1- s , r"-f s— •*- Ymi i -. f 'he 'Yuidi tions and

Limitations whero *- he "p^en'-bTi
is

]*<•-,-••

located.
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riofiniM-m of discovery

term will be interpreted consistently throughout.

S_ej-, -^

Wagner,^- Farmers Ins_^^xcJY , 786 P. 2d at 765 (applying
definitions found in various sections of the insurance contract

;? 'Jther sections of the contract).

Qf. Draughon. 771 P.2d at

1108 n.3 (reviewing particular provision in overall context
often aids interpretation); Western Surety Co.. 754 P Yj at

1240 ("the primary rule ... is to determine what the parties

intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts
,?n^eno^°n t0 Gach 0ther
• • •" quoting S^aiS., 655 P.2d at
liU /- (Jo ) .
The usual and natural meaning of the term "discove- " s
it applies to the present case, is "to obtain for the fir
tirne_ sight or knowledge."

Webster's Third New Internatmr

Dixii.^arj£__a[nabric^^) 647 (1986). The majority, however
concludes that the loss may be discovered twice, t-herebv
contradicting the plain meaning of the word "discover "'

Contrary to the majority's blanket assertion that it is
harmonizing the terms of the bond, it is clear that the
majority has created considerable disharmony and confusYn
where none had previously existed.

The majority errs in not applying to the question of
coverage the definition of discovery provided in Rider 6091

The clear intention of the parties as set forth in the insuring
hh , ?L ^Vlder' and throughout the remainder of the bond is
By
limiting the effect of Rider 6091 to Section 4, the majority
./a"Aetna
t *CtL
rrritten
in order
t0 create
coverage
under
s bond
when, bythetheb0nd
express
agreement
of the
that the definition apply throughout the entire bond

parties,

none exists.'

• ,he majority also fails to acknowledge that Home has the

burden of proving that the himiXms. loss was discovered within

if n.1!^6^ °t Aetna's bond "ther than the F&D bond.

to APtn* Tf

.er" u^

S mSt ltS bUrden th3t the bUrde" shifts

whPn
•
„W1f
S t0a right
raiSe to
any recover
"Elusions
defense. The
When ^n
an insured
claims
underas aapolicy
insured must
F
y
1nH
bring himself within the field therein

defined .... He then has brought
himself within the policy, and the terms
thereof hav^ heen m^t .

who,, h-

brings himself hi.Hmm »(><> in--:uYng <lanse
he has made his case . . . ^nd anv
exceptions or conditions which would tn«n
deny him relief, take him out of the
indemnity provisions, render them

890101-CA

52

B.

Majority's Departure From Established Case

aw

rven in the absence of Pider 6 0 91, the majority's
interpretation of Aetna's
^Qh
bond is contrary to the

well-established case law holding that a loss is discovered on
"the date the fraud was discovered by the bank--not the date

the bank was called upon to make the loss good." FDIC v. Aetna
Casualty s< Surety Cg .. -426 F.2d 729, 739 (5th Cir. 1970)

1quoting Mount Ve rnon 3ank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Casualty s,
Surety Co., 224 F.Supp.

666, ^70 (E.D. Vir. 1963)).

In

general, a loss is deemed discovered when "the insured acquires
knowledge of any fraudulent or dishonest act resulting in
loss. " USLIFE Sav, & Loan Ass'n v. National Surety Corn. , 115
Cal. App. 3d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1981).
See.
generally., American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 18 S.
C t . r- 52 , 557 (1898); American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S.
160,

18 S. Ct.

563, 564 (1898); Perkins v.

Clinton State Bank.

593 F.2d 327, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1979); United States Fidelity &
Gua.r^_Cc1. v. Empire State Bank. 448 F.2d 360,
1?71 >' Midden Splendor Mining Co.

366 (8th Cir.

v. General Ins.

Co. of

America, 370 F.2d 515, 517 (10th Cir. 1966); Alfalfa Elec.
COOP- v. Travelers Indem. e.g.. 376 F.Supp. 901, 90 6 (W.D. Okl.

1973); National Newark and Essex Bank v. American Ins. Co., 76
N.J. 64, 385 A.2d 1216, 1224 (19 78); Jefferson State Bank s.
Trust Co. v. Central Surety St Ins. Corp., 408 S.W.2d 825, 831
(Mo.

1966) .

The majority strains to distinguish the foregoing cases
without presenting any cases in support of its position. No
other case has taken the approach that a loss may be discovered

(Footnote 7 continued)
inoperative as to him, are matters of
defense, and the burden thereof rests on
the

insurer.

LPS Hospital/ 765 P.2d at 859 (quoting Browning v. Eguit_ab_i_e_
Life Assurance Soc'y. 94 Utah 570, 573-75, 80 P.2d 348, 3 5 0-51
(1938) ) .

The language at issue is found in the insuring clau se
itself which defines the field within which Home must es tablish
its case.

The majority nevertheless treaty (-he definiti o

n

o f

discovery as if it w»r <=> -^u ^yi'i^Mii.
tn i.-,,-»
»- he def in
of d isco very is pa iYy -mom t:: r. -i y
ri,u iMiniu,, ♦ h<M ef o re lie s

11 i on

Home to show that

bo nd

period.
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u po n

sue.

more than once.

The majority must strain to distinguish the

case law because it misunderstands the term "loss."^
There

a

re two types of loss covered by fidelity bondsinsured immediately parts with its property as a
or
; and (2) when an insured incurs liability due to

( 1) when an
direct resul
t of employee dishonesty as in cases of theft
embezzlement
the dishones ty of an employee which eventually causes an

insured to p ay

damages, such as the liability incurred by Home

in this case ' ^
Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. y. Central .g,,r04-Y
&_Ins. Corp. ,408 S.W.2d 825, 830-31 (Mo. 1966).
The Aetna
bond indemni fies Home against both types of losses.
£ee_ id

(notice prov lsions regarding potential losses and provisions
for handling of defense indicate that a bond covers liability).

The trial court and the majority treat this case as if the
In such cases
it is obvious that the parting must occur in order to be
oss were an immediate parting with property.

parting^ n"" <=?**> *°«™* • ^oes not involve an immediate^

liab t
Property-it involves a loss arising out of Home's
'
ty to *he borrowers created by Glad's dishonesty. The
Amitaofl court voided the trust deeds and promissory notes and
he' ^th-in-lending
ruth tn tend" beC?USe
V1°lated
the Home
securities
laws t0
and
Iht
laws. H°me
In other
words,
was liable

HoLbgrarnt:rt^rio^nsr9l0SS^ """" °f th" ~

^^h°

th.h Ihl Taj°rity ZeemS Puzzled that the cases merely "assume"
estab ishedSS Th"
sustained, even if damages were not yet
h!ln
^ . S Cases seem merely to assume that the loss has
rreateS'bv1^-^"118?
*l0SS that
fr0msustained
l^bilttywhen the*
created by a dishonest employee
is, ?riSeS
in fact,

L T1^ mal°^jY and the trial court repeatedly indicatl^^
the Aetna bond was intended to cover any »loss sustained"

bond Af-1055"' 3nd 7et those
terms
neJer
eM
a „a'he
insurin^
clause,
the
majesty
selectively combined "loss" with the

and the triaiaconrtnh ^
first wnrHnf court have
taken the word^

sustained "

°

I*'*5* f°llowin* it, i.e., "sustained" and
context to create the term "loss

9. The bond itse If indicaf e-- 'hnf
the resulting legal damages, >b,Y

i'

i --;

I h"

""tis'l- i I- h I- p

6041 provides that Aetna js ,>Miv ii ^ h ie

t <-> r

m ' sconduct , not

: the

loss.

'• J i r e c t

Rider

compensatory a3m^sw^_3j^LsJji^XLOUL^ 1Qss covered under this
bond." (Emphasis added.)
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misconduct occurs, not when the actual damages are determined.
Seje_, e.g. , FDIC v. Aetna, 426 F.2d at 735 (FDIC disposed of

nonconforming notes after the termination of bond period and
suffered a net loss of $408,362.97).
The loss is sustained
when the dishonest act is committed, not when a court makes the
factual and legal determination that the act was committed and
the insured is therefore liable for damages.
The misconduct

that creates a covered loss is complete when it is performed,
not when the damages from such misconduct are adjudicated.
Liability is therefore "sustained" at the time of the

misconduct, not at the time of final judgment. The
loss/liability may therefore be "discovered" at any time
following the occurrence of

the misconduct.

The receipt of a claim against the insured, or the

discovery of misconduct that may subject the insured to a
claim, constitutes discovery of a loss.
whether the Bank actually discovers

dishonesty or actually incurs a loss is,
however,

completely irrelevant.

A loss is

"discovered" within the meaning of the
loss provisions of the Bond when the

insured party discovers facts sufficient
to create a condition in which the insured

might be subjected to a claim against
which it is indemnified by the Bond.
FAxst Nat'l Bank of Bowie v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 634 F.2d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1981).

The cases clearly establish that it is the receipt of a

claim against the insured based upon employee dishonesty, not
the adjudication of that claim, that constitutes discovery of
the loss. £££ Jefferson Bank. 408 S.W.2d at 831 ("the time of
discovery of loss mentioned in the bond is not intended to be
the time when a claim of the depositor or customer is
established ultimately by entry of judgment."); see also
Perkins v. Clinton State Bank. 593 F.2d 327, 336 (8th Cir.
1979) (bank discovered loss when served with complaint).
Once employee misconduct is discovered, or a claim is
presented against the insured based on th» mi^c^nduct, the loss
has been discovered.
"bribe t;-no ,,f ^ Y-^-->--^' -,- <y Yi» risk

insured against is wben the b?.,k must re-iv^b'v have known and
recognized that fthe claimant 1 had suffered a Y-ss and that

[the claimant] apparently intended to attempt to hold the bank
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liable for such loss."
Jefferson Bank, 408 S.W.2d at 832.
See.
also FDIC v. Aetna, 426 F.2d at 739 (the well established rule

is that discovery occurs when the insured has "acquired
knowledge of some specific fraudulent or dishonest act which
might involve the [Insurer] in liability for the misconduct").
The majority correctly reasons that the loss element
cannot be satisfied by means of a "possible loss" and that a

possible loss is not compensable.

What the majority fails to

realize, however, is that the two preconditions to coverage as
established in the insuring clause by the phrases "sustained at
any time" and "discovered during the bond period," each relate
to a separate and distinct condition of recovery.
"Sustained
at any time" is the requirement that there must in fact be an
actual out-of-pocket loss before any compensation will be
paid.
"Discovered during the bond period," on the other hand,
determines who out of the possible insurers will pay
compensation if

an actual

loss

in fact occurs.

The two

inquiries are totally separate and distinct.

""

The majority erroneously concludes that the issue of who
will indemnify an insured cannot be determined before the issue
of

whether

the

insured

is

emtitled

to

indemnification

is

decided.
This is simply inconsistent with the insurance
industry practice that the policy in effect at the time the
event occurs provides coverage, even though the extent of that
coverage is still unsettled.
For example, if a car driver

causes an accident and then changes
there would be no question that the
when the accident occurred would be
coverage, even though liability had
the new policy was purchased.

to a new insurance company,
insurance policy in effect
the one to provide
not been adjudicated when

A fidelity insurer whose policy is in place when a lawsuit
is filed has the right to step in and assume the defense
against the suit because it is that insurer who must indemnify
the insured for any actual damages resulting from the suit.
£££ generally First Nat'l Bank of Bowie. 634 F.2d 1000.
If no
actual damages result from the lawsuit then the insured and the

insurer breathe a collective sigh of relief.
See, e.g.,
The possibility that no damages may actually result from
lawsuit simply does not prevent an earlier determination
which of the possible insurers will indemni fy an insured
those damages

if

and when

iAa
of
for

they are ^wa rfled .

Coverage is triggered by receipt of a claim against the
insured or by discovery of dishonest conduct because such

890101-CA

56

e'." e n t

s

c': v e r

ed

are

not

until

prone
its

^o

manipulation.

1i abi 1

, i t does not take a
part i e s will seek t> 11 rr. e

com t

benef it.

Even w i t h ou t

If

a loss will

be

a ny

great deal of imagination to see how
that litigation to their own

such manipulation,

there is a great

that coverage may 1 apse after the misconduct

risk

not

ity and damages are adjudicated by a

d i s c o vered, but betore t he case has been
Tfie i nsurance company co uld then simply

has

been

fully adjudicated,

refuse to renew the
and avoid ever p ay i ng for the loss .
No other insurance
c o m p a ny wouId then step forward and agree to insure against
tha t
ending loss absent a large premium to compensate for the
drama t ica1ly increased r lsk.
in such a situation, the insured
won Id , in all probabilit y,
become uninsured under the
m a i o r ify's approach.
bond

this

In
a l

w ith

th e

the

case,

Home

incurr

ed liability, and thereby
loans without complying

loss , • • ' hen it g r anted the
truth-in lending 1aws and the

ned"

" sust

1 oa ns

a

were

1 i a b i li ty.

clo sed,

In

f ac t,

no

there

to

damages,

se tt le.

th at

was

Inasmu ch

remained
as

Home

It was only the judicial
of

the

loss,

i.e.,

as

10.

The majority's characterization of this case as a

all eged

the

unknown and required adjudication
k new of the Armitage claim, as

well

Glad's

Onoe

action occurred to alter that
nothing that Home could have
"loss" was therefore sustained

done to escape 1 ia bility.
The
bef o r o
Home purcha sed the Aetn a bond.
deter mi nation of 1 iabili ty and extent
ac t u a 1

securities laws. ^

f ur t her

dishone st

involvement,

Home must

fraudulent/bad loan case is simply erroneous.

be

The loss that

Home is seeking to recover is not the result of Glad's

dishonesty in falsifying the loan applications and causing Home
to lend more to the borrowers than they were able to repay.
The loss is the result of Glad's violations of the
truth-in-lending laws and the securities laws which created

liability for Home.

The majority's reliance on

Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 166 Cal. App. 3d 703, 212 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1985), is
therefore misplaced.
Even if this claim were the result of the issuance of bad
loans, the losses were "sustained" before the Aetna bond was
purchased.
The Pacific-Southern court held that "the loss
occurred

when

the

loan

defan!fed."

this case had all ^f.-ol^^1 ""Y •:.->»•
foreclosed before Mi" <\e t;i a :" " •' o•'

as Home knew that '^ -ri'-; 0 i"!w'" «:-• •- y
the

loans

defaulted,

one must

'gain

i.d. 1

M

at
3 ,

-; n 5

^^'1

•" 11 o

,.,,,,-

rar*-

nc iude

were discovered during the F^-D bond period.
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r ,

•-

The loans in
' • o s s of- b " 1 n g
a sod .

^ he

that

I na srnuch

reason why

the

bosses

£tlTbo^
before it purchased the
Eeri't
Hie'AetiaSond
p rl'TTJ
F*D ^ond
Home tor *nd
the ™*
Armii_ag.e_
loss.
Period'
Aefcna^^
is not^ liable
to
C.

'•'overage Under Majority's Approach

by becoming an aYuaY'lo^ a T ^ ^ ""fcil lfc " "sustained
HI could be no recovery \ n th
by the mai°rity, .....

damages were ascertained alteV the eft* b*Cause the actual

bond The bond extension i^lf makes *fc^ °lear
? PSri°d
°f Aet
Aimitaaa loss was not covered
that th^

na ' s

t^ ^.""e pLuLti^rcr
t0 H°me in Secti- 12 oE
This e^
"^ fr°m Au9ust 20, 1Q,

until August 20, ]986

lts scope and only covert h " ^°n' however, „as Um t^ 1;
i-ses sustained dunnTthe extension p*^. W*'"3* f°r

ea^LsFV-1^---"- »- ^^^r?6 "—"
«Sr=in"inHhne3;od^nt ^^^ i'^M £» " ^

^atement at oral argume^Tb^o^thL^rt •' f°U°Wln"

^^il^tvi^i reLurrd hverdict
s." «e.r«dawrs
•^s^-9"
Cea ln tr':--r
the avoidance
of the
to the^rovLio^^rthelect3"13 T^
Period of twelve month, t

the 20th day a

a.m. of the -nr-h i

S^

e Insured a

" =01 a.m. of

1985, to 12:01

withi„wh?,V?:;h„^':,;i,A,;t"'^'
-^
the Insured prm, .., ,, ,7" s"':f:HM«d
(Emphasis added.) —Jt--J^-
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notes and trust deeds, establishing a less
to Home Savings.
Now, all parties in this
litigation agree, in the briefs, in
writing, that
Home Saving's

that is the point at which
loss was established.
At

that point it could not recover from the
borrowers, it could not collect from the
trust deeds, and that established the loss.
(Emphasis added.)

tender the majority's approach,

the loss was sustained

after the termination of the original bond period.

The loss

therefore, was not covered under the limited extension.

III.

EFFECT OF GLAD'S DISHONESTY

UNDER SECTION 11

^

Even if the loss was discovered within the bond period, it
fell under the exclusion provided in Section 11 of the bond
which provides:
"This bond shall be deemed terminated or
cancelled as to any Employee--(a) as soon as the insured shall

learn of any dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of such
Employee . . . ." As is evident by the foregoing language, the
clear purpose of the bond is to insure only those employees not
known to be dishonest.

At issue is whether the Aetna bond ever

covered Larry Glad.

The first question, which the majority totally ignores, is

whether this language is even ambiguous.12 A purchaser of a
fidelity bond would reasonably interpret the foregoing
provision to mean that the bond will not cover any employee
known to be dishonest at the time the bond takes effect.

Home's bond application supports this interpretation.

Glad was

12. Those courts which have considered provisions like Section
11 have all considered the provisions to be unambiguous in
their declarations that employees known to be dishonest at the
inception of the bond are not covered.

See, e.g., St. Joe

Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.. 376 F.2d 33, 35
(5th Cir.) cert. denied 38fJi f'.Y «2n, rr s . ': *- . ^1 (1967);
Ritchie Grocer Co. -; ._p__j tyy '" -""^i al_ty _r s-irofy <•,,
x_2^ F 2d

499, 502-03 (0th Cir". ryin ) : """rne^Q , rt"-.' Fidelity V"

Casualty Co. of Npw v^vrk . j33 ;,^.
(1969).
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'.: 1,

,M 9 s„

v]"~so8

^10

agreed that Th^
the bond
would not
r ambiguous. The parties
" would not cover employees known to be

dishonest

wou^erefore^^
??
enf°rCed as written.6 I
that the bond dn«1n^h^.i!C^1_°n
does not
v
ll ^ambiguously
unamoiguously provides

Home had a1ready learned of Glad' ^?onduct ^ G1^ because
purchased the bond &
S dlshonesty before it
The case law

that the bond is

on provisions such as Section 11 indicates

void ab initio as to Glad.

aUs

v- Aetjia_J^^u^l_ty
Ritchie^ro_cjgj:_Cjo^
,i..nric
,
-r~——S5-^UX^_(2_2_._, 426 F.2d 499 (8th
Cir. 1970),
stands for the proposition that a bond

is void ab initio as to

think it is implicit in these

instaailatinnhaf ^ P3rtieS W°ach the
an
H i
°farethShonest
P°lic^until
assuming
that
all employees
they are

known to be otherwise.

Thus, if the

persoTin'h"
^owl«^e
a dishonest
person n his *"
employ,
he is ofaware,
by the

terms of the exclusion clause, that he is
employee. A contrary view of ?he

not insured for the dishonest acts of that

"™"°\^:use.such.as th« Plaintiff
:ed

Clad haTre'cXTf*?" Zo^^Trr77^7^1^^^^

from
Robert
Mif-rhoi i,. The
$15,000 payment was
wrs oil',
part- -yf ^
-, + •>^
,•ack
nnn
V5™
r
^^
" - 'i-'-rcnei
Mitchell.

Mitchell from AFCn ffJ~- ,rr^nn;

??
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ived by Robert

. a 1 though

the exclusion clause

plainly indicates there can be no coverage
after the insured "shall have knowledge"
of dishonesty of his employees.
Id.

at

510-11.

Not only can an individual be excluded by Section II, but
whole

transactions night

not

be

covered.

when an

insured knows

prior to the purchase of a bond that a transaction previously
entered into by the insured is tainted with dishonesty, the
entire transaction is not covered.
See St. Joe Paper Co.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. , 359 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.) ce. rt •
denied 389 U.S.

828,

88 S. Ct.

91 (1966).

The proper inquiry to be derived from these cases is
whether an employee is known to be dishonest at the time the

bond is supposed to cover the employee.

If any dishonesty is ^

known, the bond never covers the employee.
Because Glad was
known to be dishonest at the time Home desired Aetna's bond to
apply to Glad,

as

Aetna's

bond did not cover Glad.

The maj ori t y nevert heless seeks to invalidate Section 11
of p ublic po licy. *• 4
It strains to distinguish this

matter

a

from <2\_ Dou qlas

case

Ame r i c_£,
100

S .

the

i nsured

C t .

pres i dent

5

wil son

F.2d 1275

590

S<

Co .

(4th Cir.)

v

Insurance

cert.

Co.

of

North

denied 4 4 4 U.S.

9 (1979), which is directly on point.

831,

In wjlson,

learned during a routine audit that a vice
been falsifying the dates and the amounts of
standard HUD forms, a clear act of dishonesty.

ha d

ad v an

ces

'•'ice

preside nt

commo

ninth e

Somet

ime

on

The
indicated to the insured that the practice was

industry.

The practice was immediately stopped.

lat er,

pu rch ased

the insured changed insurance carriers and
f i delity bonds from Insurance Company of North

14.
The majority is apparently attempting to prevent the risk
of coverage lapsing if an insured changes insurance carriers
after an employee's dishonesty is discovered and the insured

knows it may be liable, but before there is a final judgment
establishing any actual loss due tn that dishonesty.
That risk
only arises, howp-.-o r , i^r n11 - <- >t>'j m^ Y' r <tv >^ ,m --, o^ ho rpformize
that discovery "f fhe -t isho,wjt-;f- v , ••> noti''<j
• a claim,

triggers coveraae.
abate

a

risk that
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ru ^M-ier '•-vis, 'he -nai'-ri^v is seeking to
it

has

^ r t i r \ oi a I1 v created .
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America (INA) and Hartford.'After the INA and Hartford bonds
became effective, the insured discovered that the same vice
president had not secured letters of credit which the insured

was required to secure.
The vice president had nevertheless
falsely certified that he had secured the letters of credit.
The court held that since the insured had known of the vice

president's dishonesty in falsifying the HUD forms "before the

inception" of the INA and Hartford policies, and since the
insured did not notify INA and Hartford of the vice president's
previous dishonesty,

INA and Hartford could not be

held liable

for the losses caused by the vice president's failure to secure
the

Letters

of

credit.

The Wilson court directly addressed the argument accepted
by the majority in this case and rejected it.
"[T]he dissent
would have INA and Hartford assume liability for losses

resulting from acts committed before the inception of their
respective policies by an employee who was never within the
coverage of the policies.
This is an untenable result.''
Icl. ~
at 1279 n.6 (emphasis in original).

rn refusing to follow Wilson, the majority selectively
quotes parts of the Wilson court's regrets as if that court
felt it had rendered a poor decision.
The full text reveals
otherwise.

The unfortunate position in which Wilson

finds itself was occasioned in
sheer bad luck in timing as to
in insurers and in part by the
judgment of its own officers.

part by
the change
poor
However,

mindful of Justice Holmes' admonition, we
cannot use this hard case as a vehicle to
make

Icl.

at

bad

law.

1280.

The Wilson court did not rely upon "sheer luck" as

asserted by the majority.

It simply recognized that the timing

of the change in insurers, along with poor business judgment.

rendered the insured uninsured. Had the insured simply
revealed its knowledge of the vice president's dishonesty to
INA and Hartford when applying for t-ne now bonds, it could have
still

15.

been covered.

The IMA bond contained the same language as cont aTn~ed~~in"~~

the Aetna bond at

890101-CA
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^ro^h ine0^re"o "Sh" thS Ba]°rifc^s apparent need ^

&i'":HY £'o IS-™-:s-i^as™
Aetna's

In

its efforts to find cover age in the present hard

r'ase' the majority makes bad law.

-^^-ntral Rank ^f^HcjjugJr^n, 672 S.W.2d 641

referring to the type
— of coverage
average. 16

Tex

Zn^^^VXT^^

t? „«
'
it
was nott m

anyW3Sway

pelicT9 "Wher^T^ incu«^V FW during tSe^rlv?

ous

u [facoS^:nfT;::-^nt3?:tothrffe
----S an lndePendent

contract and will not he n«m h ?

from a prior boiding'perio ^ t
e l f continuing coverage
'^^£^-££^-^-1^^
171

Cal. Rptr. at 400.
16.

The majority

also

agreement, it will be conclusively
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that
the writing contains the whole of the
agreement between the parties. Also, that
parol evidence of contemporaneous
conversations, representations or

statements win not be received for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms
of the written agre^mont

S£Ate__Bank_£f_iJ£hi -,-. Wnni^v

—, ~P ,,, m

The majority has r^;,^?^;^ ,,^r' /''
add a new term m n,q wr jy t-n" ag ^.,n.Mh
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.ln ,

' "^h

19 7 7)

^-^'-^i language to

In order for Aetna to be liable for Glad's dishonest acts,
Aetna would have had to expressly agree to continue F&D's

coverage of Glad as it existed during the F&D bond period.17
There simply was no such assumption of coverage by the Aetna
bond.
In fact, Aetna's bond clearly states in Rider 6059 that
"coverage under this policy or bond shall not become effective

until such other coverage [as provided by the F&D bond] has
terminated." Contrary to the majority's assertion that there
is no evidence as to the issue of continuation, Rider 6059
shows that the parties expressly agreed that the Aetna bond was
not a continuation of the coverage provided under the F&D

bond.

The majority's holding is therefore directly contrary to

the express agreement of the parties.

The insurance policy in the present case clearly states
that it only provides fidelity coverage for employees not known
to have previously been dishonest and it expressly provides
that there is no continuation of coverage provided by the F&D bond.
Since Home knew on the effective date of the Aetna bond
that Glad had performed a dishonest act, Glad was never insured
under

17.

the Aetna

bond.

This court recently held in Perkins v. Great-West Life

Assurance Co.. 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah App. 1991), that a

new insurer does not automatically cover all employees that may
have been insured under a predecessor policy.

In that case,,

Mrs. Perkins was an employee of Southwest Health Management!,
Inc. when she became disabled and was no longer able to work
full time.

Southwest kept her on its records as a full-time

employee, awarding her sick leave, vacation time, and sc
forth. After she became disabled. Southwest negotiated a new
group insurance policy with Great-West Life Assurance Co.

Great-West's policy expressly limited coverage to full-time
employees and defined full-time employment. When Mrs. Ferkins
passed away, her husband sought to recover on Great-West's life

insurance policy. Great-West then discovered that Mrs. Perkins
was not a full-time employee at the inception of the policy and

had never returned to full-time employment.

Her premiums were

returned and her husband's claim against the policy was
denied . This ecu rt nphe Id the deni .--Y. >- f <-o*-Dr ^qe , reasoning

that "[s]ince Mrs. Perkins was ?vt ^" active employee on the
effective date of the Great-West pel icy, or any time
thereafter, she was not insured under that policy." Icl. at 70
(emphasis added).
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r v

DUTY

TO

DISCLOSE

•".etna claim.s that the mgui ry in the insurance application
regarding losses "sustained" d ur ing the last six years required
the disclosure of the Armi tage 1 awsuit which was already

pending against Home,

and that H oine's failure to disclose the
lawsuit now bars any recovery.
If a loss arising from
liability is "sustained" when th e misconduct occurs, as I
propose, then the Armitage loss had in fact already been
sustained when Home tilled out t he application.
I also believe
that, even under the majority's reasoning, the request for
information concerning losses wa s sufficiently clear to place
Home on notice that Aetna wanted information about pending or
potential claims.
I would there fore hold under either approach
that

Home's

response was clearly

18

inaccurate

and

should bar

r e c o'/ a r v

18. The application contained the following warranty by
that it did not know of any dishonesty committed by any

Home

f

the

employees listed in the application.
The present officers and employees of the
insured, of whom a complete list at this

time, with positions held, is given above,
have to the best of the insured's
knowledge and belief, while in the service

of the insured always performed their
respective duties honestly.
There has

never come to its notice or knowledge any
information which in the judgment of the
insured indicates that any of the said
officers and employees are dishonest.

The facts in this case indicate that Home knew prior to
the application for insurance that Elaine Reese, one of the
employees listed in the application, had committed dishonest
acts by backdating the loan documents at Glad's direction.
"A

fraudulent misrepresentation in such an application that the
insured's employees have been faithful is deemed material to
the risk undertaken by the insurer and renders that bond void

ab initio."

Phoenix Sav . & Lo an ,_ tnc . v . Aef n_a Casualty _&

Surety Co. , 4 2 7
same warranty).

F . :ri n <; 2 ,
inasmuch

misrepresentation based -"-n
addressed it on appeal.
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;.i t e r p ret i nq
~ue
ir;e

a

claim
not

o t"

The majority, however, reiects Aetna's claim by
effect iveiy rewrit ing Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1) ( 19 74)

which

p ro v ides:

Misrepresentations,
of

facts,

and

omissions,

incorrect

concealment

statements

shall

not prevent a recovery under the policy or
contract

unless:

(a)

fraudulent;

or

(b)
material either
acceptance of the risk, or
assumed by the insurer; or

(c)

the

insurer

to
to

the
the

hazard

in good faith

either would not have issued the policy or
contract, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed it at the same

premium rate, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed a policy or
contract in as large an amount, or would
not have provided coverage with respect to
the hazard resulting in the loss, if the
true

facts

had

been made

known

to

the

insurer as required either by the
application for the policy or contract or
otherwise.

As the majority correctly indicates, the issue is whether
Home had a duty under the statute to disclose in its

application for the Aetna bond the material fact that it was
being sued for over one million dollars because of the

dishonest conduct of an employee.

The majority erroneously

concludes that Home had no such duty because Aetna failed to

explicitly inquire about pending cases.
By focusing only on the duty to provide information

specifically requested in the application, the majority only
considers "misrepresentations," "concealments of fact," and

"incorrect statements." These are the possible types of
affirmative responses to inquiries in an application covered by
the statute.

The majority, however, totally ignores

"omissions" which th" Y,^ni-^ a i-" «•,,-.<=> ro.

Py including

omissions , the statute indicates iha' an ;»pp Jicant lias a duty
to disclose more than wh=> t i-(,^ npp 1[ >_-n tion specifically
requests.
The statute clearly provides that Home may be barred
from recovery if it omits facts that are "material . . . to the
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hazard assumed by the insured."
The majority today holds,
however, that an applicant for insurance may omit critical and
'bvi -us ly

relevant

info rma t ion

if

the insurer

explicitly request such information.

fails

to

In other words,

the

•:M-ior ity removes the term "omission" from the statute by
ho lding that an omission is a lega 1 impossibility.
I believe
such rewriting of an unambiguous statute is contrary to the
!egis lative intent and outs ide of the ambit of our judicial
-• u t h o r 11 y .

a p p 1 ic

for fidelity insurance has a duty to provide
ion in its application, such as pending claims
^aai nst
the i nsur ed, even if not directly requested to provide
"' ic h
inf o r m a t i on .
It is true that, in general, the insurer is
t h, e expe r f
rn
I" 1 s k
assessment and therefore has a duty to make
An

ma f e rial

inqu i r ie s
risk

T

a n t

i nf o nnaf

th a t

hat

d

if

feels

are

relevant

to

the

assessment

of

not mean however, that a sophisticated
pure hase r of
insn ranee, such as Home, may turn a blind eye to
t he obvi o u s .
Th i. s case is not in a gray area where the
"
A r m l tage suit mi.g. h_t have been relevant.
oes

In interpreting section 31-19-8(1),
has

the Utah Supreme Court

indicated that a misrepresentation is "material if it

diminishes the insurer's opportunity to determine or estimate
1h- s risk."

Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. , 723 P. 2d

388, 391 (Utah 1988).
It is blatantly obvious that a potential
claim for over one million dollars, already known of by the
applicant, affects the "hazard assumed by the insured."
Insurance companies set their premiums based on the possibility
of an event occurring.
One of the assumptions an insurer makes
when issuing a fidelity bond is that the applicant does not
already have claims pending against it.

The fact

that there is

already a million dollar claim pending against an applicant
obviously skews the probabilities of there being a claim
against the policy. Not knowing about the possible claim
prevents the insurer from accurately determining or estimating
its risk.
Inasmuch as pending claims obviously affect the
hazard being assumed by the insurer and there is no need to
"speculate" whether a pending lawsuit is relevant, I would hold

that applicants for fidelity insurance have a duty under
section 31-19-8(a) to disclose any pending claims or be barred
from recovery on such claims.
The majority
1 aw duty o f r] lso ]•
rut

t- h o

uds .
y

q j.' 1

»

•i

r" und anient a 1

principle of the law of fidelity guaranty
that if dishonesty of an agent, whose

390101-CA
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r' o mp-io n

fidelity was guaranteed under a bond,

exists before or at the time the surety
bond becomes bound thereby,

and the

principal conceals it from the surety at
the time of obtaining the fidelity bond,
the surety is not liable for the losses
resulting therefrom; . . . [T]he mere
nondisclosure of the circumstances

affecting the situation of the parties
which are material for the surety to be
acquainted with and are within

the

knowledge of the person obtaining the
surety bond,

is

undue concealment even

though not willful or

intentional or with

a view to any advantage to himself.
West

Am.

Fin.

Co.

m 1 P.2 d 9 6 3, 968

Pacific Indemnity Co., 17 Cal. App,2d 225
(1936)

One who becomes surety for another must

ordinarily be presumed to do so upon the
belief that the transaction between the

principal parties is one occurring in the
usual course of

business of

that

description, subjecting him only to the

ordinary risks attending it; and the party
to whom he becomes a surety must be
presumed to know that such will be his

understanding, and that he will act upon
it, unless he is informed that there are
some extraordinary circumstances affecting
the risk. To receive a surety known to be
acting upon the belief that there are no
unusual circumstances by which his risk

will be materially increased, well knowing
that there are such circumstances, and
having a suitable opportunity to make them
known, and withholding them, must be
regarded as a legal fraud, by which the
surety will be relieved from his contract.

American Surety. 170 U.S. 133, 1
v. Cooper.

36 Me.

179,

197).

S. Ct . at 559 (quotinc B_ajik,

Th[e J rule iinpooes an ilm-|n^ <i>y y upon
the obi i.gee to volunteer d iso 1osu re of all
facts materially affecting the risk to the
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surety on a fide 1ify bond.
of motive or

intent,

Irrespective

mere non-disclosure

of facts known by the obligee which
materially affect the surety's risk,

such

as a prior dishonesty of the principal on
the fidelity bond,
the surety.

therefore discharges

Sjjmit_omo Bank of California.

d 956, 960 (1968)

Iwa s ak i, 7 3 Cal.

Rptr.

447

(citations omitted)

The majority misinterprets the cases upon which it relies

in holding that Home had no duty to disclose the pending
lawsuit.
In United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Howard, 67
F.2 d 382 (5th Cir. 1933) cert . denied 29 1 U.S. 663, 54 S. C t.
4 39, i e.h^ denied 291 U.S. 648, '34 S. Ct . 457 (1934), the

insurer asked how much money a vice president owed the bank,

but did not ask whether the vice president had endorsed any
loans made by the bank.

The bank later collapsed and it was

~

discovered that the vice president had systematically siphoned
off bank assets through bogus loans he had endorsed.

It was

determined that at the time the bond was applied for the vice
president had endorsed over $42,000 worth of valueless loans.
The insurer claimed the bank could not recover because the bank

did not disclose the endorsements in the application.

The

court rejected the argument, reasoning that the information
could not be deemed material by the insurer because no such

information was ever requested in the application.
HP_wa_rd case,

however,

In the

there was no indication that the bank

knew of the dishonest conduct or knew of any pending loss when
it applied for the loan. The endorsements, in and of
themselves, were not dishonest on their face. At best, the

large amount of loans endorsed by the vice president was an
indication that there might have been an excessive amount of
risk attached to the bond that warranted additional

investigation. The holding of Howard is simply that neutral
information that might indicate something may be amiss and that
further inquiry might be necessary before issuing the bond,
must be expressly requested before its omission would bar
recovery.
In the present case, however, Home knew of both the
alleged dishonesty and the Armitage lawsuit and that the

lawsuit could lead to a large claim against the bond.
P.2d

In State v . Unite-.
8 09 (1980), 'ho ;

that an employee h^d p
forgery as a result ••f
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not

'.'12

disclose

first — degree

Centra ry

to

the

majority's characterization of the holding in that case, the
Washington Court (Jf Appeals expressly refused to adopt an
absolute rule that there was no duty on the part of the
applicant to have provided the information.
Instead, it: held
that the employee was covered despite the nondisclosure because

the insurance company had not relied on the application and
therefore had not been misled by the nondisclosure.
(The
insurance company did not even require the application form to
be completed.)

In the present case there is no serious

quest ron that Aetna was mis led by the nondisclosure of a major
potent i a 1 claim.

A duty to disclose pending claims simply ensures that
there will be a true meeting of the minds.

If Home's

expectation was that the Armitage loss, if any, would be
covered by the policy, and if Aetna charged a premium bcsed on

a belief that there were no claims already pending that would
need to be covered under the policy, then there was no meeting.
of the minds.

If there was no meeting of the minds, there

*

could be no coverage.

I do not accept the majority's conclusion that a rule

requiring disclosure would "require an insurance applicant to
affirmatively convince an insurer to not issue the applied-for
ly
isk

an

By including the term "omissions," section 31-19-8(1)

merely codifies this contractual principal as a statutory
duty.
I would therefore hold that Home's failure to disclose
the pending lawsuit violated its duty to disclose all facts
material to the hazard assumed by Aetna and therefore bars Home
from seeking recovery under the bond.

V.

OFFSET OF DAMAGES

Before entering int-o m-,o

i..,Mr. <y hh n)U i,,.,- rower s

had granted a loan t,, AfM.eck/YFrM ditecMy.
was not repaying the loan.

890101-CA

Home

Affleck', however,

Home therefore instructed Affleck
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that once the borrowers gave the loan proceeds to him, he was

tn immediately return the proceeds to Home as payment against
his original loan. Home even went so far as to place
restrictive endorsements on the back of the loan proceed checks
thereby preventing Affleck from cashing the checks and
Aetna claims
guaranteeing the return of the proceeds to Home.

that by requirinq Affleck to use the loan proceeds to pay off
his already defaulted loan, Home effectively shifted the loss
it was bound to incur under Affleck's loan to the borrowers'
loans. Since a loss under the Affleck loan would not have been
covered by this bond, Aetna claims it was entitled to offset
the amount of loss sought by Home by the amount of loan
proceeds actually returned to Home. Home therefore did not

suffer any actual loss when it had in fact received the very
loan proceeds it claimed were lost.

The majority erroneously dismisses Aetna's claim because

if mischaractenzes the offset issue as a question of liability
that the jury should have determined. The parties expressly reserved the determination of damages for the trial court.

Whether there is an offset relates directly to the issue'of the
amountof damages, not to the issue of liability. In order for
the trial court to make such a determination, it must consider
any claimed offsets. The trial court declined to hear the

claim, however, because it felt the issue involved questions of

fact properly reserved for the jury.

The trial court, along

with Home and the majority, have failed to identify any
questions of fact that the jury needed to determine before the
trial court could have addressed the offset claim. In fact,
there is no factual dispute as to what happened with the
proceeds.

The only issue was whether Aetna was entitled to an

offset as a matter of law. Since no jury findings were needed
to make such a legal ruling, it was perfectly logical and
acceptable for Aetna to wait and pursue the offset claim after

the jury had rendered its special verdicts and the trial court
had found Aetna liable. To have addressed the offset issue to
the jury would have been fruitless since there was no factual
dispute.

Inasmuch as the trial court refused to even address the

offset issue because it erroneously viewed it as the duty of
the jury, that issue should be remanded for consideration by
the

trial

court.

"T .

'^riCLr,o ION

Any loss incurred by Home was discovered while the F&D

bond was in place.

890101-CA

The Aetna bond was never intended to cover
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employees

that were known at

its

inception to

have been

dishonest.
The Aetna bond also did not cover pending claims
known to Home before the inception of the bond, but not
disclosed to Aetna in the application.
Aetna should not,
therefore, be requi red to indemnify Home for its loss in the
Armitage

case.

ftuttc^g*^
Russell

W.

Bench,

Presiding Judge
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Home Savings and Lean Association

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
******

HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Utah
corporation,

STIPULATED PRETRIAL ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs .

Civil No.

C36-2257

THE AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY
COMPANY,

Judge Michael R. Murphy
Defendant.
*******

pretrial hearing on this matter was held October 20,

1987' lP*3uant t0 Rule 16 °f the Ut3h RUlGS °f ClVU
Proceed*. The plaintiff, Home Savings and Loan Association,
was represented at the hearing by its counsel Gary R. Howe, P.

Bryan Fishburn and Wallace R. Bennett, Of Counsel. The
defendant. The Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, was represented

c;..:

by its counsel Lynn S. Davies,

Michael A. Peterson.
the

I.

and Russell C. Fericks and

The following determinations were made by

Court:

JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of the Court is not disputed and is
hereby determined to be present.

II.

VENUE.

Venue is proper in the Third Judicial Distric: Court of
Salt Lake County,

III.

State of Utah.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES.

The following constitutes the parties' claims which have
not been stipulated by counsel.

A.

Plaintiff's Claims:

Plaintiff claims that defendant, The Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company,

should indemnify plaintiff under Aetna's

-

2

-

M°

employee fidelity bond for losses which resulted directly from
one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of its employees, in
particular, Larry Glad.

The losses include, (i) the loss

sustained as a result of a jury verdict entered against Home on
the 14th day of August, 1984 in the case of Victor W. Armitage,
et al.. Plaintiffs v. Home Savings and Loan Association,
Defendant, Civil Action Nos. C82-0670K in the United States

District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division;

(ii) attorneys fees and costs incurred in defending, appealing
and settling the aforesaid action; (iii) prejudgment interest;

and (iv) court costs and attorneys fees incurred in the present
action.

B.

Defendant's

Claims:

Defendant claims: (i) the loss sustained by plaintiff is
not covered by the terms and conditions set forth in Aetna's

bond; (ii) the plaintiff has not complied with the condition
precedent to coverage under the bond of supplying defendant

with timely notice of its discovery of employee dishonesty or
fraud; (iii) plaintiff's own mismanagement, misfeasance,
misconduct, negligence and/or failure to follow safe and sound

lending practices directly resulted in plaintiff's losses; (iv)

-

3

-

^v

plaintiff's discovery in December, 1981, of a fee received by
its employee, Larry Glad, voids coverage under the bond for

loss resulting from dishonest or fraudulent conduct of Larry
Glad; (v) plaintiff's discovery just before or shortly after

hiring Larry Glad of Glad's embezzlement of funds at Sandy
State Bank voids coverage under the bond for any less resulting
from the fraudulent or dishonest conduct of Larry Glad;
(vi) plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages;

(vii) plaintiff did not rely upon Larry Glad's knowledge of
Afco's financial circumstances in deciding to loan money either

directly to Afco or indirectly to Afco through second mortgage
loans to Afco investors; (viii) Home's losses in the Armitage
judgment resulted from the nature of the transaction --- a

security -- rather than from any dishonesty or fraud on the

part of Larry Glad; (ix) Home's losses in the Armitagje judgment
from the acts or misrepresentations of Home's officers, Board
of Directors, and/or General Counsel which constituted common

law fraud; and (x) Home's losses in the Armitage judgment
resulted from the acts of Home's employees which were not

dishonest or fraudulent as defined by the terms of the bond.

-

4

-

-]7>

IV.

UNCONTRQVERTED

The following

FACTS.

iiczs

are established by admissions

in the

pleadings or by stipulations of counsel:

1.
of

Home

business

2.

of

in Salt

Aetna

licensed to

is a Utah corporation with
Lake County,

State of

its

principal

place

Utah.

is a surety and casualty insurance company

issue savings

and

loan

blanket

bonds

in

the State

Utah.

3.
from April

Larry Glad,
30,

was

1981 until

an employee of Home Savings

terminated effective December

& Loan
29,

19 8 1.

4.

From mid-November

January 1982,
("Afco

who

inter-related companies

borrowers'

The

through the first week of

Home made a total of 42

investors"),

Affleck.

1981

loans were

loans to individuals

invested the proceeds
("Afco")

in several

controlled by Grant C.

secured by

trust

deeds

en the

homes.

-

5

-

-c

>

5.

On November

commitments

Wyoming,

25

and 30,

from Rocky Mtn.

1981,

Home obtained

Federal Savings & Loan of Cheyenne

to purchase a total of $775,000 second mortgage loans

made by Home to Afco

6.

On or

Investors.

about

December

20,

1981

it

became

known

to

the management of Home that Larry Glad had received a $15,000
payment from Robert Mitchell.
a $31,000.00

7.

fee

The $15,000 payment was part of

received by Robert Mitchell

On December 23,

Associat ion of Great

ninety-five percent

Falls,

(9 5%)

1981,

from Afco.

First Federal Savings & Loan

Montana committed to

of

purchase

a $500,000 block of second

mortgage loans made by Home to Afco investors.

8.

On February 26,

1982,

First

Loan purchased $388,399.00 worth of Afco

Federal Savings

and

investor second

mortgage loans and it purchased an additional $45,113.00 worth
of Afco

investor second mortgage

On March

9.

7,

1982,

loans on March 3,

Afco

198 2.

filed for Chapter

11

bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District

of

Utah.

-

6

-

V

10.

On March 17,

1982,

Rocky Mtn.

Federal Savings &

Loan purchased the Afco

investor second mortgage

Home

$455,448.00

for

the

amounts

of

loans from

and $288,386.00,

respectively.

11.
1982,

On March 26,

1982, April 7,

Home was sued by Afco

investors

mortgages with Home and invested the

12.
mortgage
20,

Home Savings
loans

1982,

who had taken out second
loan proceeds

repurchased the Afco

from Rocky Mtn.

and April 29,

in Afco.

investor's second

Federal Savings & Loan on April

1982.

13.

Aetna

issued to

a Savings and Loan Blanket

Home on the

Bond,

Standard Form 22,

coverage made retroactive to June 21,

19 82.

for coverage in a principal amount of up

14.

The term of

Court

On July

(Abbott

v.

22,

July,

1982

with

The Bond provided

to $1,135,000.00.

the Bond was for three years,

running through June 20,

15.

14th day of

i.e.

1985.

1982

Shaffer,

a

lawsuit was

C32-0628K)

-

7

filed

in Federal

in which several

hundred

-

^

borrowers sought relief from 17 different
institutions
severed

for

including Home Savings.
trial

as

to each

local financial

The action was

financial

institution.

Later
The

severed port ion relating to Home involved 3 6 husband-and-wife
borrowers and was designated Armitage vs.

Home Savings,

(C82-0670K).

16.

On December

letters to Aetna to

9,

1982

and December

inform Aetna of

21,

1982

Home sent

the pending Armitage v.

Home Savings litigation and other related cases involving the
Afco

investor second mortgage

17.

Home Savings

mortgage

loans

December

30,

18.

loans.

repurchased the Afco

investor

second

from First Federal Savings & Loan Association on

1982.

On or

about

May 6,

1983,

Aetna

retained

the

law

firm of Suitter, Ax land, Armstrong & Hanson to represent
Aetna's interests with respect to Armitage v. Home Savings.

(Aetna concurs with this paragraph, subject to verification by
Home of the

indicated date of retention.)

-

8

-

ni

19.
that

On September 30,

1983 Aetna wrote to Home stating

it

elected not

to assum.e defense of

Savings

litigation,

as was

of

the

Aetna

20.

v.

On August

14,

1934

the jury in the Armitage v.

rendered special verdicts

In August,

1985,

attorneys

to

Home's

request,

the bond through August

The court entered a final

fees which was

Home

against Home.

and pursuant

Home Savings case on February 24,

judgment for

Home

its option under general Agreement C

Aetna extended coverage under

2 2.

v.

3ond.

Savings trial

21.

the Armitage

20,

1986.

judgment in the Armitage
1986,

except

for

a

rendered on March 21,

1986.

23.

The Armitage judgment rescinded 3 6 separate loans

with a net principal amount (face value of

benefit to borrowers) of $998,623.00.

loans minus di rect

This net principal

amount includes $10,000.00 of punitive damages.

24.

The March

21,

plaintiff's attorneys fees

1986

judgment

for the Armitage

and costs was $381,294.00.

-

9

Home

-

n

settled this claim for $190,647.00.

(Aetna accepts the

representation of amounts indicated in the paragraph, subject
to reasonable proof and documentation by Home.)

25.

Home paid attorneys fees and costs of $336,647.00

to the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and $13,573.00 to the

law firm of Backman, Clark & Marsh for the primary defense of
the Armitage lawsuit.

In addition. Home paid $45,464.00 to the

law firm of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker for the appeal and
settlement of the Armitage judgment, plus $9,728.00 to
Intermountain Court Reporters for

the costs of trial

transcripts to support the appeal.

(Aetna accepts the

representation of amounts indicated in this paragraph,, subject
to reasonable proof and documentation by Home.)

V.

CONTESTED

ISSUES OF FACT.

The contested issues of fact remaining for determination
are:

1.

Did Larry Glad commit dishonest or fraudulent acts

or omissions relating to the Afco investor loans which are
covered by the Aetna

Bond?

-

10

-

\}fl

2.

Did Home Savings'

second mortgage

loans

repurchase of

from Rocky Mtn.

the Afco

investor

Savings & Loan and First

Federal Savings & Lean Association constitute a failure by Home
to mitigate

3.
mortgage

its carnages?

Did Larry Glad cause the Afco
loan documents

to

be

investor second

backdated before closing so as

to

deny to borrowers their three-day right to rescind?

4.
terms

and

5.

Was

the

conditions

loss
set

sustained by plaintiff covered by the
forth

in

Aetna's

Did the plaintiff comply with

bond?

the condition

precedent to coverage under the bond by supplying defendant
with timely notice of "discovery" as such term is defined in
Rider

6091

6.

of

the

bond.

Was plaintiff's own mismanagement,

misfeasance,

or

other negligence and/or failure to follow safe and sound
lending practices the &o le—.sufficient cause of plaintiff's

oTJ tV
losses?

-

n

-

A

7.

Did plaintiff discovery just before or shortly

after hiring Larry Glad that he had embezzled funds at Sandy
State

Bank?

8.

Did plaintiff rely upon Larry Glad's know ledge of

Afco's financial circumstances

in deciding to

loan money either

directly to Afco or indirectly to Afco through second mortgage
loans

to

Afco

9.

investors?

Did Home's

from the nature of

from acts or
and

Genera 1

12.

in the Armi tage judgment result

the transaction -- a security --

from any dishonesty or

10.

losses

Did Home's

fraud on the part of Larry Glad?

losses in the Armitage judqment result

misrepresentations of
Counsel

rather than

which

Home's

constituted

Board of Directors

fraud?

Did Home's losses in the Armitage judgment result

from the acts of employees which were not dishonest or

fraudulent as defined, by the terms of

13.

the bond?

Was Aetna prejudiced by a failure to receive timely

notice of a potential

loss covered under the bond?

-

12

-
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14.
manifestly
conduct

VI.

the

Did Larry Glad,
intend 10

taken

in

the

or

cause Home
course of

CONTESTED

ISSUES

OF

LAW.

Contested

issues

of

law,

foregoing

1.

If

covered under

issues

the bond

must

independent cause of
from the act,

2.

of

fact,

causation

a fidelity bond,

is

to

lose m.oney by any action cr

Home'5

in

lending

from an

addit ion to

act,

alleged as

Afco

those

event

or

investors?

imp 1ici t in

a defense

procedure

an

in

event or procedure

loss or must

the

be

to

bar

a sole,

the

loss

result

recovery?

must employee dishonesty or

constitute the sole independent cause of

not

action on

less only directly

procedure in order

the bond,

to

are:

that act,

event or

Under

any other Heme employee,

fraud

in order

to

establish coverage?

3.

Under the Aetna bond,

is

the plaintiff entitled to

attorneys fees and costs incurred in appealing the Armitaae
j udgment?

-

13

-

4.
date of
14,

Does prejudgment
the jury verdicts

198 4) or

Under

if any,

run

from the

in Armitage v. Home Savings (August

from the date of

Savings (February 24,

5.

interest,

the judgment in Armitage v. Home

1986)?

the Aetna

bond,

is

Home

entitled

to

recover

the punitive damages imposed on Home in the Armitage judgment?

6.

Under

the Aetna

awarded to a party (i.e.

bond,

are

the attorneys

fees

the Armi tage plaintiffs) who prevails

against the insured a compensable loss?

7.

Are plaintiffs entitled to

court costs

8.
notice as

9.

incurred

in

the

present

their attorneys

action?

Is defendant estopped to assert
a defense to

fees and

lack of

timely

plaintiffs claim?

Is failure to provide information not requested on

a bond application form a bar to

recovery in an action on the

bond?

-

14

-

V

'#

10.

Is

accept Home's
10 challenge

by Home

defendant

tender
the

in that

11.

of

estopped,

by virtue of

the defense

reasonaoleness of

in

its

failure

the Armitage

the attorneys

to

litigation

fees

incurred

litigation?

The Court

pursuant

to

a motion

filed by

the

plaintiff has previously addressed the evidentiary/burden of
proof

issue regarding the subject matter of whether or not

plaintiff must show dishonesty or
bond

as

to

each

individual

Afco

fraud as defined under the

investor

plaintiff can show a common scheme that

program of
Court

has

determination

been presented tor

claim of

12.

loan

or

whether

perm.eated the entire

loans to borrowers who then invested in Afco.

reserves

of

the

such

issue

until

the

The

evidence

the purpose of establishing plaintiff's

"permeation".

Did plaintiff's discovery in December,

fee received by

its employee,

Larry Glad,

198 1,

of a

void coverage under

the bond for any loss resulting from dishonest or fraudulent
conducted of Larry Glad?

13.

Did plaintiff's discovery just before or shortly

after hiring Larry Glad of Glad's embezzlement of funds at

-

15

-

3>

^3
i>

Sandy State Bank (assuming the jury answers Contested Issue of
Fact No.

8

in

the affirmative)

void coverage under

the

oond

for

any loss resulting from any fraudulent or dishonest conduct of
Larry Glad.
contested

(Plaintiff does not stipulate that this

issue of

14.

Do

is a

law.)

forgeries of

signatures

and alterations

to

information contained in loan applications and employer
verifications or di recti ions given to
forgeries,

or alterations

on the secondary market,
the

VII-

Bond

as

ISSUES

a

matter

of

RESERVED

The parties

relative to

another

to engoge

loans

intended to

in such
be sold

constitute dishonesty as covered by
law?

FOR

COURT:

reserve the following

determination by the court after

issues

jury verdicts

for
have been

returned.

1.

Does the Aetna bond's $5,000 per

loss deductible

provision apply separately to each Afco investor second
mortgage loan,

or just once to the loss sustained by virtue of

the Armitage judgment?

-

16

-

2.
bv Home

VI :I .

Is
in

the

amount of

defense of

MOTIONS

IN

the A rm i 13 g e

finds

that

fees

lawsuit

and costs expended
reasonable?

LIMINE.

The Court denies
Court

attorneys

the

plaintiff's first motion

documents

identified

in

relative

limine.

The

to

plaintiff's first mot ion are relevant,

subject to the condition

that

have

Defendant

must

shew

that

it

would

interceded

to

halt

the repurchase from First Federal Savings & Loan of Great Falls
on or

about Decemoer

30,

investor second m.ortgage
that

defendant's

1982

of

loans.

assertion of

approximately $500,000

In addition,

Section

11

of

in Afco

the Court finds

the

bend as

does

not provide an independent basis for the introduction of
"discovery" evidence.

The Court grants in part and denies
second motion

in

limine.

The Court grants

in part plaintiff's
plaintiff's

motion with respect to evidence offered to show:
because of

that

inadequate procedures Home failed to discover

dishonest acts of

Larry Glad;

or

(2)

that Home's

from its negligent supervision of Larry Glad.

plaintiffs'

(1)

second

loss

resulted

The Court denies

second motion with respect to evidence offered to

-

17

-
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W

show that procedures in place at Home and/or acts or omissions
of

Home's directors,

officers or employees,

dishonesty of Larry Glad,

apart

from any

resulted in the loss Home sustained

as a consequence of the Armitage verdict.

IX.

EXHIBITS.

Exhibits have been designated separately by

the parties.

The designations are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "3."

A.

exhibits,

The parties are to

prepare conformed sets o f

premarked and numbered consecutively,

and accepted as

to authenticity and foundation except with regard to those
specifically identified in Exhibit

B.

The parties may,

"B."

by stipulation,

prepare a one (1)

volume binders of copies of selected stipulated exhibits for
use by each of the jurors.

C.

The parties stipulate that the transcripts of

testimony from the Armitage v. Home Savings trial are
admissible

for

use

in

this

trial

-

under

the

same

standard

1

&

[U.R.Civ.P.

32(a)(3)]

decositions

taken

in

which governs
this

admissibility of

case.

WITNESSES.

X.

Witnesses

have

The designations

been designated separately by counsel.

are attached hereto

The parties shall prepare written

as

Exhibits

lists of

they intend to call designated witnesses.

day of

trial,

expect

to call on the tellewing day of

and "D."

the order

in which

At

the close of

each

the parties shall designate which witnesses they

which they will

XI .

"C"

trial,

and the order

in

ee called.

REQUEST FOR

INSTRUCTIONS.

Inasmuch as the case is to be tried to a jury,

requests

for jury instructions and proposed Special Verdict forms shall
be submitted to

However,
such

the Court

by

12:00

noon on Novem.ber 9,

1987.

this shall be without prejudice to modify or augm.ent

instructions

before

the

close

-

19

of

trial.

-

^1

XII.

AMENDMENT

TO

The

has

reassert

Court

PLEADINGS.

ordered

the Twelfth

The Court has

also

XIII.

in

indicated that

Defenses

of

be

a liewed

its

to

Answer.

it will entertain a m.otion by

add a claim for attorneys

fees

action.

Defendant may take the deposition of

the Utah Department

of Financial

designated by the plaintiff
designation,
27,

shall

DISCOVERY.

1.
of

this

defendant

and Thirteenth

either party to amend to
incurred

that

if any,

as

any emp loyee

Institutions who

a witness,

is made by 9:00 a.m.

so

long

as

on Tuesday,

is

the
October

1987.

XIV.

TRIAL

SETTING.

This case is set for trial before a jury to commence on
the 27th day of October,

1987

at

the hour

of

9:00 o'clock a.m.

and to continue thereafter as needed on October 28, 29 and 30,
November 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23 and 24,
1987.

Trial days shall begin at 9:00 o 'clock a.m.

-

20

anc. recess

-

ft

^

at

12:00 o 'clock noon,

ce

reconvened at

recess at 5:00 o'clock p.m.
.r

1:10 o'clock p.m..

and

subject to modification by the

•-, l ' r

'' XV.

STATEMENT OF

THE

CASE.

• i
• i

11

,i

ii

The parties shall stipulate to a concise statement of the

! case to

be

read to

the

iurv

at

the com.mencem.ent of

the case.

|l

!jXVI.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT.

jj

jj

•:!

Possibility of settlement of this action is considered

'i
:i

,I poor.

DATED:

27/ ,.

October ^

19 87.

3Y

THE

COURT

YkujLP.

By

Michael R. Murphy
District Court Judge

CDN9113H

-

21

-

!>

The foregoing Proposed Pretrial Order is hereby adopted

this AvJ' day of October, 1987.

CALLISTER,
RICHARD H.

DUNCAN &
NEBEKER

NEEEKER

GARY

R. HOWE
BRYAN FISHBURN

P.

WALLACE

R.

BENNETT,

By

%i^f 77V^

Of

Counsel

P. Bryan Fishourn
Gary R. Howe
Attorneys for Plaintiff
RICHARDS,

3RANDT,

MILLER

&

NELSON

?^v-..—

/By

Lynn"S. uavies
^/Russe 11 C. Fericks
Michael

A.

Attorneys
THE

AETNA

Peterson

tor Defendant

CASUALTY

AND

SURETY

COMPANY

By

CDN9113H

22

-

n*9

Tab 3

FILLr- IN C.E^K'3 OFF'C;
f: " t':••
0 ,'.-•/ Utah

IN THK DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTJ^ - 5 1937
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF ttT&JP': '~'z ' l'""' <^ -''V00'
•ki.

KCME SAVINGS AND LOAN,
a Utah corporation,

••«•

*,r

SPECIAL JURY
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

C-86-2257

vs.

THE AETNA CASUALTY AND

SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY:

You are to respond to these

special jury interrogatories only after you have reached
agreement on your answers to questions contained in the special
jury verdict.

We

the

Put these aside until then.

jury,

respond

to

the

following

special

interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO.

1

In accordance with the standard of proof required in

numbered paragraph 1 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were intentional misrepresentations or nondisclosures
of facts known by Home Savings on the application questionnaire
which facts materially affected its risks under the bond and that
it would not have issued the bond or would have excluded the risk
disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

" —*-—"

-2-

INTERROGATORY NO.

In

2

accordance

with

the

standard

of

proof

required

ir.

numbered paragraph 2 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that

there

were

unintentional

misrepresentations

or

nondisclosures of facts known by Home Savings on the application
questionnaire which facts materially affected its risks under the

bond and that it would not have issued the bond or would have
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER:

\/

Yes

INTERROGATORY NO.

No

3

In accordance with

the standard of proof required

in

numbered paragraph 3 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were intentional failures to disclose facts known by
Home Savings beyond those inquired about on the application
questionnaire which facts materially affected its risks under the
bond and that it would not have issued the bond or would have
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER:

Yes

INTERROGATORY NO.

. No

v

4

In accordance with the standard of proof required

in

numbered paragraph 4 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were unintentional failures to disclose facts known by
Home Savings beyond those inquired about on the application
questionnaire, which facts materially affected its risks under

-3-

the bond and that it would not have issued the bond or would have

excluded the risk disclosed if it had known these facts?

ANSWER:

S

Yes

INTERROGATORY NO.

No

5

At any time prior to the termination of Larry Glad from the
employment

of

Home

Savings,

did

Home

Savings

learn

of

any

dishonest or fraudulent act on his part?

ANSWER:

YES

INTERROGATORY NO.

r

NO

6

If your answer to Interrogatory No. 5 above was "yes", state

whether the dishonest or fraudulent act occurred before Larry
Glad became employed by Home Savings,

after Larry Glad became

employed

before

by

Home

Savings,

or

both

and

after

such

employment?

ANSWER:

BEFORE

INTERROGATORY NO.

AFTER

^

BOTH

7

If your answer to Interrogatory No. 5 above was "yes", and

if you checked "After" or "Both" in response to Interrogatory No.
6 above, state whether the dishonest or fraudulent act occurring
during Larry Glad's employment was related or not related to the
Afco investor loans.

ANSWER:

Related to Afco investor loans

Not related to Afco investor loans

s,^

-4-

INTERROGATORY NO.

8

If your answer to Interrogatory No. 5 was "yes," state the

date

when

Home

Savings

first

learned

of

any

dishonest

fraudulent act by Larry Glad?

ANSWER:

Date:

A.^juT A^'Q Ptc£±*6£*. /<?? I

DATED this <?S~~ day of November, 1987.

£
Juror No.

1

Juror No.

2

Juror No.

3

Juror No.

4

Juror No.

5

Juror No.

6

Juror No.

7

Juror No.

8

Juror No.

9

Juror No.
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HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN,

SPECIAL VERDICT

a Utah corporation,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

C-86-2257

vs.

THE AETNA CASUALTY AND

SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant.

We, the jury, answer the questions propounded to us in the
Special Verdict as follows:

1.

Did Larry Glad commit any dishonest or fraudulent acts,

related to the Afco investor loans, with the manifest intent to
cause Home Savings and Loan to sustain its loss and to obtain
personal benefit?

ANSWER:

Yes y/"

No

If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no," you have
completed this Special Verdict, and you need not answer questions
No.

2 and No.

2.

3.

Did the verdict against Home Savings in the lawsuit of

Armitage, et al v. Home Savings & T,oan in whole or in part,
directly result from dishonest or fraudulent acts, if any, of
Larry Glad?
ANSWER:

Yes

)/

No

-2-

If your answer to Question No.

2 is "no," you have

completed this Special Verdict, and you need not answer question
No.

3,

3.

If you have answered "yes" to both question Nos. 1 and

2 above, itemize, by placing an "X" in the space provided, the

specific loans where a loss resulted directly from the dishonesty
or fraudulent act(s) of Larry Glad.

If you find that plaintiff

has not proven that a loss on any specific loan resulted directly
from any such acts, mark the space provided "NONE."
BORROWER NAME

ROSENLOF, Dennis

X

PENROD, Donald

<

GLEED, Virgil

yi

PHIPPEN, Arthur

•<

LOVELAND, Clinton

x

MORRILL, Elvin

^

SORENSON, Newell

x

FERRE, Shirl

A/^£

MILLER, James

fJo^C

WHITAKER, Mario

xr

WITT, William

x

WALTON, Russell

*

FARNSWORTH, Orrin

>c

LINFORD, Melvin

^_

PEHRSON, Reed

x

HIND, Richard

x.

-3-

SCOVILLE, Steven

X

BECKSTEAD, Quinn Merrill

^C

HANCOCK, Terry D.

^

DRUMMOND, Marvin

x

CULLIMORE, 0. Stanley

<_

LOVELAND, Ardel H.

<

ROBERTS, Andrew

<_

FISHER, Craig G.

xc

PRATT, Leigh Burgess

<-

MILES, Walter M.

<_

FARNSWORTH, Orrin Fay

^_

ARMITAGE, Victor W.

<_

TOBLER, Grant

<

RICHARDS, Kenneth D.

^_

MICHAELIS, Owen A.

^

KIRK, Ronald

^_

CHANDLER, Jerome

>£

REESE, LeRay

<~

HOLMAN,

>^

Kathleen C.

^

DEVEY, Richard R.

4.

Did Home Savings fail to mitigate its losses?

ANSWER:

Yes

No ><

K

-4-

5.
If you answered question No. 4 "yes," and you placed at
least one "x" in the space provided on question No. 3, state the

dollar amount by which the verdict to be calculated from your
verdict must be revised because of such failure to mitigate.
ANSWER:

DATED

this

$_

«#S~~day of November, 1987.
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THE *TNA CASUALTY AND .SURETY COMPANY

SAVINGS AND LOAN BLANKET BOND

Hartford, Connecticut 06115

Standard Form No 22, Revued to September, 1910
LIFE Si CASUALTY

(A Stock Company, herein called the Underwriter!

Bond No

19 F

3041 BCA

I,
DECLARATIONS

Item 1. Name of Insured (herein called Insured):

Home Savings & Loan

Salt Lake City, Utah

Principal Address: H6 South Main Street,

Item 2. Bond Period: from noon on

June 21, 1982
IMOHTM.

t>*T.

Villi

to noon on the effective date of the termination or cancellation of this bond, standard time at the Principal
Address as to each of said dates.

Item 3. Limit of Liability —

Subject to Section 7 hereof, the Limit of Liability is $

1,135,000.00

Provided, however, that if any amounts are inserted below opposite specified Insuring Agreements or Coverage,
such amounts shall be part of and not in addition to such Limit of Liability.
Amount applicable to:

Audit Expense Coverage
Insuring Agreement (D)—Forgery or Alteration

$ Nil
$ 100,000. CC

Insuring Agreement (E)—Securities
$ Nil
(Insert amount of Insuring Agreement or Coverage, or if an Insuring Agreement or Coverage is to be deleted, insert "Not Covered")

If '^Not Covered" is inserted above opposite any specified Insuring Agreement or Coverage, such Insuring Agreement

or Coverage and any other reference thereto in this bond shall be deemed to be deleted therefrom.

'*?"' Iv, Jh,e ,ia^'I'XX, of the Underwriter is subject to the terms of the following riders attached hereto
bh

58/ob
5884c
5923b
5936d

5972a
5973
6037
6041

60^2

6091

6059(1)
6064a
6090

Item 5. The Insured by the acceptance of this bond gives notice to the Underwriter terminating or canceling prior
bond(s) or policy(ies) No.(s) Mil

.(

such termination or cancellation to be effective as of the time this bond becomes effective.

Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)
8-20-82 ep

THE /€TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY

MArM

Thonas S. Carpenter, IV

TSB 5064b

.IF-493-DI

9-70

CAT. 135747

PRINTED Ity U.S.A.

"-•> { -ide'wnter, m consideration of an agreed premium and subiect to the Declarations made a part hereof the Generai Agreements
Y- ' ""• -i"' - —itations ana other terms of this bond, agrees *'!" me insured, m accordance with the insuring Agreements hereof to which an
.•— ,-•* • -iJ'ar.ce s appucabie as set fortn in Item 3 cf the Deoaraticns aid with respect to loss sustained t\ me insured at any time but
• •_-,f---: -jring fe Ecnd Period, to indemnify and hold narmiess tne insured for
INSURING AGREEMENTS
FIDELITY

a
—.-

IN

^-,-t mrough anv dishonest or fraudulent act of any of the
•,•.•(-",

committed anvwhere and whether committed alone or in

.,. i wi*n others, inciudmg loss, through any such act of any of

. ,. .".-•

TRANS'T

'O Loss of Property '.occurring with or without negligence or vtoleneei through robberv, common-law or statutory larceny, embezzlement

theft, hold-up, misappropriation misplacement, mysterious unenpijm-

it?PS at property held by the Insured for anv purpose or in

able disappearance, being lost cr otherwise made away with, damage

-. • ).•j;.f. j.nd whether so neld gratuitously cr not and whetner or
ame therefor.
• **-.- •••„-e^iS
AUDIT EXPENSE
-..-,;-- -;„"ed bv the Insured for that part of the cost cr audits or

thereto or destruction thereof, and icss of subscription, conversion, reden-phon or deposit privileges through the displacement or ess cf
P'Operty while the Property is in trans^f anvwhere in the custody of anv
person cr persons acm-g as messenger, e-ceor wn.ie in the mail or w,th

. • •- T --s -ec_.red bv Mate or Federal supervisory author, nes re 0e
.. ._--,-.. t, :~e. Dv. SuCh aurhonties cr by independent accountants by

d ca'ner 'or hire, other than an armored motor ven,cle company, for the
purpose of transportation such transit to-egm immediately upon rece-pt

n •• me c sccverv of loss sustained by the Insured through dis-

°f such prDPer,y b* 'he transporting person cr persons, and to end im-

• -• / • - "aucuient acts of any of the Employees The total iiabintv of

mediately upon delivery thereof at destination

--.. ^ - •e-v.n'cr for sucn eipense by reason of such acts of any Employee

FORGERY OR ALTERATION

- .- .h.r.- vuch Employee is concerned or implicated or with respect to

(D, Losi through FORGERY OR ALTERATION of on cr in anv

-. --: .... : • -r exam.njt.nn ,s limited to the amount stated opposite
•'•.:• c:--:e^cve-ace m item 3 of the Declarations it being unde--

checKs, drafts, acceptances, withdrawal orders or receipts for the w,mdrawal ot funds or Property certificates cf deposit letters c; ced-t »ai.

•

rant<. r^cney orders or orders -jpen public treasuries

' - we.-' "-a- such expense snail be deemed to be loss sustained

.•-•-• -.--,: "-^rcugn o.snonest cr fraudulent acts ot one or mere ct f"e
_- ..>.-,-s 3--, "he • abm'v C the Underwriter under rms oaragrapn ct
-•..'-•:"-:'pe"-enriA'sha'lbeapartofandnotinadditiontofheLimif
• -_ r .t, s'a'ed m .tern 3 of the Declarations

"

MechamcaY reproduced 'acsimile signatures are treated the same
as handwritten signatures
r

't'

•J"

(.[:r|
_ C(.
.-^--.

Loss through the insu'ed s having, m good faith and m the course

of business, purchased or otherwise acquired, or sold cr delivered, or

.-',s :t Pro-ertv (occurring with or without negligence cr vio-

qiven any va|ue extended any credit or assumed any l.abnitv. on the

• —e thr-u-jh robber, burglary, common-law or statutory iarcenv,
•'- •• "- :-up or cthe' -raudulent means, misplacement, mysterious un-

f,llth of< or otherwise acted upon, any securities, documents or other
wntten instruments wtiich prove to ha.e been

• •:- ,i r.y c disappearance, damage thereto or destruction thereof and
•-, ' :-".:' :t''Cn conversion redemption or deposit privileges through
'-•: ~ --;- .ice—enr cr ess cf Property, wnile the Property is ^cr is sup-• -. ' " :•-' "dgeo or deposited within any offices or premises ocated

i(3. counterfeited or forged as to tne signature of any rra«r, d'awer,
issuer, endorser, assignor lessee, far-ster agent or -cgistrar acceptor, surety or guarantor cr as ro me signature ct any perscn
signing m any other capacity, or

--,--> m

••:•?::

.n 'np —a<i or with a carrier tor h:rP

c'-e- 'han

.D,

raised or otherwise a'te-ea cr icst or stc'en

n ,.„ .„-. „„,;., '.enice company, for the purpose of transportation
• .-,-•, " 'he items o< property enumerated in the pa'ac/3nn

EXCLUDING m .my evem -ss tt--c„go YRGcRY OR ALTERAT.CN
of| on or in any checks, drafts acceptances withdrawal orders or re-

., .,..,„-. , ,. rcftVi m tne possession ot any customer ct the Insured or
'•• ,i". •!.•:;'esentative of such customer, whether or not the Insured is

cdpts tor the withdrawal of funds or Property, certificates ot deposit.
letters of credit, warrants money orders cr crders upon public treasuries

•at- e t ;t 'ne less tnereof,
.i ri-'-u^h any hazard specified in the preceding paragraph, while
•- " :"-re'''. 'S within any of the Insured's ottices. or

Securities, documents or other written mst-uments shall be deemed
t0 mClln original Uncluding original COunte'Carts • negotiaole or ncn-

:.>

cdmiry course of business transferable bv de 'vrv ot such agreements

•s j;"_,j . :'3"<acim- business with the Insured at an cutside win-

-.irn anv necessary endorse —ent or assign —e^t

: w "- ;t-e- s "-nar facisity offered to the public for mat purpose
r. *"e ^surej. and attended bv an Employee c' tne Insured, at

Actuai physical possession z' such secu-i'^s document z- ether
written instruments by ihe ntu-ed ,s a c:"C,!icri ;;'eceeenr io tne

A--. -.' "-e •"S'jied
-

neg"tiable agreements m writing having va'^e which va>ue is in tie

ii--.-. j -n -ocoerv or hold-up while such customer or rep-e sen-at ive

s offices cr

Insurerl s having rent"-1 cr the 'aifh Y

.^.-^^.^ -ebbery or hcid-up during business hours »hi'f such CUS-

'""i« rr representative is in any building or on any driveway.
^jrMpg

ct or s:r"iljr facility maintained bv the Insured as a con-

'•reence for such customers or representatives using motor
• ^hic'es if such customer or represenjative is present in such
be. Id eg or en such, facility for the purpose of transacting bus mess
„,.n .i-ie injured at any or its offices,

The word "counter*eited

and excluding

in any event, loss caused cv seen

as used in this Insjnng Ag-eemcnt shall

be deemed to mean oniy ^n imitation of anv such security

document cr

ether written instrument which is intended to deceive and to be taken
for an original
Mechanically reo reduced facsimile signatures are treated the same
as handwritten signatures

pm.idr: such :ss a' tne option of the Insured, is mcLded m --e
l.iSu'i' ; , ~'~e' ~> icss

or c'^^rwise acted jpen, such

seCur't'CS documents or -f-cr wit'en ms'^jry-e-ts

R^EMPT'ON CF !'N TED STAGES SAVINGS BONDS

Cuv;-, -r an. -cprcsentahve of such customer
C".ces ana Equipment
•a !_-.',•, e-. cr damage to, furnishings, fixtures, stationery supplies

" L'"" througn me Insured s cavm- or redeem.no. cr guaranteeing
r-r »,!ni'<>,ing anv ^'gnatere ucc" any c-n'ed irates L'j-mgs CC_s,
Senp<. A ,^ K |nc ,JS,;e Lr,,ea c:jrc5 Sa,,nv;s Notes cr A-^ed Fe-:es
Lea^e Bends which shai. have beer, fe-ged ccunterte; ted, raised cr

or ct.ji; n-ent within ,iny of the Insured S offices caused by 'arcenv er

ntne'w^e altered or lost o- stolen er en wheh the signa'ure to the

thru .n .;.- by ourg-ary, robbery or hold-up of such office, or aite-ot

Request tor Payment sha.l ha.e been forged

there.!1, i - by vandalism or malicious mischief, or ih! loss throogn dam

age ' • ar-v such e'tice bv larceny or theft in, or by burglary r-bcery er

COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY

he1 '. ur • ' -J„:n e-^ce or attempt thereat, or to iHc interior c' a"v ;uc"

'G' Loss through n-e 'ece ot bv f~e Insured in gced • nth, cf jny

of..- :•, ijnij ,sm or maiicious mischief, provided, m any event mat
the -.,"..: - -"e Owner of such etfices, furnishings, t i tu'CS if J" --€••• .

counter*e<ted or a.tered caper currencies cr cem c* •">> U-itcd S'J'es
C> A-^enca or Canada v,ij,'C or p_rpe't'-g 'o hav been , ^ued bv

sL,:-: .... . c-_..-.—ent or is liable for such loss or damage.—J.-a.i e>crpt,-- - wee a, ess or damage through fire

the U"i'ed Sfa'es ;t An-e-;..5 jr Zi"aca z- iS^ed pu';u.j-.r •? a .„n,ted
-ta'cs : ^nfijj cr Crj::'.ti j'jMp ':• -•.( js cu'r'.'":.

GENERAL

AGREEMENTS

A:,;,'T ONAl. OFFICES CR EMPLOYEES—CONSGL'DAT.CN
OR MERGER

,,-.,! re^-r.^.e af'e-ne..s J^es >rZ^'?-i ,md na.d bv --e 'nsjred -n
(]fifni,n ,inv suit r.r \rr..\\ pi'Tfedmg cr;-u ,ht aga n-.t the Insured to

A It 'ne |rsurcd shall, while this bend is m force, establish any addit.-n.ii •" c.' ''Offices such office or offices shall he autemar iC.i I.v

c-^rce the Insured s li.ibn.i. •t .)l eged h.ibi .tv .-n account ct any loss,
t'.ir" rr iimjge which i' e'f.ibhshcd agj'n-.r tne Insure 1 would con-

C-,e-M n,-',-under '-cm tne dates of their establishment 'C -,pect' - e'v
N j i- • r.-. •-•

--c L" :c writer of an increase du"n'i anv l''!.'"'"-*1 ce-

d

• VjT,. ,, ,,,,,,( 3n..i €••• iccf.-'e I .ss Susta -e < bv '"e
.... —r, -.i .i-,^ ecnd

m mc event s^;h ics'-

••• ..,rr : under me

: Jim ' ' '.m- >:,. ,-, -,_oiecf

ln ,-.. „._.-,.,,r., .. -.- ,rc, cr ,n ;^e number of Empio.ees jt a", -_: mc

. -, ., ^c^Cf :Je Am :u-i: ~r h .n e-.CSs c' '"'"•

'n ,..'. • , '• :es need be g1 vfn and no additionji prem..j— n,-e ' be rjnJ

.„r ,„rrf,s -lf ,„IS .r:nd ^'.h ccurt cos's ;md j't --n.". •, '.-.';.. -> -, | he Oro

.-"-non--' c

..;'•(•'c

u"ber

*•-. >• ,, r„^.ir,:e- -t luCn o'emium penod, uotss i.;Cn \rzre:ic -."i

'.•••:'.

r(?,u . ••

~ .-e •r-u^rr i s cense-ida tion cr merger w.m or :j;:"J'.C . '

,^ , n< uic.TtiCn ot such

asse* . "'

an.-me' msfirution

n -,,lCC, ,Q , hc (Jndc *r ,tr- -• the mst ituhcn -* any such .._, t or leg a I D'OCCCd'"" .It the reeucSf O1 '"C Underwriter S"JH furnish i- witn copies of
admgs and
p.ipc-s therein
at me
Underwriter
a:! P eadmgs
and ether
ether e.ipcs
me'em and
and a'
me ;_"'.
s'rwrniT s
s eiectmn
t-!t",'".j"
.
, ,. ,
J
.
,
,
, ,i
she
I
ui-rmit
the
Ijnderwr,trr
n
conduct
r^e
defense
c!
such
suitor
legal
'^ ' P('r

__

__

WARRANTY

E

•-. , .'ven-cm made by or on behalf of the Insured wnethe-- c
,

i, .

j

_,,,!,,

,..-,..-,

tamed ,n tr-e application cr otherwise, shall be deemed to bo a warranty
_. an,th.ne
,_ .„ __ except ....
i~~ u„,.
~i .r,n,. and
.o.-i -.,:,,.(
o*
'njt it is true to the
best of
tne i„„»
knowledge
bencf

of *he -ers.-n rr-,Kln- me statement

•CC'JRT.COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

S^;n ."den-nty =,"!,' be m addition 'e mea"' u-t - • f-sbed

" le—n.tv

tKe r-A„'ed s"i

: ":-"Ct:v gi'C

P'-ceedmg, ,n the Insureds na^e. th-eugn attorneys ,.t the Under^.,'e- s o-n selection in ,-c even- o* s^cn e;ecticn bv t-e I Lode-write',

Aoo.icab'e 'o an Insunng Agreements now or hereafter

me mured shall give ail reasonable infc'^ahon ar-.^ ass.stance, other

fo'rmng pjrt ot this bondi

t"an pecuniary, which the Underwriter shall deem necessary Q. tne

C Thc 'Jndc.rjo. w,ll .nd'-mnily th. Insured *9'inii co^." co*t,

p-UDr, ddtnie of such suit or legal proceeding*'.

THE FOREGOING INSURING AGREEMENTS AND GENERAL AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
DEFINITIONS

Section !

The following terms, as used in this bond, shall have the

respective meanings stated in this Section1
\jj "Employee" means.
! ( i any officer or employee of the Insured and any officer or em

ployee Ot any predecessor of the Insured whose principal

assets are acquired by the Insured by consolidation or merger
with, or purchase ot assets of, such predecessor,
(2) anv employee of an executive officer cf the Insured,
(3i any duly elected or appointed attorney of the Insured or any
employee of such attorney;

(4) any natural person (sometimes known as conveyancer) duly
eiecfed or appointed by the Insured to draw deeds of con

veyances of lands, to investigate titles of real property or

otherwise to assist the Insured in the making (as distinguished
from the servicing or collection) of mortgage loans, while
performing such services,
(5) any natural person duly elected or appointed by the Insured
to collect rents for the account of the Insured while collecting
or having possession of such rents, and
(6) any natural person appointed by or with the approval of the
Insured to man.e collection of savings from persons who com

there'or,

g) loss through cashing or paving forged or iltered travelers' checks
or traveie's' checks bearing 'orged endorsen-ents, in whatsoever form

drawn, unless fraud or dishonesty on the part of any of the Emp'cvees
is involved, or ioss of unsold travelers' checks placed m the Custody ot
the Insured with authority to sell, where no fraud or dishonesty en the

part of any of the Employees is involved, unless !a) the Insured is legally
liable for such ioss ot such checks and ibl such checks are later paid or
honored bv the drawer rhereof

(hi loss of Property or loss of privileges through the misplacement
or loss of Property as set forth in Insunnq Agreement (B1 or 'C< while
the Property is in the custody of any armored motor vehicle company,
unless such loss shal. be in excess cf the amount recovered or received
by the Insured under la) the Insured's contract with said armored motor
vehicle company, (b/ insurance earned bv said armored motor vehicle
company for the benefit of users of its service, and (ct all other insurance

and indemnity m force in whatsoever form carried by or for the benefit
of users of satd armored motor vehicle company's service, and then this
bond shall cover only such excess,

(i> loss resulting from the use of credit or charge cards. whether such
cards were issued, or purport to have been issued, bv me Insured or by
anyone other than the Insured, except when covered bv msunrg Agree

pose, or purport to compose, a group making systematic de

ment

posits with the Insured while collecting or having possession
of anv such savings and such savings, while upon The prem

i|i expense incurred by the Insured for any audit or examination
whether conducted by the insured, by independent accountants or by
State or Federal supervisory authorities and whether or not conducted

ises where collected and in the possession or custody of *he

At,

said person collecting them, shall be deemed to be in "he

by reason of the discovery of loss sustained by the Insured through dis

possession of the Insured

honest or fraudulent acts of any of the Employees exceot when covered
by the second paragraph of Insuring Agreement (A),
(k) any person, who is a partner, officer or employee of anv Processor
covered under this bond, from and after the time that the Insured or any
partner or officer thereof not in collusion with such person shail have
knowledge Or information that such person has commrmd any fraudu
lent or dishonest act m the service of the lnsured or otherwise whether

Each natural person, partnership or corporation authorized by written
agreement with the

Insured to perform services as electronic data

processor of checks or other accounting records of the Insured, herein
called Processor, shall, while performing such services, be deemed
to be an Empiovee as defined in the preceding paragraph Eacn such
Processor and the partners, officers and employees of such Processor

sha I ceiled veiy, be deemed to be one Employee for all the purposes

of 'Or, b-nd. excepting, however, the third paragraph of Section I I
'b' "Property" means money (i e , currency, coin, bank nores, Fed
eral Reserve notes), postage and revenue stamps, U S Savinqs Stamps,

such act be committed before or after tne time this brmd is et'echve
ill loss 'ai involving automated mechan cal devices wmch en beha.f

of fhe Insured, disburse money, accept deoesiM, cash checs. drafts or
Similar written instruments or make credit card loans umess such auto

bullion, precious metals of all kinds and in any form and articles made

mated mechanical devices are located wit^m an office ot the Insured

therefrom, jewelry, watches, necklaces, bracelets, gems, precious and

and access thereto is not available outside such office cr ib' resulting
from the mechanical failure of such devices to function properly

semi-orecicus stones, bonds, securities, evidences of debts, debentures,
scrip, passbooks held as collateral, certificates, income shares, prepaid

share., fuM paid shares, matured shares, receipts, warrants, rights, trans
fers, ecu pons, drafts, bills cf exchange, acceptances, notes, checks,
money •--:;:e-s trav elcs' letters of credit, warehouse receiots, bills cf
lad'o;;, w.-nerawal orders, abstracts of title, insurance policies, deeds.
m-rtoages upon real estate and, or upon chattels and upon interests

ASSIGNMENT OF

Section 3

RIGHTS

This bend does not a'ford coverage in fav.or c' any Proc

essor, as aforesaid, and upon payment to the insured bv tne Lnderwnter
on account of anv loss through 'rauCu ent or dishonest acts comm.tfed

by anv of fhe partners, officers or employees ot such P-ccesscr whetner
acting alcne cr m col.usicn with others, ar assignment et such e' ,he

them n. and' assignments of such policies, m.ortgjges and instruments,

Insured's rights ana causes of action as if may h3. e against such

and other va'jabie papers, including books cf account and other records

Processor by reason o' such acts so cemmitted shall, to the extent of
such payment, be given by the Insured to the Underwriter, and the
Insured shall execute ail papers necessary to secure to the Underwriter
the rights herein provided for
LOSS—NOTICE —PROOF—LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Section 4 This bond is for me use and benefit en.',- ef tke l-sured
named m the Declarations and the Underwriter shall m-.t be 'ab'e here
under for less sustained bv anyone otne' than the lniLred unless me
Insured, in its sole disc'ct'O" 3nd at its option, shall mc u-!e such less m
the Insured's proof cf less At me earnes" practicable "-"mem a'ter dis

used by the Insured in the conduct of its business, and all other instru

ments similar to or in the nature of the foregoinq, in which the nsu-ed
has an interest or in which the Insured acquired or should have acquired
an interest bv reason of a predecessor's declared financial ccndtion at

the time of the Insured's consolidation or merger with, or purchase of
the p-mcipal assets of, such predecessor or which are held by the i nsu-ed

for any ;-urpcse or m anv capacity and whether so held gratuitcusiy or
net aid wnemer or not the Insured is liable therefor
EXCLUSIONS

Section 2

THIS BOND DOES NOT COVER:

(a) loss ef'ected directly or indirectly by means of forgery or altera

tion of, on or in any instrument, except when covered by Insuring
Agreement (A), (D), (El, (F) or (G),
(b)

loss due to military, naval or usurped power, war or insurrection

unless such loss occurs m transit in the circumstances recited in Insuring
Agreement iO, and unless, when such transit was initiated, there was
no k'l-'wiedge of such military, naval Or usurped power, war cr msur-

rcc'i^n .--n the cart of any person acting for tne Insured m mitiar eg
such -ransif

''c ' :css,

n bme of peace or war, directly or indirectly caused bv or

resulting trom the effects of nuclear fission or fusion or radicactiv ty,
provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply to loss resulting
from industrial uses of nuclear energy,

(d) loss resulting from any act or acts of any director or trustee of rhe
Insured orher rhan one employed as a salaried, pensioned or elected of
ficial cr an Employee of the Insured, except when performing acts com
ing within the scope ot the usual duties of an Employee, or while acting
as a member of any committee duly elected or appointed by resolution
of the board of directors or trustees of the Insured to perform specific.

as distinguished from general, directorial acts on beha'f of rhe Insured.
(e) loss resulting from the complete or partial non-payment of, or
defac !r upon,

(1

any ,oan or transaction in the nature of, or amounting to, a loan
made by or obtained from the Insured, or
(21 any note, account, agreement or ether evidence of debt assigned
or sold to, or discounted or otherwise acquired by, the Insured

whether procured in good faith or through trick, artifice, fraud or false
pretenses unless such loss is covered under Insuring Agreement <A),

covery ot any ioss hereunder me insured s,*-ci:I give t-e ..>-ofwrter

written notice thereof and sna'l also withm six n-onms ,Ttc sucn dis
covery furnish to the Underwriter affirmative proof ;f less with iuil

particulars If claim is made under this bond for less of securities,
the Underwriter shall net be luble unless each of such securities is

identified in such proof of loss bv certificate or bon i numroer Legal
proceedings for recovery of any loss hereunder shah not be brought
poor to the exp.ration o' sixty days after such ; roof ot —ss is fi:ed with
the Underwriter nor after the expirat.OO cf tv-enty-t - or r~-ntns frbm
the discovery of such loss, except that any ac' en o- ; -oceeo "- to re
cover hereunder on account ot any judgment against the nsureG m
any suit mentioned m General Agreement C 3r re recover a'*ernevs'
fees paid m any such suit, shal.1 be begun withm twi n-v-tcur r-o-,ths
from tne date uocn which 'he ludgment m such suit mal! beccme
fmai If the Insured be a Federal Savings and Loan Assc-ciation or a

state-chartered association insured by the Federal Savings and Loan

Insurance Corporation, but not subiect to state supervisory authority,
it is unoerstocd and agreed that in case of any loss hereunder discovered
either dy the Insured cr the Federal Home Loan Ban- ct w.mcn tne
Insured is a memrer. the said Federal Home Loan Biik is emoowemd
to give notice merecr to

the Underwriter within tne period limited

therefor If any 'nutation embodied m this bend is prohibited bv any
law controlling fhe construction hereof, such limitation snail be deemed
to be amended so as to be equal to the minimum pened of limitation

permitted by such law
Section 5

VALUATION
Securities

The Underwriter shall settle in kind its liability under this bond on
account of a loss of any securities, or at the option of the Insured shall

pay to the Insured the cost of replacing such securities, determined by

(Dior .,Y

the market value thereof at the time of such settlement

(f) loss of Property contained in customers' safe deposit boxes unless
such loss be sustained through any dishonest or fraudulent act of an

loss of subscription, conversion, redemption or deposit pn.ileges, as

Empiovee m such circumstances as shall make the Insured legally liable

In case of a

above set fortn, the amount of such loss shail be the value of. such

privileges immediately preceding the expiration thereof

:f such se-

cunt.es cannot be replaced or have no quoted market value, cr if such
„nv. leges nave no quoted market value, their value shal; be determined
bv agreement or arbitration. Any loss under this bond cf currency or
funds of any country shall be paid in the currency or funds cf such
country o'. a' the option of the Insured, in the United States cf Amenta
cy.'ar equivalent thereof determined by the rate of exchange at tne time

recovered in whole or in part under any ether bonds or policies issued
by the Underwriter to rhe insured or to any predecessor ,n interest of
rhe Insured and terminated or canceled or allowed to expire and in
wmch the penod for discovery has not expired at the time any such
loss thereunder is discovered, the total liability of the Underwriter under
rhis bond and under such other bonds or policies shall not exceed, in the

of fee payment cf such loss. Any other loss sustained at any of rhe In

aggregate, the amount earned hereunder on such loss or the amount
available to the Insured under such other bonds or policies, as limited
by the terms and conditions thereof, for any such loss if the latter

sured s e-fices and payable in money shall be paid in the currency or
(unds cf the country in which such office ts located or, at the option o<
the insured, in the United States of America dollar equivalent the-eof determ,nec by the --ate of exchange at the time of the payment of sucn loss

amount be the larger

If tne coverage of this bond supersedes in whole or in part the cover
age of any other bond or policy of insurance issued by an Insurer other
than the Underwriter and terminated, canceled or allowed to expire, the

Loss of Securities

t me aopi.caole coveraqe of this bond is not sufficient m amount to
mder-n-m, rhe msurec m full for the loss of securities for wmch caim
•s mace n^eunde' 'he liability of the Underwriter under this bond is
i-t- -ed to the payment for, or the duplication of, so much of such secun-

Underwriter, with rcspecf to any loss sustained prior to such termination,

cancellation or expiration and discovered withm the period permitted
under such other bond or pc'icv for the discovery of loss thereunder,

hes as "as a -alue equal to the amount of such applicable coverage ard

shah be iiable under this bong only for that part of such loss covered
by this bond as is in excess cf The amour: recoverable or recovered en

m sucn event me Insured shall assian to the Underwriter 3\- its n-nrs

t.fle ang mte-est in and to those securities for which sue- payment o-

account of such ioss under such other Dond or policy, anything to the

Cub'icahon .s made by the Underwriter

contrary m such other bond or policy notwithstanding

Bocks of Account and Other Records

In case or loss of, cr damage to, Property consisting of bocks cf ac

OTHER INSURANCE OR INDEMNITY

count or ;mer records used by the Insured in the cenduct of its business,
f-e Lnoerwnter sha.i be liable under this bond cr-iv if such books or

Section 10. If the insured carries or holds any ctner insurance cr
indemnity covering any loss covered by this bond, the Underwriter sna'i

recces are ac'ua.iy 'eproduced and then for not more man the cost c

be liable hereunder cniy for that part cf sucn loss whicn is in e.cess cf
the amount recoverable or recovered 'rem such otner insurance 0' in
demnity In no event shail the Underwriter be habie tor more than --e

b arr. cocks b an* pages or ether materials plus the ccsr of iabc for the
ac'-a faoscriphon 0r copying of data which shall have been furnished
.y me .nsu'ed m order to reproduce such books and other records
Property ether than Securities or Records

amount of the coverage of this bond applicable to such loss, subject,
nevertheless, to Section 7 cf this bond

In case cf less of, or damage to, any Properry orner rhan securities,

TERMINATION OR CANCELLATION

ccoxs o- account or other records as aforesaid cr damage to rhe mferi0,
er '-e nsuree s o'hees. or loss of cr damage to the 'urmsn.-g^ rixtures,
stahone', s-ppiies a"C\ equipment therein, the Underwriter snai. nor be
lisp e •-.' mere man the actual cash value of sucn Property or ot such

Section 11

bond, or (bJ immediately upon tne receipt bv fhe Underwriter of a written
-eguesf from the Insured to rermmare or cancel this bend, or ic1 imme
diately upon the taking over of fhe msu-ed by a receiver or other liqui

*u"- -~n n-s --xtures. stationery, supplies and equipment or 'or more

m3n -r-e ac'^al cost of repairing such Property or ot'.ces. furnishings.

• *r-m; statione-y. supples and equipment, or of repiacmq same w,m

dator or by State or Federal offic-a s, or -a- immediately upon the taxing
o-er of the Insured by another institution The Underwriter snj.l, en

C-roc-'. c matenai or hxe quality and value The Underwriter may. at
• i e cc* .r pa, such actuai cash value, or maise such reparrs or replace-

request, refund to the Insured the unearned premium, cemputed'pre

—c-- , •• me Underwriter and the 'nsured cannot agree upon sucn casn

rafa, it this bond oe terminated or cance eo or reduced by notice f-om,

•a „e -• -.jcn cost of repass or replacements, such cash vaiue or sucn

or at the instance of, the Lnderwr.ter. c- if terminated or canceled as

ccs' ;ha ' be dete"—inea by arbitration

provided in sub-section c or 'd' ot this paragraph The Underwriter

shall refund to the Insured thC unearned premium computed at snet
rates if this bond be terminated or cancired or reduced by notice from

SALVAGE
See-

-n 6

If the Insured shail sustain any loss covered bv this bond

or at the instance of. me ms.jre--1

-cceds fho amount or coverage provided by mis bong C'us t-e

If the Insured be a Federal Savings and Loan Association or a state
chartered association insured bv the Federal Savings and Loan Insur
ance Corporation, no termmar.cn c cancel'at.en of "this bond m its

; e A—runt " any, applicable to such loss, fhe Insured sna'i be
as

': a: mcc-enes made after payment by the Underw-iter of loss
"- m ; oond except recoveries on account o; loss of secu'ities
o"1- ,n the second paragraph ot Section 5 or -eccvenes 'rem

se'

; U ' e * V '•

and

a-

co-e- e

t^emr
w •m

n

paces

entirety, whether bv the Insured or the underwriter, snail take effect

prior to the expiration of ten days from the receipt by the Federal
Home Loan Bank of which me Insured is a member or written nctice
of such termination cr eancenaron Un ess an earlier date cf termination
or cancellation is approved by sa'd "ederal Home Loan Bank

e ms^raoce, remsu-ance. security and indemn -y Mxen bv or
~c-p- - ot "••; e-ce'wntcr. by whomsoever n-1cie !ess the actual

=i-c;. ^~ -,uz-, -ccovenes. until reimbursed for such excess loss
•c~amder or .• f -here be no such excess loss, any sucn rema i oe appi.ed first in reimbursement of the U.nde'wnter and
c .n -e mpur^emenf or ,hc Insured for rha' part c' such less
-i:n ^cductmle A-ount The Insured shall execute ail necessary
b secure to the Underwriter the rignts herein provided *0LIMiT Cr

n /

This bond shall be deemed mm-maied o- cance ed as to any Employee
a1 as soon as rhe Injured s^al 'earn e< any drsnoncsf or fraudu.e"t

act on the part ot such EmCiCVec without prejud.ee to the loss of any
Property then in trans." t tne custody c< sucn Emp.ovc or 'br f,fmen
davs a-ter the receipt by me m^-cj rjf a wr,rren notice tmm the Underwnter cf its desire to ter-.narc -o-.cc m,s pond as to such Employee
RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION OR CANCELLATION
Sect on 12 At any time prior 'o the termination or cancellation
of this bond as an entirety, whether bv fhe Insured cr the Under

LIABILITY

Payment of loss under this bond sha I --ot reduce fhe

c- toe U.n.oc'wnrer under this bond for omer losses whenever
sustain.

i

w -.*e-

-ice- *ms bono on account of

_

PROVIDED, however, that the total

lability ot the Lnder-

writer, the Insured may give to the Underwriter notice that it desires

"•• caused bv any one act of burglary, robbery or hold-up c'e~pf thereat, in which no Employee is ccnccned c m--liifed

under this bond an additional period c* twelve months w.thin when
to discover loss sustained by tne Insured pnor to the effective dare cf
such termination or cancellahcn and shall pay an addit.onal premium
therefor If this bond is terminated or canceled as an entirety by

or

•-. -,m respect to any one unintentional cr negligcnr ac' cr
•" :sicn en me part of any person (whether one o' me E—p levees
"C 'esurnng in damage to or destruction cr mi5p accent cf

reason of the taking over of me Insured by a receiver or other liqui
dator or bv State cr Federal officials, such receiver or other liquidator
or State or Federal officials snail have the rights of the Insured ana
be sub.ect to the same limitations as set forth ,n this paragraph pro

:berty. or

ss -rner than those specified in (al and 'b' preceding caused
a

ac's or emissions by any person 'whether one of th.- Em-

"•'"•CS

cr n-r

or 3l' acts or omissions in which Such person is

vided mat such rights are exe'esed bv notice to the Underwriter witmn

thirty days after sucn Insured is taken over by such receiver or other
liquidator or State or Federal ctf.c als and provided, further that such
Insured has not previously e.emised such r,ghts Lpcn receipt cf sucn
notice 'rom the Insured or from such receiver or ether liquidator cr

ss ;•"?• 'i-jn -nose soecibed m 'a;, (bi and (c p-cccdmg rcsu fd

'-em anv one casus.tv cr event

: to 'ne L--if of L.abi.itv stated m Item 3 of me Dec 'arjti-.i?
"-•no z- amen-;.—ent thereof or to rhe amount et the ape. cab e
c j . e •a o-

c- ti-.s oond r such amount pe smaller, irrespective of tne fetal

an- "-.„--

SON.ACCUMULATION OF LIABILITY
<eoai

^less ot the number of years this bond shal. con'mue

ibe- cf premiums which shail be cavable or paid, the
1 a b 111 f y

"~e

Und erwiter

soec • e;

under this bond with 'espcer to any .oss

State or Federal oft.ciais. me U-de-wnter s-a'l g.ve ,ts wntten censer-

thereto provided, however mat- Such additional penod of t.me shail
terminate forthwith on the effective date of any other insurance
(.-) obtained by the Insured or ,ts successors m business, other than
such receiver or other hguidato- or State or Federal officials,
replacing m wholr- or m part the msurance af'orded bv this bend,
whether or not sucn othc- insurance provides coverage tor loss
sustained prior to its effective date, cr
(bi obtained by such receiver. , guidator or State or Federal officials

••v :DcD clause of Section 7 of this bond sna.l not be
TS from year to vear or from period to period

ci.~. i:

L I V.: T
-ct.e- 9

vv

replacing m whoie or ,n part the insurance afforded by this
bend but onlv d such other insurance provides coverage to

OF L'ABILITY UNDER TH^S BONO
AND PRIOR

This bond shall be deeded terminated or canceled as an

entirety—iaJ thirty days after me receipt by the Insured of a written
notice from the Underwriter of its des.re to terminate or cancel this

INSURANCE

seme extent tor loss susta.ned prior to its eftectivo date, and
the event that such additior
rjd of time

esoect to anv ioss set forth ,n subsection -c< c< the

-ectien 7 of thiS bond which is recoveraole or

he'em provided, the Underwriter snail refund any unearned premium

v}n w,j-nes5 whereof, the Underwriter has caU;,ed th is

bond to be executed on th/? Declarations paoe

* *

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22
in favor of

, No. 19 p 3041 BCA

Home Savings & Loan

It is agreed that.
1

The attached bond is amended

(a) by deleting the second paragraph of subsection (a) of Section 1;
(b) by deleting the exclusion from Section 2 which reads as follows:

"any person, who is a partner, officer or employee of any Processor covered under this bond,
from and after the time that the insured or any partner or officer thereof not in collusion

with such person shall have knowledge or information that such person has committed any

fraudulent or dishonest act in the service of the Insured or otherwise, whether such act be
committed before or after the time this bond is effective";

(c) by deleting Section 3.

2

This rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1982

as specified tn fhe attached bond

Accepted' Signature Waived

DELETE ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING COVERAGE

FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONOS, STANDARD FORMS NOS

14 22 AND

?4
DISCOVERY" OR "LOSS SUSTAINED' FORMS AND STANDARD FORM
NO lb, TO DELETE ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING COVERAGE
RFVISED TO JUNE. 1974.

SR S87(.b

Printed in U.S.A

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22
in favor of

, No.

19 F 3041 BCA

Home Savings & Loan

It is agreed that:

Dollars ($5,000.00

LiaebH^
^
c^

Art°hUnn' ^^ thCn f°; SuUCh eXC6SS °n,y' but 'n no ev^ for ™* than the Limit of

- —d— —of or the amount of

The Insured shall in the time and in the manner prescribed in the attached bond give the Under

2
writer not

writer is llhlP th^ °SS ° 1 6kmducovered bV the terms of the attached bond, whether o^not the Unde -

Cp^^

'«*«' °< ^ U"d-writer shal, f„e with ,t abnef statement^

standard S ^ t t S ^

Accepted;

Signature Waived

EXCESS OR AGGREGATE DEDUCTIBLE — DISCOVERY fORM

f-,0R .'^Jt'™ 3|-ANKET BONDS. STANDARD FORMS NOS S M 22 AND
i v'-Y IZZX Ek7t"„„0?MS WHEN '"UED AS EXCESS OVER an LNDER•\ a ??L[^T 0R T0 PROVIDE A DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT UNDER ALL

AN AGGREGATE BANTS W'™ ™E FOftGERY UEDUCT;BlE APpLY NG ON

REV'SED TO JANLARY
SR S684c

1975

Pr,n(ecj in U S A

J™ 21' ^

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that;

term,nated'ort^n?JuHhe
*0nd
*he contrary
the attached
bond shall
deemed
errn.nated or canceled as attachfd
an entirety
sixtyto days
after thenotwithstanding,
receipt by the Insured
of a wntten
not.rebefrom
the
Underwriter of .ts desire to terminate or cancel such bond

2.

This nder shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1932

CANCELATION RIDER

"nO*THL^s^N^ l£;WW*5WWoS?X?r £&

"°rtetV b°; xr^zN^tN ™e bond is cancePeVaYIn0^

NOTE NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDARD FORM NO 10
REVISFD TO APRIL

iR "b923t>

1974

Printed in U S A

Tab 4

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bo~d Standard Form

in favor of

22

Jo 19 F

3041 BCA

Home Savings & Loan

It is aareec that:

1.

The Underwriter shall no: oe i so!

of Prccerty away frcm an oftice o; me Ins

Yer Ye attached bond or account of loss f

:h the surrender

: as a resuit of a threat.

'a) to go bodily harm to any oe-son exceot ;oss of Property m fa-s t m t-e custody cr any perseacting as messenger orovcea mat .•.•ne-. sucn transit was mi:ia:eo :here .'.as r,c knowledge bv tne

Insured of any sucn mreat. or
(b) to do damage to prenrses cr orcoerty,
exceot when covered under Insuring Agreement;Clause (A).

a

2. Th's nder shall become effective as cf 12 01 a m. on June 21.

19S2

•s scecified :n the attachea bond.

Accected:

Signature Waived

EXTORTION EXCLUSION RIDER

Y" '--E '•'•"•T1-

A'''<' ^LANKFT tiOND FORM '.OT ."TjTi'«jr

t.ln ;':l'_; c\

m excjee ^oss i-rojch si.h = =--'.d —

AA'iv -a-.,. AN OFFICE OF THE A'SJ^tD

i = ;:pehtt

" =: SEE! '0 3E"Ev-3EP. 1980
SR 5935C

F-.-iteC in U S A.

T*?^--

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond. Standard Form No. 2Z No. 19 f "5041 BCA
in favor of

Home Savings & Loan

It is agreed that

1.

The attached bond is amended by deleting subsection (i) of Section 2 and by substituting in lieu

thereof the following;

"(i) loss resulting from:
the use of credit, debit, charge, access, convenience, identification or other cards
(a)

in obtaining credit; or

(b)

in gaining access to automated mechanical devices which, on behalf of the Insured, dis
burse money, accept deposits, cash checks, drafts or similar written instruments or make
credit card loans; or

(c)

in gaining access to Point of Sale Terminals, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals,
or similar electronic terminals of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems,

whether such cards were issued, or purport ';o have been issued, by the Insured or by anyone other than the
Insured, except when such loss is covered by Insuring Agreement (A)".
2.

This rider shall become effective as of 12:01 a.m. on

as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted:

Signature Waived

CREDIT, DEBIT, CHARGE, ACCESS, CONVENIENCE,
IDENTIFICATION OR OTHER CARD EXCLUSION

FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS, STANDARD FORMS NOS 5 AND 22.
•DISCOVERY" OR "LOSS SUSTAINED" FORM TO EXCLUDE LOSS RESULT
ING

FROM THE USE OF CREDIT

DEBIT. CHARGE

ACCESS. CONVENIENCE

IDENTIFICATION OR OTHER CARDS IN OBTAINING CRED'T OR IN GAINING
ACCESS TO
NALS

AUTOMATED MECHANICAL

OF ELECTRONIC

Printod in

OR

FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS

REVISED TO APRIL, 1977.
SR 5972a

DEVICES

U.S.A.

ELECTRONIC

TERMI

June 21, 1982

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanker Bond, Standard Form No 22, No 19 F 3041 BCA

in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that

1

Subsection (I) of Section 2 of the attached bond is deleted

2 The Underwater shall not be liable under rhe attached bond on account of loss involving automated

mecnamca devices which, on behalf of the Insured, disburse money, accept deposits, cash checks, drafts or

Similar written instruments or make credit card loans unless

(a) such automated mechanical devices are situated withm an office of the Insured which is

permanently staffed bv an Employee whose duties are those usually assigned to an association
teller whe-ner or not public access to such devices is from outside tneconfines of such office, or

fb) such automated mecnamcal devices are not situated withm an office covered under (a) above

but are situated on premises at a location listed in the Schedule in paragraph numbered 3 beiow!

but in no event shall the Underwriter be liable under the attached bond for loss (including loss of Property)
d) as a result of damage to such automated mechanical devices situated within any office
referred to m (a) above resulting from vandalism or mancious mischief perpetrated from

outside such office, or

(ii) as a result of damage to such automated mechanical devices situated on any premises
referred to in (o! above resulting from vandalism or malicious mischief, or

(in! as a result of damage to the interior of that portion of a building on any premises referred
to m fb) above to wh,ch the public has access resulting from vandalism or malicious mis

chief,

cr

(iv) as a result o* mechanical breakdown or failure of such automated mechanical devices to
function properlv. or

Iv) through r-usolacement or mysterious unexpia.nable disaooearance while such Property is
(or is supposed to be.1 located withm anv sucn automated mechanical devices, or

(vi) to any customer of the Insured or to anv representative of such customer while such person
is on anv premises referred to in lb) aoove. or

(vn) as a result of the use of credit, charge, access convenience, identification or other cards

m gam.ing access to such automated mecnamcal devices wnerner sucn cares were issued or

purport tc have been issued, by the Insured or bv anyone other than the Insured,
except when such loss is covered under Insuring Agreement (A)
3

Schedule of Device LocationsLimit qf ^.AS i jv
DEviCE
LOCAT.O'

* T

JEDUC'BLE AMOUNT

E' C H

AT EACH

DEVICE lCCaT'CN

Nil

DEVICE LOCATION

Nil

Nil

4 The liability c< the Underwriter under the Schedule ser forth ,n oa'aa-aoh numoered 3 ,s limited
to tne sum set forth cppcs.te each dev.ee location, after the application of rhe deductible amount ,t any .f

being understood however 'hat such liability shail be apart of and no. ,n add,.,on to the Limit of Liability

stated ,n item 3 of tr,e Declarat.ons of the attached bond
5

This rider shall become effecti •e as of noon on

as specified m the attached bond

Accepted

Signature Waived

AUTOMATIC T[IL(« MACHlMI

tXCLUJIOM L1M1TIO Sn rilKilli COVie*S[ ICMIOULf Ot

CO.[»lD LOCATION! OF U-iUINOICI OIV1CIS

'S" V.1£ •!""" SAVINGS AND LO*N BLANKET ST-D SFAMDABO E.-BM
E«CLLi:;

,7 , :V5°" . Y „„VSS ---I"A.'.iC

CO/fBEO LOCAT.CNS 6r ,N,--|.
ACCEfT ng ^rsc^iTS
ADOPTED

AND A SCHmULE 01

It. '.1% —

-•

CiJNNECT'ON

,'i'D 'OB DI'.BUHSING MONEY
3BACS CB OTntfl ',i«lLAB
UNC CSEOIT CABD LOASlS

Caw ;r, C"El«5
r,

WBirrEN in^-^mEn-s OB

CQB« TO PBOVIDF. AN

!**Cr

June 21.

1952

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and torm part ol Blanket Bond, Standard Form No 22 . No 19 F 30^1 BCA

in favor of

Hotie Savings & Loan

It is agreed thai:
1. The attached bond is amended bv deleting the General Agreemeni captoned ADDITIONAL OFF'CE:
OR EMPLOYEES—CONSOLIDATION OR MERGER and by substituting in the p:ace thereof the loiiowmg
ADDITIONAL OFFICES OR EMPLOYEES-

CONSOLIDATION. MERGER OR PURCHASE OF ASSETS—NOTICE
If the Insured shall while this bond is in lorce. establish any additional otlice or offices

cher

than by consolidation or merger with, or purchase ot assets ot, another institution sucn ci^ce or
offices shall be automatically covered hereunder from the dates of their esiaolisnmeni. lescectiveiy, and without the requirement of notice to the Underwriter ol an increase a unrig any

premium period in the number of offices or Employees at any of the otlices covered hereunae
or the payment of additional premium tor the remainder ot such premium period
If the Insured shall, while this bond is in force, merge or consolidate with

or Purchase the

assets of, another institution, the Insured shall not have such coverage as is ancrded unoer
this boid for loss which:

(a) has occurred or will occur in offices or premises,
(b) has been caused or will be caused by an employee or employees, or
(c) has arisen or will arise out of the assets
acquired by the Insured as a result of such merger, consolidation or purchase ol assets; unless
the Insured shall.

n) cause to be delivered to the Underwriter written notice ot the proposed merger ccnsclidalion or purchase of assets at least 60 days prior to tne propcsea effective cale ot the merger,

consolidation or purchase of assets,

(ii) obtain the written consent of the Underwriter lo extend the coverage provided Cy this
bone to such additional offices, Employees and other exposures and

(ni) oay to the Underwriter an additional premium computed pro rata f-om tre date ot such
consolidation, merger or purchase of assets to the end of tne CLrrem premium penoa
2.

The attached bond is further amended by inserting alter the phrase

" any olficer or employee of any predecessor of the lnsurec whose principal assets are accuired
by rhe Insured by consolidation or merger with o- purchase of assets of. such predecessor
in the definition of "Employee." the following words'

" , if coverage is extended to such persons under the terms of this bond"'
3
The attached bond is further amended by inserting a'ter the phrase "in which the Insj-ed has an
interest or" in ne definition of "Property', the following words.

" . if coverage is extended under the terms of this bond,"
4
This rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1982
as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted. Signature Waived

NOTICE OF MEHGE*. CONSOLIDATION OB PURCHASE
OF ASSETS BIOEB

FOP USF WITH Bl*N<cT EHUD il"*D»°0 IC»"S NOS •> *"-0 2>
D'S
'.OSS SuSTAisEO
FC-*M 10 Hi QUI"1: '-'.'iCE ro '»£
COVFHY
OH
UNIlPwHiIER 0' THE Nonius UFBGER CON5QL <D" lON OP PUR
CHA5E (jF ASSETS OF «WT"EP iiMiTuTICN
ADOPTED JANUARY
SP 603?

1977

PrinHd in U !• A

standard

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of BlanKet Bond, Standard Form 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of

Home Savings & Loan

It is agreed that:

1. The attached bond is hereby amended by deleting the first paragraph of insuring Agreement (A)

anc by substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"(A) Loss resulting directly from one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee, committed
anywnere and whether committed alone cr in collusion with others, including loss of Property resulting from
sucn acts of an Employee, which Property is held by the Insured for any purpose or m any capacity and
whether so held gratuitously or not and whether or not the Insured is liable therefor

Dishonest or fraudulent acts as used mthis Insuring Agreement shall mean only dishonest or fraudulent
acts committed by such Employee with the manifest intent:

(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss; and

(to) to obtain financial benefit for the Employee, or for any other person or organization intended by
the Employee to receive such benefit, other than salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions,
awards, profit sharing, pensions or other employee benefits earned in the normal course of employ
ment."

2. In addition to the existing Exclusions in the attached bond, the Underwriter snail not be liable under
any Insuring Agreement for:

(i) Potential income, including but not limited to interest and dividends, not realized by the Insured
because of a loss covered under this bond.

(ii) All damages of any type for which the Insured is legally liable except direct compensatory damaoes
arising from a loss covered under this oond.

(iii) Less resulting from payments made or withdrawals from a deooslor's account involving funds
erroneously credited to such account, unless such payments are mace to or withdrawn by such
depositor or representative of such depositor who is within the offxe of the Insured at the time of

such payment or withdrawal, cr un.!ess such loss is covered under Insuring Agreement (A).

3. This rider shall become effective as of noon on
as specified in the attached bend.

Accepted:

Signature Waived

DEFINITION OF DISHONESTY -

EXCLUSIONS

rOR JSE ATh 9LANKE7 BOND STANDARD cORM SO. 22 ' DISCOVERY"
AS„'
LOSS SUSTAISED' FORMS TO REVISE INSJRING ASREEVEST Al
ASD A2Z CE.RTA'N EXCLUSIONS.
AZCP7Z2 JULY, 1976.

SR 604:

p- red ,n U.S.A.

June 21, 1932

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:

1. The attached bond is amended by the addition of General Agreement A.2 in the General Agreements
section of the bond as follows:

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF CONTROL

A.2 Upon the Insured's obtaining knowledge of a transfer of its outstanding voting stock or voting
rights (including rights with respect to withdrawable accounts) which resu ts in a change in
control of the Insured, the Insured shall within thirty days of such knowledge give written

notice to the Underwriter setting forth,

1. the names of the transferors and transferees (or the names of the benelicial owners if the
shares or voting rights are registered in another name),

2. the total number of shares or voting rights owned by the transferors and the transferees

(or the beneficial owners), both immediately before and after the transfei, and
3. the total number of outstanding shares of voting stock or voting rights.

As used in this General Agreement, control means the power to determine the management
or policy of the Insured by virtue of voting stock or voting rights ownersmp A change in
ownership of voting stock or voting rights which results in direct or indirect ownership by a
stockholder or an affiliated group of stockholders of ten per cent (10%) or more of the
outstanding voting stock or voting rights of the Insured shall be presumed to result in a chanoe

of control for the purpose of the reguired notice.

Failure to give the required not ce shall result in termination of coverage of this bond effective

upon the date of stock transfer or voting rights transfer for any loss mwhich any transferee is

concerned or implicated.
2.

y "dnb,eree IS

This, rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21,' 1982

,.

as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted;

Signature Waived

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF CONTROL. RIDER
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BOND. STANDARD FORM NO 12

PIsmvFRV

OR LOSS SUSTAINED" TO REQUIRE NOTICE TO THE UNDERWRITER OF A
CHANGE
OF CONTROL OF THE INSURED.
un^hwhiil-h o A
ADOPTED JULY, 1976,
SR 6042

Printed In U.S.A.

c,,:nH,fH t

standard time

EFFECTIVE TIME RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Policy or Bond No.

™m«B-««„

ENDORSEMENT 203
(Edition ol January, 1977)

19 F 3041 BCA

issued to or in favor of Home Savings & Loan

The time of inception and the time of expiration, termination or cancelation of this policy or bond anrt
of any schedule, endorsement or nder attached or to be attached shall be 12:01 a m standard time
To the extent that coverage in this policy or bond replaces coverage in other policies or bonds terminal

mg at noon standard time on the inception date of this policy or bond, coverage under this policy rrbSnd

shall not become efleclive until such other coverage has terminated.
Effective as of

June 21, 1982

r^.,-^!."! AHY B0ND *ND ™E COMPREHENSIVE 3-D AND BLANKET

Ffln0M\0OOLNClTE0S/?°0,CHA':G£ ™E ''^ °F INCEPII°* °" TERM,NATO,
ADOPTED JANUARY

1977

SR 8059 [1) Prmua in USA.

y

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No.22 , No.

19 r 3041 BCA

in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:

1. The Underwriter shall not be liable under the attached bond for:

Loss resulting directly or indirectly from payments made or withdrawals from a depositor's account

involving items of deposit which are not finally paid for any reason, including but not limited to Forgery
or any other fraud, unless such payments or withdrawals are physically received by such depositor or
representative of such depositor who is within the office of the Insured at the time of such payment or
withdrawal, or except when covered under Insuring Agreement/Clause (A).

2. If this rider is attached to Standard Form No. 5, then the following language of Exclusion (e) is deleted:
". . . or loss resulting from payments made or withdrawals from any depositor's account by reason of
uncollected items of deposit having been credited by the Insured to such account, unless such payments
are made to, or withdrawn by, such depositor or representative of such depositor who is within the office

of the Insured at the time of such payment or withdrawal, or unless such loss is covered under Insuring
Agreement (A)."

3. This rider shall become effective as of 12:01 a.m. on June 21, 1982
as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted:

Signature Waived

UNCOLLECTED FUNDS EXCLUSION

FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS, STANOARD FORMS NOS 5 AND 22
"DISCOVERY" OR "LOSS SUSTAINED'' FORMS AND FORM NO 23 TO EX

CLUDE ANY LOSS RESULTING FROM THE PAYOUT OR WITHDRAWAL OF
UNCOLLECTED ITEMS OF DEPOSIT.
REVISED TO DECEMBER. 19B0.
SR 6064a

Primed In U.S.A.

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Bond No
in favor of

19 F 3041 BCA

HOME SAVINGS & LOAN, ET AL

It is agreed that:

1.

The Deductible Amount applicable under the attached bond to loss

sustained through acts or defaults committed by Employees shall not apply
to loss sustained by any Employee Welfare Benefit Plan or Employee Pension

Benefit Plan covered under such bond through acts or defaults committed by
any Employee of any such Plan.
2.

This rider is effective as of

Signed, sealed and dated

12-3-82

THE ,CTNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY

January 3, 1983

BYj

Sheila Diggins, Attorney-in-facit

SR 5817a

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Bond No.

in favor of

19 F 3041 BCA

Home Savings & Loan, et al

It is agreed that:

1. If the attached bond, in accordance with its agreements, limitations and conditions covers loss

sustained by two or more Employee Welfare or Pension Benefit Plans or sustained by any such Plan in addi

tion to loss sustained by an Insured other than such Plan, it is the obligation of the Insured or the Plan Ad-

mmistrator(s) of such Plans under Regulations published by the Secretary of Labor implementing Section 13
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 to obtain under one or more bonds or policies
issued by one or more Insurers an amount of coverage for each such Plan at least equal to that which would
be required if such Plans were bonded separately.

2. In compliance with the foregoing, payment by the Underwriter in accordance with the agreements
limitations and conditions of the attached bond shall be held by the Insured or if more than one by the

Insured first named therein for the use and benefit of any Employee Welfare or Pension Benefit plan sus
taining loss covered by the attached bond and to the extent that such payment is in excess of the amount of
coverage required by such Regulations to be carried by said Plan sustaining such loss, such excess shall be
held for the use and benefit of any other such Plan also covered under the attached bond in the event that
such other Plan discovers that it has sustained loss covered thereunder.

3. If money or other property of two or more Employee Welfare or Pension Benefit P ans covered under

the attached bond is co-mingled, recovery under the attached bond for loss of such money or other prop

erty through fraudulent or dishonest acts of Employees shall be shared by such Plans en a pro rata basis
in accordance with the amount for which each such Plan is required to carry bonding coverage in accordance
with the applicable provisions of said Regulations.

4. Nothing herein contained shall vary, alter or extend any of the agreements, limitations and condi
tions of the attached bond.
5.

This rider is effective as of noon on

Signed, sealed and dated {enter below)

12-3-82

THE /ETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY

1-5-83

By^<U^..L..C-C^-r^< C^.^lffi.

Sheila Diggins, Attorney-ityf/ct
(SEAL)

HOME SAVINGS & LOAN, ET AL
Accepted:
BY:

PAY-OVER RIDER

FOR USE WITH ALL FORMS OF STANDARD BONDS, WHEN TWO OR MORE
EMPLOYFE WELFARE OR PENSION BENEFIT PLANS ARE COVf'REO THERE
UNDER CR WHEN ANY SUCH PLAN IS COVERED THEREUNDER IN AD

DITION TO ANOTHER INSURED, TO COMPLY WITH THE REGULATIONS
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOSS
PAYMENTS.

REVISED TO JANUARY, 1963.
SR 5796a

Printed in U.S A.

(F-101 1) Ed. 1-63

J

>

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Bond No
in favor of

Home Savings & Loan

effective as of

June 21, 1982

19 F 3041 BCA

In consideration of the premium charged for the attached bond, it is hereby agreed that
1 From and after the time this Rider becomes effective the Insured under the attached bond
are

Home Savings & Loan

Home Savings & Loan Profit Sharing Plan

2. The first named Insured shall act for itself and for each and all of the Insured for all the
purposes of the attached bond.

3 Knowledge possessed or discovery made by any Insured or by any partner or officer thereof
snail for all the purposes of the attached bond constitute knowledge or discovery by all the Insured.
4 If, prior to the termination of the attached bond in its entirety, the attached bond is ter

minated as to any Insured, there shall be no liability for any loss sustained by such Insured unless
discovered before the time such termination as to such Insured becomes effective.

5. The liability of the Underwriter for loss or losses sustained by any or all of the Insured shall
not exceed the amount for which the Underwriter would be liable had all such loss or losses

been sustained by any one of the Insured. Payment by the Underwriter to the first named Insured of
loss sustained by any Insured shall fully release tne Underwriter on account of such loss.

6. If the first named Insured ceases for any reason to be covered under the attached bond
then the Insured next named shall thereafter be considered as the first named Insured for all the '
purposes of the attached bond.

7. The attached bond shall be subject to all us agreements, limitations and conditions exceot
as herein expressly modified.

of

8. This Rider shall become effective as of
December

,1982

^SKX

the beginning

Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)

Qf thg

3rd

day

THE /ETNA CASUALTY ANDSURETY COMPANY

January 5, 1983
HOME SAVINGS & LOAN
Accented
BY:

JOINT INSURED RIOER — DISCOVERY FORM

FOR USE WITH all F0RyS OF STANDARD BONDS ON A D'SCOVFPY '
I Y. r
D0 N0T C0NTA,N A JOINT INSURED PARAGRAPH
V\he ,[vER TV.O Ca MOPE ARE NAMED AS INSURED
RtViSEOTOSEPTEMBER 1954
SP 5S38 P- „;Mir ,_, s A
if 6«8 D' 4 71

Sheila Diffiins

1 ^H or rev m-Fact

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of

Home Savings & Loan

It is agreed that:

1. The attached bond is amended by inserting as part (c) in the Definitions Section, the following:
(c) "Forgery" (or "Forged") means the signing of the name of another with intent to deceive: it does

not include the signing of one's own name with or without authority, in any capacity, for any purpose.

2. The words "Forgery" and "Forged" shail be deemed to appear with an initial capiial throughout this
bond and attached riders.

3. This rider shall become effective as of 12:01 a.m. on June 21, 1982
as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted:

Signature Waived

DEFINITION OF FORGERY

FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS. STANDARD FORMS NOS. 5

14 !5

AND 22 TO PROVIDE FOR A DEFINITION OF THE WORD FORGERY
ADOPTED DECEMBER. 1960.
SR 6090

Printed In U.S.A.

20

standard time

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Bond No. 19 F 3041 B^A
in favor of

Home Savings & Loan, et al

it is agreed that:

2. This rider is effective as of noon on
Signed, sealed and dated (enter belcw)

12-3-82

THE /ETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY

1-5-83

Sheila Diggins, Attorney-in-fai^
(SEAL)

WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN RIDER

FOR USE WITH ALL FORMS OF STANDARD BONDS TO COVER niRFfTno<;

« TRUSTEES CF THE INSURED WHILE HANDLING eUNDS OH ^tSeI
PROPERTY OF THE INSURED'S WELFARE OR P^ION PLANS AND TO

P?ANS TRUSTEES' "^GERS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 0* SUcS
REVISED TO JANUARY, 1963.
SR 5137b
•.:-10'0i

Ed

Pr.nted .n U S.A.
1-63

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22 , No.

19 F 3041 BCA

in favor of Home Savings & L0an
It is agreed that:

fmm l J** Unfherwnte;kshal'n0t be liable under the ^hed bond for any loss resulting directly or indirectly

from radmg, with or without the knowledge of the Insured. ,n the name of the Insured or otherwise whether
art"
a T<en
yry mdebtedness or balance shown <° be due the Insured on any customer's'account
actual or fictitious, and notwithstanding any act or omission on the part of any Employee in connection with

any account relating to such trading, indebtedness, or balance.

In regard to Blanket Bonds Nos. 5, 22 and 24, this sub-section shall not apply to Insuring Agreement
(D)
d ccmicui iu,

or (E) if coverage is carried thereunder.

2. This rider applies to loss sustained at any time but discovered after 12:01 a m on June 21 1982
standard time as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted:

"

SignatureWaived

DELETE TRADING LOSS RIDER -

DISCOVERY FORM

FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS. STANDARD FORMS NOS 5 22 74 AND 28
•DISCOVERY- FORMS. TO DELETE TRADING LOSS COVERAGE "
REVISED TO JUNE. 1978
SR 6030a Printed in U S.A.

CAT. NO. 036625

'

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Bond No
in favor of

HOME SAVINGS & LOAN

effective as of

JUNE 21, 1983

19 F 3041 BCA

In consideration of the premium charged for the attached bond, it is agreed that:
1.

The attached bond is hereby amended by canceling and terminating a certain rider (hereinafter called Canceled

Riderl dated

June 21, 1982

, attached to the said bond and more fully described as follows-

SR-5876b - Delete Electronic Data Processing Coverage

so that from and after the effective date hereof, the anached bond shall continue in force without the amendment
contained in the said Canceled Rider,

2. The amendment of the anached bond effected hereby shall apply to loss or losses sustained at any time but
discovered on and after the effective date hereof.

3

The anached bond shall be subject to all its agreements, limitations and conditions except as herein expresslv

modified

4. This rider shall become effective as of

noon

u """"

Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)
4/6/84

HOME

Accepted:

SAVINGS & LOAN

of the ?lst day of r,,nP

. 1984

THE £TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY

Thomas S. Carpenter, IV/

A:TDrn3v.,rvFacl

Signature Waived

RIDER CANCELING AN EXISnNG RIDER — DISCOVERY FORM
FOR USE WITH ALL FORMS OF STANDARD 80NDS ON A ' DISCOVERY
FORM TO CANCEL OP TERMINATE AN EXISTING ROER
'
REVISED TO SEPTEMBER 1954.
SR 5531

Printed in U S A

[F-886-A) 3-73

CAT 4S4WJ

UDU

To be attached to and form part of BoncrNo.

in favor of

19 F 3041 BCA

HOME SAVINGS & LOAN

It is agreed that:

1 At the request of the Insured, the Underwriter w^^^f™, th* ll$t of lniur«d under t,-»e attached
bond the following:

HOME SAVINGS SERVICE CORPORATION

2.

This rider is effective as of noon on

Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)

June 21, 1983

THE £TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY

4/6/84

L

22222*1 V

1.rU-irtimaZ^ J&

Thomas S. Carpenter^ IV

Accepted:

ai*™h**W

Signature Waived
ADDING OR MDUCTtMQ INIUIIM R1DC1

FOB USE WITH ALL FORMS OF BONOS CONTAINING A JOINT INSURED
CLAUSE OR RIDER, TO ADO Oft OtDUCT JOINT INSUR£D$.
REVISED TO *AAV, 1957.
SR 5109a

.(F-7S4-C) 7-6*

CAT

44569A

PRINTED IN UiA.

'• n

RIDER

To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22
in favor of

, No.

19 f 3041 BCA

Home Savings & Loan

It is agreed that:

1. The attached bond is hereby amended by deleting Section 12, "Rights After Termination or Cancela

tion' and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION OR CANCELATION

Section 12, At any time prior to the terminat'on or cancelation of this bond as an entirety, whether by

tne Insured or the Underwriter, the Insured may give to the Underwriter notice that it desires under this bond

an adaitional period of 12 months within which to discover loss sustained by the Insured prior to the effective
date of such termination or cancelation and shall pay an aaditional premium therefor.
Upon receipt of such notice from the Insured, the Underwriter snail give its written consent thereto'
provided, however, that such additional period of time shall terminate immediately

(a) on the effective date of any other insurance obtained by the Insured, its successor ti business or any

other party, replacing in whole or in part the insurance afforded by this oond, whether or not such
other insurance provides coverage for loss sustained prior to its effective date, or

(b) upon takeover of the Insured's business by any State or Federal official or agency, or by any receiver
or liquidator, acting or appointed for this purpose

without the necessity of the Underwriter giving notice of such termination. In tne event that such additional
period of time is terminated, as provided above, the Underwriter shall refund any unearned premium.

The right to purchase such additional period for the discovery of loss may not be exercised by any

State or Federal official or agency, or by any receiver or liquidator, acting or'aopomtec to takeover the
Insured's business for the operation or for the liquidation thereof or for any other curpose. '

2. The attached bond is further amended by inserting the following as tne <>.ai paragraph of Section 4:
"Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of facts whicn would cause a reasonaole

person to assume that a loss covered cy the bond has been or will be mcurreo even though the exact
amount or details of loss may not be then known. Notice to the insureo of an actuai or potential cla;m
by a third party which alleges that the Insured is liable under circumstances, which. :f true, would create
a loss under this bond constitutes such discovery,"
3. This rider shall become effective as of 12 01 a.m. on
as specified in the attached bond.

Accepted:

Signature Waived

DISCOVERY RIDER-RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION OR CANCELATION

FOR JSE WIT" BLANKET BONDS STANDARD FORMS NCS 5 14 20 AND 22
•DISCOVERY" FORMS TO REVISE SECTIONS 12 AND 4.
ADOPTED DECEMBER, 1980
SR 6091

Printed in U.S.A.

June 21, 1952

standard t:me

This policy is not valid unless countersigned by our authorized representative.
Signed for the Company by:

Secretary

Prtitdint I

